











Title of Document: RESILIENCE OF TRANSPORTATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS: 
QUANTIFICATION AND OPTIMIZATION    
  
 Reza Faturechi, Doctor of Philosophy, 2013 
  
Directed By: Professor, Elise Miller-Hooks, Department of 




Transportation systems are critical lifelines for society, but are at risk from natural or 
human-caused hazards. To prevent significant loss from disaster events caused by such 
hazards, the transportation system must be resilient, and thus able to cope with disaster 
impact. It is impractical to reinforce or harden these systems to all types of events. 
However, options that support quick recovery of these systems and increase the 
system’s resilience to such events may be helpful. 
To address these challenges, this dissertation provides a general mathematical 
framework to protect transportation infrastructure systems in the presence of uncertain 
events with the potential to reduce system capacity/performance. A single, general 
decision-support optimization model is formulated as a multi-stage stochastic program. 
The program seeks an optimal sequence of decisions over time based upon the 
realization of random events in each time stage. This dissertation addresses three 
problems to demonstrate the application of the proposed mathematical model in 
  
different transportation environments with emphasis on system-level resilience: 
Airport Resilience Problem (ARP), Building Evacuation Design Problem (BEDP), and 
Travel Time Resilience in Roadways (TTR). These problems aim to measure system 
performance given the system’s topological and operational characteristics and support 
operational decision-making, mitigation and preparedness planning, and post-event 
immediate response. Mathematical optimization techniques including, bi-level 
programming, nonlinear programming, stochastic programming and robust 
optimization, are employed in the formulation of each problem. Exact (or approximate) 
solution methodologies based on concepts of primal and dual decomposition (integer 
L-shaped decomposition, Generalized Benders decomposition, and progressive 
hedging), disjunctive optimization, scenario simulation, and piecewise linearization 
methods are presented. Numerical experiments were conducted on network 
representations of a United States rail-based intermodal container network, the 
LaGuardia Airport taxiway and runway pavement network, a single-story office 
building, and a small roadway network.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Motivation and research objectives 
Transportation systems provide a network of options to support the mobility of people 
and goods. They connect businesses and support supply chains and services. Moreover, 
they offer accessibility to vital resources for daily activities and in emergency 
circumstances. In this latter case, these systems play a key role in survivor evacuation, 
rescue operations, and community reconstruction and recovery. These systems are 
exposed to risk from a multiplicity of hazards, ranging from natural events and 
technological failures to intentional malicious acts. Disruptions in the operation of 
these systems can have cascading impacts within the system and on other 
interconnected critical lifelines. In addition to the effects of direct damage to the 
physical transportation infrastructure, indirect damage to, for example, the economy 
and social systems may result. 
The frequency of disasters, whether natural or human-made, has increased to 
an unprecedented level in the last decade (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011). Likewise, the 
impacts of such events on transportation infrastructure systems have intensified due to 
increased system complexity and interdependency, and urbanization in coastal and 
other disaster-prone areas. Hurricane Sandy (2012), Hurricane Irene (2011), the 
Japanese Tsunami (2011) and subsequent nuclear meltdown, the Sichuan Earthquake 
in China (2008), the Christchurch earthquake (2011) in New Zealand, the Minneapolis 
I-35W bridge collapse (2007), and Hurricane Katrina (2005) are only a few examples 





systems with embedded infrastructure are to such events. Damage caused by Hurricane 
Sandy to the New York City transportation system amounted to $7.5 billion (New York 
News 2012). Hurricane Irene affected more than 500 miles of highways, 2000 miles of 
roadways, 200 miles of railways, and 300 bridges in Vermont (Lunderville 2011). The 
collapse of the I-35W Bridge over the Mississippi River imposed over $0.4 million in 
costs to daily trips alone due to traffic rerouting (Zhu et al. 2011). 
Transportation infrastructure systems are also a common target of terrorist 
attacks, such as 9/11 attacks and the bombings in London (2005), Madrid (2004), and 
Mumbai (2006). In addition to resulting physical damage, these events have long-term 
socio-economic and psychological impacts. Furthermore, they affect traveler decisions. 
Gordon et al. (2007) concluded a 6% reduction in passenger trips and noted a big shift 
from public transit services to private automobiles during a two-year period following 
the 9/11 attacks. 
While many societies have come to rely on transportation systems, these 
systems are operating at or near design capacity. They are aging and are faced with 
greater risk of attack, whether natural, accidental or human-induced. Because these 
systems have become quite complex, interdependent and interconnected, the possibility 
that a disruptive event to any one system will cascade into an event involving multiple 
systems is significant and can result in widespread failure or difficult recovery. 
Sustained loss of one or more of these lifelines can have catastrophic impact on the 
well-being of a society. Consequently, governments and agencies that own or operate 
these systems are reviewing their investment policies with goals of expanding system 





given possible disruptions or disaster events (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Homeland Security, 2009). In addition, as it is impractical to reinforce or harden these 
systems to all types of events, efficient options to support quick recovery of these 
systems from such events are being considered. 
To evaluate investment options that can be taken to reduce risk of failure and 
increase a system's ability to rebound from an attack, one must be able to quantify the 
innate ability of the system to cope with attack and its ability to adapt through the use 
of available resources. Numerous performance measures have been proposed in the 
literature for such quantification. These measures include various specifications of 
system reliability, vulnerability, robustness and flexibility, which describe the behavior 
of systems and their performance variations under different situations. They aim to 
quantify how well a system is expected to perform given the possibility of potential 
future events that affect system capacity.  
Various definitions of such performance measures have been introduced in the 
literature. These definitions, however, are sometimes intertwined and often 
inconsistent. Moreover, the majority are qualitative in nature. As a result, it is often 
unclear to the agencies responsible for maintaining, expanding and protecting critical 
societal lifelines which measure or set of measures should be considered in evaluating 
these systems or potential investment options.This dissertation provides a 
comprehensive survey of the literature on performance measurement for transportation 
infrastructure systems under possible disaster occurrence. It further develops a 
mathematical framework for conceptualizing, categorizing, and quantifying such 





based on the introduced framework for quantifying these measures congruously and 
maximizing their values. This problem is formulated generally as a two-stage stochastic 
programming model to capture the uncertain nature of disasters and their consequences. 
The model seeks the optimum allocatation of resources to pre-event mitigation and 
preparedness and post-event response actions given the realization of a single disaster 
scenario od many possible scneairos. 
This general framework is customized for application to a variety of 
transportation systems, incliding freight networks, airport taxiway and runway 
pavement networks, roadway networks, and building environments. The characteristics 
of each system and their operations are captured. Application on a set of real world 
based case studies offer insights into the various performance measures, their 
relationships, and the relative importance of preparedness and response actions.  
In the next section, specific problem classes addressed in this dissertation are 
discussed in detail. The main contributions of this dissertation are synopsized in Section 
1.3. Formal definitions, as well as detailed description of mathematical approaches, 
models, and solution methodologies, are given in Chapters 3 through 6. 
1.2. Specific problems addressed 
1.2.1. A mathematical framework for quantifying and optimizing protective actions 
for civil infrastructure systems 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, a comprehensive framework is addressed for 
conceptualizing, categorizing, and quantifying system performance measures in the 





reduce system performance. The framework clarifies the interrelationships between 
notions of coping capacity, preparedness, robustness, flexibility, recovery capacity and 
resilience, previously espoused as independent measures, and provides a single 
mathematical decision problem for quantifying these measures congruously and 
maximizing their values.  
Required solution methodologies are described for use in evaluating system 
performance in terms of these measures. Resulting solutions can be exploited to determine 
an optimal allocation of limited resources to preparedness and response options. A 
numerical transportation-related example is provided to illustrate its application. Results 
of this application offer insights into these various performance measures, their 
relationships, and the relative importance of preparedness and response actions. More 
details on this framework, the mathematical structure of the decision problem and solution 
methodologies are given in Chapter 3. 
1.2.2. Resilience of airport runway and taxiway pavement networks  
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, the problem of assessing and maximizing the resilience 
of an airport’s runway and taxiway pavement network under multiple potential 
damage-meteorological scenarios is addressed. The problem is formulated as a 
stochastic integer program with recourse and an exact solution methodology based on 
integer L-shaped decomposition is proposed for its solution. The formulation seeks an 
optimal allocation of limited resources to response capabilities and preparedness 
actions that facilitate them. The overall aim is to quickly restore post-event take-off 
and landing capacities to pre-event operational levels taking into account operational, 





impacts, reductions in capacity due to joint take-off and landing maneuvers on common 
runways or bidirectional flows on taxiways, potential for outsourcing repair work, and 
multi-team response, is incorporated.  
The capabilities and applicability of the solution approach is demonstrated on 
an illustrative case study. Potential benefits to airport operators are described. These 
include for example, the tool’s utility in suggesting equipment to have at the ready, 
identifying the critical pavement system components, and information to aid in 
prioritizing future facility developments. 
1.2.3. Stochastic Models for Emergency Shelter and Exit Design in Buildings under 
System Optimum and User Equilibrium Conditions 
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, a bi-level, two-stage, binary stochastic program with 
equilibrium constraints and three variants, are presented that support the planning and 
design of shelters and exits along with hallway fortification strategies and associated 
evacuation paths in buildings. At the upper-level of this model, decisions are made 
regarding exit design, hallway fortification and the location of shelters, along with their 
size and level of protection, with the objective of minimizing the expected maximum 
endured risk over all scenarios. At the lower-level, the choice of evacuation routes by 
the users, following the upper-level design decisions, is modeled as a user equilibrium 
problem, where each individual seeks to minimize his/her risk exposure. Variants of 
the model involve both stochastic programming and robust optimization concepts 
under both user equilibrium and system optimal conditions. A multi-hazard approach 
is utilized in which the performance of a plan is tested given various possible future 





constraints transformation method that converts the single-level equivalent math 
program with complementarity constraints to a mixed integer program are employed to 
eliminate nonlinearities in the model. Integer L-shaped decomposition is adopted for 
solution of all four variants. These approaches are compared on a case study involving 
a single-story building. 
1.2.4. Travel time resilience of roadway networks in the presence of non-recurring 
disruptions 
In Chapter 6 of this dissertation, a bi-level, three-stage stochastic mathematical 
program with equilibrium constraints (SMPEC) is proposed for quantifying and 
optimizing travel time resilience in roadway networks under nonrecurring natural or 
human-induced disaster events. At the upper-level, a sequence of optimal decisions is 
taken over pre-event mitigation and preparedness and post-event response stages of the 
disaster management life cycle. Appropriate preparedness and response actions that 
aim to preserve or restore capacity to damaged roadways are considered. Assuming 
semi-adaptive user behavior exists shortly after the disaster and after the 
implementation of immediate response actions, the lower-level problem is formulated 
as a Partial User Equilibrium, where only affected users are likely to rethink their 
routing decisions. An exact Progressive Hedging algorithm is presented for solution of 
a single-level equivalent, linear approximation of the SMPEC. A recently proposed 
technique from the literature that uses Schur’s decomposition with SOS1 variables in 
creating a linear equivalent to complementarity constraints is employed. Similarly, 





link travel time functions. The formulation and solution methodology are demonstrated 
on an illustrative example. 
1.3. Contributions 
The main contributions of this dissertation are enumerated next.  
1) Completion of an extensive literature review that archives, syntheses, and 
categorizes approximately 200 journal articles, conference proceedings and 
technical reports based on a host of criteria, including qualitative/quantitative 
concepts, measure employed/defined, assessment or management strategy used, 
and proposed mathematical methodology. This provides a framework for 
considering this body of literature, as well as similarities and differences in their 
coverage, approach and utility. 
2) Development of a conceptual and mathematical framework for protection of 
infrastructure systems generically devised to permit consideration of a variety 
of applications, including, for example, applications arising in transportation, 
power grid, telecommunication, supply chain, and water supply networks. 
3) Application of variants of stochastic programming approaches, including two- 
and three-stage stochastic programs, as well as the concepts of robust 
optimization. These models can be used to measure and optimize performance 
in different transportation environments in the presence of uncertain events in 
which a sequence of optimal decisions are taken over time based upon the 
evolution of uncertainty over time stages. 
4) Application and adaptation of cutting edge OR techniques, especially 





complementarity constraints to address inherent nonlinearities and 
nonconvexities. 
5) Presentation of exact solution methodologies to address the specific 
mathematical properties of the considered problem classes based on concepts 
of primal and dual decomposition methods, including integer L-shaped 
decomposition, and progressive hedging.  
6) Design and completion of extensive numerical experiments to illustrate the 
concepts and application of proposed stochastic programs and solution methods 










Chapter 2: Disaster Research in Transportation Infrastructure 
Systems: A Comprehensive Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Transportation infrastructure systems provide a network of options to support the 
mobility of people and goods. They connect businesses and support supply chains and 
services. Moreover, they offer accessibility to vital resources for daily activities and in 
emergency circumstances. In this latter case, these systems play a key role in survivor 
evacuation, rescue operations, and community reconstruction and recovery. These 
systems are exposed to risk from a multiplicity of hazards, ranging from natural events 
and technological failures to intentional malicious acts. Disruptions in the operation of 
these systems can have cascading impacts within the system and on other 
interconnected critical lifelines. In addition to the effects of direct damage to the 
physical transportation infrastructure, indirect damage to, for example, the economy 
and social systems may result.  
The frequency of disasters, whether natural or human-made, has increased to 
an unprecedented level in the last decade (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011). Likewise, the 
impacts of such events on transportation systems have intensified due to increased 
system complexity and interdependency, and urbanization in coastal and other disaster-
prone areas. Hurricane Sandy (2012), Hurricane Irene (2011), the Japanese Tsunami 
(2011) and subsequent nuclear meltdown, the Sichuan Earthquake in China (2008), the 
Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand (2011), the Minneapolis I-35W bridge 





devastating events. Their impact illustrates how susceptible transportation systems, and 
their infrastructure, are in such circumstances. Damage caused by Hurricane Sandy to 
the New York City transportation system amounted to $7.5 billion (New York News 
2012). Hurricane Irene affected more than 500 miles of highways, 2000 miles of 
roadways, 200 miles of railways, and 300 bridges in Vermont (Lunderville 2011). The 
collapse of the I-35W Bridge over the Mississippi River imposed over $0.4 million in 
costs to daily passenger trips alone due to traffic rerouting (Zhu et al. 2011).  
Transportation infrastructure systems are also a common target of terrorist 
attacks, such as 9/11 attacks and the bombings in London (2005), Madrid (2004), and 
Mumbai (2006). In addition to resulting physical damage, these events have long-term 
socio-economic and psychological impacts. Furthermore, they affect traveler decisions. 
Gordon et al. (2007) identified a 6% reduction in passenger trips and a large shift from 
public transit services to private automobiles during a two-year period following the 
9/11 attacks.  
An increasing awareness of these issues has led to a growing body of literature 
on the subject of transportation systems performance in disaster. A marked and 
continued growth in journal articles, both qualitative and quantitative, on this topic 
followed the 1995 Kobe earthquake (also noted by Chang and Nojima 2001). The 
articles range in content from conceptual frameworks and performance metrics to 
strategies for improving preparedness and reducing the duration of time required for 
recovery. This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of that portion of 
this literature which emphasizes performance evaluation in the presence of physical 





The contributions of this work include: (1) an archive and synthesis of recent 
literature on the studied topic; (2) analysis and organization of approximately 200 
journal articles, conference proceedings and technical reports based on a host of 
criteria, including qualitative/quantitative concepts, measure employed/defined, 
assessment or management strategy used, and proposed mathematical methodology; 
and (3) a framework for considering this body of literature, similarities and differences 
in their coverage, approach and utility. An additional benefit of this review is that it 
provides newcomers to the field with the background needed to contribute to the area, 
and enables the identification of gaps in the literature for which additional study is 
warranted. 
2.2. Study Scope 
An enormous number of works address the performance of transportation systems, and 
hundreds of these works consider aspects associated with disaster events involving 
these systems. This subject is rather general. The scope of this chapter, thus, was 
carefully chosen to provide insights into that portion of the literature pertaining to 
transportation system performance given damage to the physical infrastructure. 
Articles that provide strategies for preparing for or responding to disaster events 
(e.g. evacuation planning, resource allocation), address humanitarian relief logistics, or 
focus on the effects of disaster on human well-being or the environment (e.g. air quality 
or ecology) are not included in this review.  Additionally, studies on the material 
properties of transportation system components from a structural engineering 





are excluded. While several pioneering works from the late 1990s are included, this 
review primarily includes works published since 2000. 
A variety of terms have been used to label events precipitating disaster. These 
include: hazard, threat, perturbation, and disruption event. They are referred to herein 
as “hazards” and are considered herein to fall within one of three categories: (1) natural 
climatic/geological events (e.g. earthquake, hurricane, flood, and tsunami); (2) 
operational and technological failures due to hardware/software degradation/error and 
human error (e.g. major traffic accidents); and (3) intentional malicious acts, such as 
terrorist attacks. The term “disaster” is used to describe an event in which such a hazard 
has caused extensive physical damage; the event is non-recurring and likely 
unanticipated, and its location, impact area and severity, cannot be predicted with 
certainty. 
2.3. Overview of terminology 
A variety of performance metrics have been proposed in the disaster literature for 
evaluating and analyzing disaster impacts on transportation systems. Selection of an 
appropriate disaster measure for the particular application is an important first step in 
system analysis. These measures can be generally categorized as: risk, vulnerability, 
reliability, robustness, flexibility (also known as agility and adaptability), survivability, 
and resilience. Other performance metrics, such as total travel time, throughput, 
economic loss and connectivity, that may also provide input in quantification of some 
of these measures, are considered and categorized herein as alternative measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs). Because authors use these terms in a variety of ways, and also 





chosen terminology, this review includes those works using alternative terminology 
under the most relevant of these categories. Where an author uses a measure that might 
be categorized under an alternative heading, the default is to assign that work based on 
the terminology adopted by the author.  
2.3.1. Risk 
 
Risk is a concept used to characterize the threat of a disaster event in terms of its 
likelihood of occurrence and consequences. Thus, risk is typically measured as with 
respect to the probability of an event arising and its corresponding effects (e.g. Basoz 
and Kiremidjian 1996). Often their product is taken. These two risk components must 
be derived through detailed location-specific probability and impact (e.g. likelihood of 
structural damage of varying levels, reduction in services, and health or environmental 
concerns) estimation. In the context of transportation system performance in disaster, 
risk can be a good measure when considering engineering failures related to a specific 
component, such as the collapse of a bridge; it may be impractical for use in networks 
consisting of many components. Thus, alternative measures may be preferred (Taylor 
et al. 2006). 
2.3.2. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability, like risk, considers the potential consequences of a disaster event on 
system performance. It captures a system’s weaknesses or susceptibility to threats 
related to operational performance (e.g. Berdica 2002, Jenelius et al. 2006). Unlike risk, 
however, the probability of the disaster event is not accounted for (Jenelius et al. 2006). 





of very rare events for many systems, and expectations that incorporate such low 
probability events may not be very illuminating (Taylor et al. 2006). The concept of 
vulnerability can be vague and is often described qualitatively.   
2.3.3. Reliability 
Reliability is typically defined as the probability that a network remains operative 
(often a function of connectivity) given the occurrence of a disaster or disruption event 
(e.g. Scaparra and Church 2008, Balakrishnan et al. 2009). Variants with utility for 
transportation systems have been introduced that capture effects of disruption on 
performance level. Such a reliability measure might be, for example, the probability of 
a system performing within a satisfactory level of service under a disruption event 
(Wakabayashi and Iida 1992). One can view reliability as the complement of 
vulnerability, where the former considers remaining functionality and the latter 
potential loss or degradation (Berdica 2002 and D’Este and Taylor 2001). Concepts of 
reliability are used extensively in assessing telecommunication networks, electric 
power grids, and other engineered systems, where failures can be recurrent, and thus, 
their probability of occurrence may be significant and predictable. 
2.3.4. Robustness 
Robustness measures the ability of a system to continue in operation and, thus, maintain 
some level of functionality, even when exposed to disruption. Like reliability, it is a 
measure of strength rather than loss and can be seen as a complement to vulnerability 
(Jenelius et al. 2006, Snelder et al. 2012). For many works in the literature, robustness 





it is that reliability considers probability of meeting a given level-of-service; whereas, 
robustness assesses remaining functionality for a given event. It might be noted that 
offering a high degree of reliability often requires a robust system. Robustness concepts 
have been applied to engineered systems (Nagurney and Qiang 2007), including 
computer systems and telecommunications, for example. In the context of 
transportation systems, this concept was initially applied to measure network-level 
impacts of node or link removal (e.g. Chang and Nojima 2001, Sakakibara et al. 2004, 
Scott et al 2006, Nagurney and Qiang 2007). 
2.3.5. Robustness 
Another relevant concept is flexibility (also known as adaptability or agility). It 
captures the inherent capacity of a system to cope with uncertainty. This concept is 
primarily used in manufacturing systems, where for example multipurpose system 
elements or processes enable adaptation to new circumstances, e.g. pooling resources 
to allow the same capacity to be used for production of a variety of products (Morlok 
and Chang 2004). This concept has been applied in the transportation arena. For 
example, Morlok and Chang (2004) measure system flexibility in terms of the transport 
system’s ability to continue to accommodate traffic with existing capacity under 
demand uncertainty. Chen and Kasikitwiwat (2011) and Tomlin (2006) discuss 
flexibility with respect to supply uncertainties, e.g. possible degradation in the 
functionality of facilities, or other network nodes or links. Application to supply chain 
disaster management involves a general definition of flexibility as the ability to adapt 
and adjust to supply changes through contingency planning in the aftermath of 





ability of the system to absorb changes with negative impact as opposed to the ability 
to endure these changes without adaptation (Faturechi and Miller-Hooks 2013).  
2.3.6. Survivability 
Survivability is a measure of whether or not a network can continue to perform its 
intended function given damage to network components (Mead et al. 2000). Morlok 
and Chang (2004) describe survivability as a supply-oriented concept aimed at 
measuring the fraction of system demand that can be met post-disruption. A main 
application area for survivability measures has been telecommunication networks. 
These networks are often partitioned hierarchically, rendering some components more 
important than others. Additionally, arc traversal times are considered to be trivial in 
comparison to time spent waiting to pass through network nodes. Thus, extension of 
specific survivability measures developed for this industry to transportation systems 
requires adaptation (Abdel-Rahim et al. 2007 and Du and Peeta 2012). This measure 
may be comparable to robustness.  
2.3.7. Robustness 
Resilience was initially conceptualized and applied in the context of ecological systems 
(Holling 1973). It is generally defined as a system’s ability to resist and absorb the 
impact of disruptions (Bruneau et al. 2003). It builds on the strengths or weaknesses 
measured by risk, vulnerability, reliability, robustness and survivability (i.e. resistance) 
and adaptability measures, while also encapsulating the benefits of the system’s ability 
to adapt to post-disaster circumstances as in flexibility measures. Resilience measures, 





nearly pre-disaster levels. They can quantify the potential benefits of pre-disaster 
mitigation actions aimed at increasing the system’s ability to cope with disaster impact 
and post-disaster adaptive actions that aim to restore functionality.  
2.3.8. Summary 
In Table 2-1, the most-agreed upon interpretations of these measures discussed in this 
section are given. Fig. 2-1 provides a schematic of their boundaries and interactions. 
Table 2-1 Common Definitions of Common Performance Metrics 
Measure General definition 
Risk 
Combination of probability of an event and its consequences in terms of system 
performance 
Vulnerability Susceptibility of the system to threats and incidents causing operational degradation 
Reliability Probability of a system performing its intended purpose adequately post-disaster 
Robustness 
Ability to withstand or absorb disturbances and remain intact when exposed to 
disruptions 
Flexibility 
Ability to adapt and adjust to changes through contingency planning in the 
aftermath of disruptions 
Survivability 
Ability to withstand sudden disturbances to functionality while meeting original 
demand 
Resilience Ability to resist, absorb and adapt to disruptions and return to normal functionality 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Disaster measures, their boundaries and interactions 
2.4. Qualitative vs. quantitative approaches to assessing performance 
The literature on disaster-related performance measurement can be categorized by 





descriptions can provide insights into impact evaluation and management tactics. 
Quantitative measures, on the other hand, provide direct measurement that can be used 
to assess or predict disaster impact. Such measures can aid in the prioritization of 
mitigation, preparedness and adaptive actions.  
Some quantitative measures have been implemented within software or other types of 
decision support tools. Table 2-2 provides an overview of the literature through this 
categorization approach, distinguishing those works in which mathematical models or 
quantification techniques are provided from those in which a tool employing such 
models or techniques is described. Mathematical models are further classified by 
whether they provide direct assessment or suggest decisions that can be used to alter 
system performance. Assessment includes component- and system-level performance, 
both of which allow for identification of critical system elements. The models that 
suggest decisions support management of these systems. Disaster management 
includes prioritization and optimization of pre- and post-disaster investment options 
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2.5. Categorization by life-cycle phase 
The disaster life-cycle is often described as having four phases: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery (e.g. Green 2002). The first two phases arise pre-
disaster, when the disaster occurrence and its component- and system-level impacts can 
only be anticipated and actions can be developed for their mitigation. The latter two 
phases involve the implementation of post-disaster adaptive actions that aim to restore 
system performance to pre-disaster levels.  
Mitigation efforts typically aim at reducing the probability of disaster 
occurrence or the level of its consequences. The aim of such efforts may be to reduce 
the probability of an attack (e.g. human-made) on the system or reduce the likelihood 
that an attack will cause a given level of damage (i.e. will have certain consequences). 
In the context of transportation systems, the primary mitigation strategies can be 
described as: (1) retrofitting system components, (2) expanding the system to include 
new links or nodes, (3) adding capacity to existing system elements, or (4) positioning 
resources for protective purposes. The concept of expansion as a mitigation strategy is 
fairly new, and its benefits are derived through added post-disaster residual capacities. 
Highway embankment, assignment of security teams, and bridge fortification, are some 
examples of mitigation strategies used to combat floods, terrorist attacks and 
earthquakes, respectively.  
Preparedness strategies support quicker and more efficient response in a 
disaster’s aftermath. Such strategies might include, for example, implementing 





other resources, such as fire extinguishers for firefighting, water pumps for use in 
floods, and salt spreaders for snow or ice handling.  
Post-disaster emergency response includes short-term response actions in the 
aftermath of a disaster with the aim of restoring system performance. The first portion 
of this life-cycle phase is devoted to humanitarian relief operations, such as emergency 
rescue and medical service distribution (not covered in this study). This is followed by 
repair of damaged system components with the objective of restoring connectivity or 
increasing system throughput levels. Pavement crack repair, debris removal, and 
construction of temporary road mats, are some examples of response strategies.  
Recovery, as the final phase of the disaster life-cycle, continues beyond 
emergency response, until actions to improve system performance are terminated. This 
phase may take months, even years, to accomplish; thus, requiring long-term planning. 
Short-term decisions taken in the response phase can impact the efficiency of the 
recovery phase (Baird 2010).  
The reviewed literature is categorized by life-cycle phase and performance 
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As illustrated in the histogram of Figure 2-2, reliability and robustness are 
common pre-disaster measures used in the literature, while most studies on post-
disaster response and recovery do not involve any specific disaster measure. 
Furthermore, system resilience is the one measure chosen by the majority of studies to 
model both pre- and post-disaster actions simultaneously.  
 
Figure 2-2 Number of disaster management publications in pre- and post-disaster phases 
2.6. Categorization by MOEs 
A variety of user- and supply-oriented MOEs have been developed in the literature. 
These differ depending on the transportation mode, such as intermodal ports, airports, 
highway networks and transit services, for which they were developed, and specific 
system objectives.  
Two major categories of MOEs were identified: function and topological. 
Functional measures focus on serviceability of the transportation system as categorized 
by: travel time/distance, flow or throughput, and accessibility. Topological measures 
consider the transportation system as a pure network and characterize it based on 
concepts of graph theory. Measures such as connectivity, betweenness, and centrality 
fall into this category. These measures focus on the relative location of network nodes 























In addition to functional and topological MOEs, a number of studies have been 
conducted on the estimation of economic losses due to disaster damage within 
transportation systems. However, it appears that no work in the literature presents or 
discusses quantitative economic measures for disaster management purposes.  
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Table 2-4 summarizes the literature by these three categories of MOEs: functional, 
topological and economic. The histograms in Figures 2-3 and 2-4 provide a graphical 
representation of the number of publications that falling under these categories. The 
figures indicate that travel time is the most utilized MOE. In the context of recovery, it 
is the predominant measure. Topological measures have been applied primarily in 
mitigation and response studies. 
Figure 2-3 Number of disaster assessment 
publications on each MOE 
 
Figure 2-4 Number of disaster management publications 


































2.7. Categorization by uncertainty modeling technique 
The geographic location, severity and other impacts of a disaster event can at best be 
known a priori with uncertainty. Several different approaches have been applied within 
this literature for modeling possible disasters and their consequences. Such models are 
employed in providing input for system optimization and analysis. These approaches 
can be generally categorized as falling under scenario, simulation, probability 
distribution and worst-case performance-based techniques as given in Table 2-5. This 
table also includes those works that study a single historical disaster event. 
Scenario-based techniques generate one or more hypothetical disaster 
scenarios; the probability of the scenario’s occurrence is not regarded. Applications of 
these techniques generally consider a small set of component-level scenarios, e.g. 
failure of a road segment or a bridge. Before and after analysis are often conducted for 
comparison. Techniques that include targeted and coordinated attack scenarios aiming 
at the most important system components also fall in this category. Simulation 
techniques generate a wide range of scenarios for consideration. The scenarios are 
generated in proportion to the disruption or damage occurrence probabilities at the 
component-level. A distribution of system performance level over all considered 
scenarios can be generated. Other techniques that employ disruption or damage 
probability occurrences might use the probability distribution functions directly. 
Finally, optimization and game-theoretic modeling approaches, e.g. interdiction 
models, can be used to identify a worst-case performance that might results from 
damage to the system, where the damage may be given in terms of, for example, a 





Table 2-5 Categorizing by disaster event modeling technique 
2.8. Categorization by methodology 
Mathematical models of system performance, for either assessment or management 
purposes, proposed in the literature can be considered as analytical, simulation, or 
optimization models. Those that address assessment are described in Table 2-6, while 





 Scenario  
Al-Deek and Emam (2006), Basoz and Kiremidjian (1996), Bell et al. (2008), 
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al. (2007), Knoop et al., (2012), Liu et al. (2009),  Liu and Murray-Tuite 
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Sanchez-Silva et al. (2005), Siu and Lo (2008), Wakabayashi and Iida (1992), 




Bell (2000), Bell et al. (2008), Bell and Iida (2001), Chen et al. (2011), 
Cappanera and Scaparra (2011), Grubesic and Murray (2006), Huang et al. 
(2007), Ibrahim et al. (2011), Jenelius and Mattsson (2012), Laporte et al. 
(2010), Liberatore et al. (2011),  Lim and Smith (2007), Lou and Zhang 
(2011), Losada et al. (2012), Lownes et al. (2011), Lo and Tung (2003), 
Matisziw and Murray (2009), Murray-Tuite and Mahmassani (2004), Scaparra 
and Church (2008, 2012), Smith et al. (2007),  Snyder and Daskin (2005), 




Bekkem et al (2011), Chang (2000), Chang and Nojima (2001),  Cox et al. 





Analytical methods have been used to analyze potential failure states and risk 
classification based on disaster probabilities and consequences through different forms 
of logical structures, e.g. risk matrix, Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). In disaster management, 
analytical models, specifically Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), have been applied 
for evaluating, ranking and prioritizing decision options through concepts of utility 
theory. These methods are not efficient for large-scale applications with a large number 
of possible failure states and candidate investment options (Wang et al. 2008, Murray-
Tuite 2008).   
Simulation methods, such as Monte Carlo simulation, are employed to generate 
a large sample of scenarios, each with a randomly selected damage state and probability 
of occurrence. These methods broadly allow generation of different combinations of 
degradation in the links or nodes. Simulation methods are also employed to evaluate 
the effectiveness of investment options by comparing system performance before and 
after expenditures are made. Such evaluation is made separately for an individual 

























Basoz and Kiremidjian (1996), FAA 
(2007) 
 Ranking risk of system 
components with respect to 
disaster probability and 
consequences, from low to 
extreme risk 
ETA/FTA 
Al-Deek and Emam (2006), Murray-
Tuite (2007,2008) 
 Representing probable states of 
system components using 
logical structures in the form of 
a tree 
FMEA 
Bekkem et al. (2011), Caplice et al. 
(2008) 
 Analyzing potential failure 




Freckleton et al. (2012), Serulle et 
al. (2011), Wang and Elhag (2007) 
 Assessing vulnerability using 
linguistic terms such as High, 
Medium, and Low rather than 




Cho et al. (2001), Gupta (2001), 
Ham et al. (2005), Kim et al. (2002), 
Sohn et al. (2003), Tatano and 
Tsuchiya (2008) 
 Modeling system losses, mostly 




Bensi et al. (2011), Murray-Tuite 
(2010) 
 Real-time assessing of post-
disaster system performance 
through evolving information 
Simulation 
Chen et al. (2002), Chen et al. 
(2013), Dalziell and Nicholson 
(2001), Kiremidjian et al. (2007), 
Knoop et al. (2012), Liu and 
Murray-Tuite (2008), Morohosi 
(2010), Murray-Tuite (2006), Na 
and Shinozuka (2009), Nojima 
(1999),  Omer et al. (2011), 
Shinozuka et al. (2003), Shiraki et al 
(2007),  Snelder et al. (2012), Suarez 
et al. (2005), Sumalee and Watling 
(2008), Tampere et al. (2007), 
Stergiou and Kiremidjian (2010), 
Vugrin et al. (2011), Werner et al. 
(2000) 
 Generating a large number of 
disruption scenarios, useful for 
capturing failure dependencies 

















Abdel-Rahim et al. (2007), Andreas et al. 
(2008), Angeloudis and Fisk (2006), De-
Los-Santos et al. (2012), Derrible and 
Kennedy (2010), Ferber et al. (2007), Ip 
and Wang (2011), Jenelius and Mattsson 
(2012), Moreira et al. (2009), Nagurney 
and Qiang (2007,2009,2012), Sakakibara 
et al. (2004), Scott et al. (2006), 
Shimamoto et al. (2008), Sullivan et al. 
(2010), Taylor et al. (2006), Tu et al. 
(2012), Yingfei et al. (2010), 
Wakabayashi and Iida (1992) 
 Determining most critical 
nodes/links using graph 
theory concepts (e.g. 
connectivity); scenario-





Israeli and Wood (2002), Murray et al. 
(2007), Matisziw and Murray (2009), 
Ukkusuri and Yushimito (2009) 
 Sequentially seeking to 
maximize and minimize 
transportation costs using 
a two-player game 
between a leader and 
follower for identifying 
worst-case performance 
as in interdiction 







Bell (2000), Bell et al. (2008), Grubesic 
and Murray (2006), Ibrahim et al. (2011), 
Lownes et al. (2011), Murray-Tuite and 
Mahmassani (2004), Szeto (2011), 
Murray-Tuite and Fei (2010), Yates and 
Lakshmanan (2011)  
 Incorporating in the game 
the uncertain 
characteristics of the 
transportation network 
due to disasters, where 
the leader seeks to 
maximize the expectation 




Bell and Schmocker (2002), Nguyen et 
al. (2011) 







Asakura (1999), Chen et al. (2007), Lam 
et al. (2008),  Luathep et al. (2011), Siu 
and Lo (2008), Sun et al. (2006), Yin and 
Ieda (2001)  
 Using concepts of 
random utility theory to 
model stochastic user 
route choice under 
disruptions (Stochastic 






Table 2-7 Management methodologies 
Methods References Description 
AHP 
Modarres and Zarei (2002), Patidar et 
al. (2007), Wang et al. (2008) 
 Prioritizing alternatives based 
on concepts of utility theory  
Simulation 
Chang (2003), Chen and Tzeng 
(2000), Sato and Ichii (1996), Zhang 
and Levinson (2004), Zhou et a. 
(2004)  
 Evaluating management 




Feng and Wang (2003), Golroo et al. 
(2010), Karlaftis et al. (2007), 
Lambert and Patterson (2002), 
Lertworawanich (2012), Mehlhorn 
(2009), Mohaymany and Pirnazar 
(2007), Orabi et al. (2009), 
Viswanath and Peeta (2003), Vugrin 
et al. (2010), Yan and Shih (2009), 
Yan et al. (2012) 
 Optimally selecting 
alternatives, e.g. resource 
allocation and reconstruction 







Cappanera and Scaparra (2011), 
Lakshmanan (2011), Laporte et al. 
(2010), Lou and Zhang (2011), 
Losada et al. (2012), Liberatore et al. 
(2011), Scaparra and Church (2008, 
2012), Smith et al. (2007), Yates and 
Snyder and Daskin (2005) 
 Optimally selecting design 
alternatives under worst-case 
scenario through use of a multi-
level defender-attacker game, 
where the defender makes 
decisions on network design in 
the upper–level and the attacker 





Bin et al. (2009), Chootinan et al. 
(2005), Desai and Sen (2010), 
Dimitriou and Stathopoulos (2008), 
Lo and Tung (2003), Park et al. 
(2007), Poorzahedy and Bushehri 
(2005), Santos et al. (2010), Sanchez-
Silva et al. (2005), Sumalee and 
Kurauchi (2006), Yin and Ieda 
(2002) 
 Optimally selecting design 
alternatives using stochastic 
network design with reliability 





Barbarosoglu and Arda (2004), 
Chang et al. (2010), Chen et al. 
(2011), Chen and Miller-Hooks 
(2012), Du and Peeta (2012), Fan and 
Liu (2010), Faturechi et al. (in 
review), Faturechi and Miller-Hooks 
(2013), Ferris and Ruszczynski 
(2000), Garg and Smith (2008), Kim 
et al. (2008), Liu et al. (2008), Liu et 
al. (2009), Miller-Hooks et al. 
(2012), Nair et al. (2010), Peeta et al. 
(2010), Vugrin and Turnquist (2012) 
 Optimizing sequence of 
alternative selection over time 
given realization of uncertain 




Huang et al. (2007), Laporte et al. 
(2010), Patriksson (2008) 
 Optimally selecting alternatives 
to guarantee system 
performance under worst-case 
scenario; generating 






2.9. Conclusions and insights  
In this chapter, a comprehensive review of the literature addressing transportation 
system performance measurement given potential future disaster events is provided. 
Related publications were identified and categorized from a variety of perspectives. 
This categorization provides clarity through direct comparison of similarities, 
differences, intersections and interactions, permitting a deeper understanding of the 
topic. The review also aids in the identification of research challenges and gaps to be 
addressed in the future. 
Although the literature was scoured the for all transportation environments, the 
vast majority of the scholarly literature related to disaster performance measures and 
transportation has focused on surface transportation as is reflected in this literature 
review. The review reveals that nearly 70% of publications on this topic reported in 
this literature address the assessment of the transportation system’s ability to cope with 
disaster consequences. Publications including strategies for managing these systems in 
disaster are fewer in number, but growing. While decision-makers can benefit from 
techniques that consider interdependency of decisions in different stages of the disaster 
life cycle and multiple disaster scenarios, more than 90% of disaster management 
publications reviewed herein address only one component of the life-cycle. Although 
qualitative works of relevance were reviewed, much of the analysis provided herein 
focuses on quantitative efforts. Additional effort to categorize the qualitative studies on 
disaster assessment may be useful. 
An uptick in papers explicitly considering uncertainty in future conditions can be noted 





of the real-world, including dependencies that contribute to system-level failure, is 
noticeable. In that vein, an increase can be noticed in the percentage of articles that 
consider system- rather than component-level performance. To consider these 
complexities, simulation is often required. Improved computational capabilities in 
recent years has also made sensitivity analysis possible on a larger scale, as evidenced 




















Chapter 3: A Mathematical Framework for Quantifying and 
Optimizing Protective Actions for Civil Infrastructure Systems  
 
3.1. Introduction 
All societies depend on a system of infrastructure for survival. The most advanced 
depend on this infrastructure to support a wide range of human activities. These 
infrastructure systems, often described in terms of the sectors of society that they affect, 
such as agriculture, finance, transportation, energy, water, healthcare, communications 
and defense, are crucial for public health, safety, security and economies. 
While many societies have come to rely on these infrastructure systems, these 
systems are operating at or near design capacity. They are aging and are faced with 
greater risk of attack, whether natural, accidental or human-induced. Because these 
systems have become quite complex, interdependent and interconnected, the possibility 
that a disruptive event to any one system will cascade into an event involving multiple 
systems is significant and can result in widespread failure or difficult recovery. 
Sustained loss of one or more of these lifelines can have catastrophic impact on the 
well-being of a society. Consequently, governments and agencies that own or operate 
these systems are reviewing their investment policies with goals of expanding system 
capacity, reducing risk of attack, and reducing susceptibility of infrastructure to damage 
given possible disruptions or disaster events (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Homeland Security 2009). In addition, as it is impractical to reinforce or harden these 
systems to all types of events, efficient options to support quick recovery of these 





To evaluate investment options that can be taken to reduce risk of failure and 
increase a system's ability to rebound from an attack, one must be able to quantify the 
innate ability of the system to cope with attack and its ability to adapt through the use 
of available resources. Numerous performance measures have been proposed in the 
literature for such quantification. These measures include various specifications of 
system reliability, vulnerability, robustness and flexibility, which describe the behavior 
of systems and their performance variations under different situations. They aim to 
quantify how well a system is expected to perform given the possibility of potential 
future events that affect system capacity.  
Various definitions of such performance measures have been introduced in the 
literature. These definitions, however, are sometimes intertwined and often 
inconsistent. Moreover, the majority are qualitative in nature. As a result, it is often 
unclear to the agencies responsible for maintaining, expanding and protecting critical 
societal lifelines which measure or set of measures should be considered in evaluating 
these systems or potential investment options.  
This chapter provides a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing, 
categorizing, and quantifying system performance measures, previously espoused as 
independent measures, in the presence of uncertain events, component failure, or other 
disruptions/disasters with the potential to reduce system capacity or performance from 
pre-event levels. The framework is structured from a supply-oriented perspective and 
assumes a constant demand for system capacity. It builds on concepts involving a 
system's innate ability to resist and recover from the negative consequences of events, 





This framework clarifies the intersection and overlap between notions of inherent 
characteristics of the system (coping capacity), preparedness, robustness, flexibility (or 
adaptability/agility), recovery capacity and resilience, and provides a common 
approach for their quantification. Building on the framework, a single decision problem 
is proposed that can be used to quantify these measures and determine optimal 
investment strategies so as to maximize their values. The formulation of the decision 
problem is generically devised to permit consideration of a variety of applications, 
including, for example, applications arising in power grid, transportation, 
telecommunication, supply chain, and water supply networks. A numerical example is 
provided to illustrate its application. 
3.2. Related System Performance Measures In the Literature 
Several system performance measures for assessing the coping capacity of a network 
that is subject to disaster or disruption have been proposed in the literature. These 
measures are applied within a variety of arenas ranging from transportation, water and 
other civil infrastructure systems to computer and supply chain networks. Key 
measures include vulnerability, reliability, robustness, flexibility (adaptability/agility) 
and resilience. No attempt is made herein to review all literature that discusses such 
measures. Rather, an overview of these measures with examples from the literature is 
given. 
The most widely used of these performance concepts is that of vulnerability. 
Vulnerability typically expresses some notion of how susceptible a system is to 
malfunction or performance degradation in the event of an attack, natural or otherwise 





susceptibility to performance degradation by the probability of attack. Because the 
concept of susceptibility can have many interpretations, exact definitions of 
vulnerability vary widely. Additional concepts, such as reliability, have been 
introduced to address this lack of specificity. Definitions of reliability, while varying, 
have in common that they aim to quantify the probability that the system will continue 
to function given a disruption event (Iida 1999) or measure system performance given 
a disruption (e.g. Berdica 2002).  
Another related concept is that of system robustness, typically defined as the 
ability of a system to resist changes to its physical structure in response to a hazard 
event (e.g. Nagurney and Qiang 2007, Immers et al. 2004). Flexibility captures how a 
system adapts to significant internally- and externally-induced changes (Goetz and 
Szyliowicz 1997). Most of the network flexibility literature focuses on demand changes 
(e.g. Morlok and Chang 2004, and Chen and Kasikitwiwat 2011). 
A number of works (e.g. Ukkusuri at al. (2007)) study the impact of system 
capacity expansion on system robustness and reliability. Others (e.g. Liu et al. 2009, 
and Peeta et al. 2010) consider retrofit actions that can be taken to reinforce existing 
infrastructure and improve system robustness. Numerous works (e.g. Huang et al. 
(2006) and Kondaveti and Ganz (2009)) develop techniques to support emergency 
response to disasters, but few works address planning for recovery efforts aimed at 
post-event restoration of system performance.  
The concept of resilience has been introduced to measure not only the network’s 
ability to absorb externally induced changes as in vulnerability, reliability and 





circumstances, which can be likened to flexibility. This notion of resilience was 
initially conceptualized by ecologists in relation to stability of ecological systems in 
the presence of disruptions due to natural or anthropogenic causes and their ability to 
bounce back to a state of equilibrium (Holling 1973). It is discussed also in (Rose 2004) 
in the context of economic systems. Bruneau et al. (2003) define community resilience 
as the ability of a community to mitigate the effects of hazards and recover system 
performance so as to minimize life and economic loss. Cutter et al. (2008) discuss 
community resilience in terms of inherent and adaptive qualities. Additional works 
describe performance measures similar in concept to vulnerability or robustness under 
the name of resilience (e.g. Berche et al. 2009, Gutfraind 2010, Bekkem et al. 2011, Ip 
and Wang 2011, and Serulle et al. 2011).  
Concepts of vulnerability, reliability, robustness and flexibility, or related 
concepts under headings of redundancy and adaptability, have been coupled to form a 
variety of resilience notions. Some of these notions involve pre- or post-event actions, 
such as preparedness, or actions taken in advance to improve resource availability, 
post-event recovery action implementation times and, ultimately, recovery time, to 
enhance resilience levels (Bruneau et al. 2003, Sheffi 2005, Murray-Tuite 2006, 
Caplice et al. 2008, McDaniels et al. 2008, Ortiz et al. 2008, Ta et al. 2009, and Cox et 
al. 2011). To illustrate, Bruneau et al. (2003) provide a qualitative measure of resilience 
whose components are robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity of 
response to disruption. Recently, Cox et al. (2011) adapted concepts from ecological 





role of vulnerability (defined in terms of robustness), wealth (given by system 
redundancy), and flexibility. 
While numerous works discuss the concept of resilience, few provide the 
necessary methodology for its quantification. Murray-Tuite (2006) proposed 
quantitative measures for transportation system adaptability, safety, mobility and 
recovery, and applied a simulation-based method for their computation. Adams et al. 
(2010) applied the resilience framework of Caplice et al. (2008) to assess the resilience 
of ten high-risk segments along a U.S. interstate highway given knowledge of past 
events and their consequences. Nguyen et al. (2011) proposed four general 
mathematical formulations for the quantification of four criteria in the context of 
resilience of transportation networks: functionality degradation, recovery time, 
recovery speed and flexibility of the system.  
A quantitative resilience measure for intermodal freight transport systems that 
seeks the maximum post-event expected fraction of demand that can be met in the 
aftermath of disruption was introduced by Chen and Miller-Hooks (2012). This 
measure incorporates both the innate coping capacity and effects of short-term adaptive 
actions on mitigating negative effects that can be taken post-event. They proposed a 
stochastic programming formulation of the problem and exact solution technique based 
on Benders decomposition, column generation and Monte Carlo simulation. This 
resilience concept was applied in Nair et al. (2010) to improve security at nodal 
facilities within intermodal freight networks. Miller-Hooks et al. (2012) extended this 





between pre- and post-event investments to improve system resilience. They employ a 
two-stage stochastic program and propose an integer L-shaped method for its solution. 
A variety of concepts have been proposed to address system performance under 
disruption from different perspectives. These concepts are often intertwined and the 
same term can be used with different definitions. The authors know of no prior work 
that has sought to provide a common framework with guidelines for creating consistent 
definitions of measures designed for assessing system performance under 
disaster/disruption as well as supportive roles of different classes of actions. This work 
seeks to fill this gap by defining important elements of infrastructure protection, 
positioning these elements within a single framework, showing how these elements can 
be combined to define the various performance measures, and clarifying connections 
between measures accordingly. 
3.3. Framework for Infrastructure Performance Management 
3.3.1. Infrastructure Protection Framework (IPF) 
A single framework for understanding the various system performance measures 
discussed in previous sections is provided. This framework builds on concepts used in 
describing a system’s innate capacity to endure natural and human-made disruptions 
and considering pre- and post-event actions to improve the system’s performance. The 
former includes coping capacity characteristics (including ability to withstand stress, 
i.e. resistance, and/or excess in terms of redundancies and underutilized capacity), and 
the latter includes retrofit, expansion, resource availability and response activities that 





system qualities of resistance and excess. Together, these form a framework, referred 
to herein as the Infrastructure Protection Framework (IPF), and depicted in Figure 3-1.  
Figure 3-1 Infrastructure Protection Framework (IPF) 
 
 
(a) Coping capacity (b) Preparedness (c) Robustness 
 
(d) Flexibility (e) Recovery (f) Resilience 
Figure 3-2 System Performance Measures Defined on IPF 
 
Concepts of coping capacity, preparedness, flexibility, robustness, recovery 
capability and resilience are described in terms of elements of this framework as shown 
in Figure 3-2. These relationships are further illustrated in Table 3-1. 
Figure 2 serves as a tool for understanding system performance measures 




















































differences. It can aid in assimilating relevant literature and choosing an appropriate 
measure for an application.  







Innate capability to resist disaster event 
through material strength and maintain 
functionality without intervention as well as 
built-in excess capacity and redundancies 








Pre-event action to enhance network 
performance by increasing connectivity (e.g. 
adding redundancy) or capacity; aimed at 
reducing effects of disaster event by reducing 
marginal impact of loss; benefits for both pre-








Pre-event actions to reinforce or harden system 
elements, diminishing likelihood or level of 
damage due to disaster event impact; does not 












Pre-event actions aimed at supporting post-
event response, including pre-positioning 
resources and contracting for response 
support; no pre-event performance benefits 
derived, but reduced response times and costs 














Post-event actions to quickly recover some 
portion of lost capacity and performance loss; 










Figure 3-2(a) describes inherent characteristics of the system that enable it to 
resist and absorb the impact of the disruption, i.e. its coping capacity. A preparedness 
measure in Figure 3-2(b) contains all actions that are taken prior to the disaster event, 
including those that have benefit only if response options are exercised (i.e. resource 





of preparedness actions are incurred whether or not disaster occurs. Such a prepared 
system can be distinguished from one that is robust in that robustness can be described 
in terms of the system’s innate coping capacity and pre-event actions taken to enhance 
system resistance under disruption as in Figure 3-2(c). A system that can withstand the 
impact of the disaster event is said to be robust. 
A flexibility measure is defined in Figure 3-2(d). This definition, in contrast 
with robustness, accounts for a system’s adaptive capabilities to respond to disruption. 
That is, flexibility measures the capability of the system to absorb system demand given 
reduced system offerings through post-event adaptive response actions. It draws on 
excess capacities that may exist through coping capacity. Measures of recovery in 
Figure 3-2(e) can be viewed as the converse of preparedness, where resource 
availability is established during the preparedness stages, but is exploited through 
response actions. These concepts further differ in that preparedness measures’ focus 
on the existing coping capacity and system enhancements made through pre-event 
actions, while recovery measures include only post-event coping mechanisms to restore 
performance.  
Finally, the framework of Figure 3-2(f) supports a concept of resilience that 
incorporates all elements of the system's inherent capabilities, disaster readiness and 
post-event response capability, i.e. its ability to both resist and adapt. With this 
conceptualization, coping capacity, preparedness, robustness, recovery and flexibility 
can all be seen facets of resilience. Note that one might argue for the inclusion of 
reliability, vulnerability or risk as important classes of related measures. Despite that 





because it is used to compute a probability, such as the probability that the system 
remains connected, or the probability that travel time/capacity remains within a desired 
range, rather than post-event expected performance level. Likewise, risk and 
vulnerability are measures of disruption probability and/or level of consequence. These 
measures capture potential losses and event likelihood rather than residual performance 
given event occurrence. 
3.3.2. A common framework for performance measure qualification 
a) Graphical representation through disruption profiles 
A common framework for depicting and quantifying the performance measures 
considered herein is constructed using concepts of disruption profiles. Disruption 
profiles are used to display system behavior changes over time, beginning from the 
moment prior to disruption through the time at which the system is restored to its pre-
event state or reaches an alternative desired state. The profile can be divided into 
distinct disruption and recovery periods, where the former refers to the duration of time 
from the moment the disruption takes place, , until recovery begins, and the latter 
refers to the duration of time during which response actions are taken to recover 
performance. Bruneau et al. (2003) and Sheffi (2005) employed such disruption 
profiles to graphically depict system performance in the context of human communities 
and supply chain network resilience, respectively.  
This disruption profile is employed herein (see Figure 3-3). It is a function of 
time, and hence denoted as , because it provides an indication of the system-wide 





into the impact of individual IPF components. Four performance functions, , 
 (or ), , and , depict the performance of the same system given 
that select preparedness actions, i.e. no action (unprepared, u), retrofit (r), expansion 
(e), retrofit and expansion (re), and expansion, retrofit and resource availability 
(prepared, res), are taken. Preparedness actions lead to enhancements in system 
performance over time as shown in the figure. Let , , , , . 
As in Figure 3-3, the period of time prior to and up to the very moment of a 
disruption event is referred to as the pre-event period, denoted by O. The moment just 
after the event arises, and the effects of the disruption on system performance begin, 
until the system experiences its lowest performance level as a consequence of the event 
is referred to as the post-event period. D is used within the nomenclature to refer to this 
period. Finally, the recovery period refers to the period beginning from the point in 
time when the system reaches its minimum performance level through the point at 
which a desired performance level is attained as a consequence of response actions. R 
is used within the nomenclature to refer to this period.  Z , , .  
 



























For the disruption period, let  be the point in time at which the system 
experiences its minimum performance level given, for ∈ , and  be the 
corresponding minimum post-event performance level. Let , ∈ , be a point in time 
in the recovery period at which a desired performance level, referred to herein as the 
post-recovery performance level, is achieved. Figure 3-3 depicts this time for a desired 
performance level .  
Consider the unprepared system in Figure 3-3. The reduction in  during 
the period of disruption from  to  provides information about the system's inherent 
coping capacity. If no further action is taken, the system will continue to perform at the 
 level into the future. Likewise, for the other performance functions, the maximum 
achievable post-event performance level will be sustained if no additional response 
actions are taken. 
Improvements in a system’s post-event performance can be attained through 
retrofit and expansion actions resulting in post-event performance . Retrofit actions 
are intended to aid the system component(s) in withstanding a disaster event and may 
result in a higher minimum post-event performance level. That is  for 
, and . Such actions will have no impact on pre-event 
performance. Expansion actions improve pre-event performance, i.e. . 
Consequently,  for . Moreover, expansion and retrofit 
result in greater time to descend to this minimum, i.e. . Note that 
 for , since investment made in resource availability has no effect 





improvements due to system retrofit and expansion actions are given in the figure by 
 and e , respectively. 
The position on the y-axis and shape of performance function  over the 
recovery period, for ∈ , depends on the value  and the impact of response actions 
taken to restore performance, . Retrofit and expansion actions, both of which are 
taken in advance of any disruption, do not have additional impact on system 
performance during the recovery period. , because 
 for a given response action. 
The impact of resource availability is evident only in the recovery period, as 
depicted in Figure 3-3. If resources are made available in advance to support recovery 
efforts, a higher performance level, , can be attained when considered at a 
specific point in time t during the recovery period, i.e. , and a shorter 
duration of recovery period will be needed to attain a desired performance level, e.g. 
. The vertical distance between  and , , indicates to what extent 
resource availability can improve the recovery process over time. 
b) Point and period performance metrics 
Using the concept of disruption profiles, mathematical equations can be derived for the 
studied system performance measures. Two conceptualization of the measures, point 
and period, are given. Let . The contribution of the IPF components to the 
maximum post-recovery performance level  achieved at time  is called its point 
contribution (Figure 3-4(a)). Additional information about performance can be 





the rate at which the performance level drops or increases over time. The contribution 
of IPF components in characterizing performance over disruption and recovery periods 
can be captured by computing the relevant areas under the performance function 
curves, called period contribution, as depicted in Figure 3-4(b). The shaded areas 
illustrate the contributions of each IPF component over time period , .   
 
(g) Point contribution of IPF components on post-
recovery performance  
(h) Period contribution of IPF components over time 
period ,  
Figure 3-4 Point contribution of IPF components on post-recovery performance  
 
Point and period performance measures are computed from the summation of 
point estimates and areas under the curves, respectively, as mathematically formulated 
in Table 3-2. Let ̅ ,
	  and ,
	  be point and period performance measures of ,  
{coping capacity, preparedness, robustness, flexibility, recovery, resilience}, for an 
available budget level , and point in time . Note that in the best case, the system will 
achieve a level of post-recovery performance equivalent to (possibly better than) its 
pre-event performance level. In the worst-case, a zero system performance level may 
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Table 3-2 Mathematical equations of point and period performance measures 
Point performance measures Period performance measures 
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Considering the time dimension in assessing system period performance may 
also aid post-disaster response activity scheduling, permitting earlier gains in system 
performance levels. To further illustrate, consider Figure 3-5 in which a disruption 
event occurs at time 1. Capacity along the studied link is immediately reduced from 10 
to 3 units. Two recovery options are available, both of which restore performance to 9 
units of capacity by time 5. Using the point measures discussed in the previous section, 
these recovery options produce identical results. However, it can be noted that recovery 
option 1 restores capacity more quickly and, thus, may be preferred.    
 







1 3 5 Time 
Recovery period 
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3.3.3. Contribution of Pre- and Post-event actions to infrastructure protection 
While only preparedness, robustness, flexibility and resilience measures account for 
the coping capacity of the system, these measures, as well as recovery capability and 
flexibility, include the contributions of pre- and post-event actions that can be taken to 
prevent or mitigate the effects of disaster. The nature of these actions and related need 
for investment and implementation efforts are investigated in this section. This 
investigation requires the introduction of four variables, described in Table 3-3.  





Retrofit  [0,1] 
 1 is the level at which no disruption scenario can impact 
component  
 Reduces disruption severity; no impact on event probabilities 
Expansion  [0,	∞) 
 Expansion strategies include: 
   (1) expand capacity of existing component 
   (2) add component 
 Theoretically ranges from 0 (no action) to infinity 
 1 for the first expansion strategy indicates an expansion 
of a component  equivalent to its starting capacity 
 For second expansion strategy one could think of relating 





 1 means perfect resource availability in component a such 
that required resource for implementing responsive actions in 
the most efficient way are provided in advance 
Response  [0,	∞) 
 Reflecting restored system performance taking both resource 
availability and responsive actions 
  indicates the level of restoration related to the pre-event 
performance level of the component. In the event of complete 
failure, λ ξ 1 would infer complete reconstruction. Note 
that a value greater than one is permitted as further enhancement 
may be desirable 
 
The proposed action levels are continuous representations of actions with 
corresponding budgets and implementation times defined for each individual system 
component ∈ , given the set of all system components, . In general, in a network 





represented by the links of the network (e.g. roadways or railways in a transportation 
network, pipelines in a water supply network, or gas lines in an energy network).  
To assess system performance a priori, one must consider the prospect of 
numerous possible future disruptive event scenarios from a variety of potential sources. 
These sources might include natural weather events, accidental events, e.g. due to 
technological failure or a hazardous materials incident, or malicious acts. Each scenario 
will affect post-event performance differently. Which scenario will occur cannot be 
known a priori with certainty.  
The post-event performance depends on the performance of the individual 
system components and their interactions. Furthermore, the components of the system 
that are impacted and the extent of impact depend on the specifics of the event. Let  
and  represent the post-event and post-recovery performance levels of component 
a, for ∈ .  and  are random variables, and  and  are their 
corresponding post-event performance levels under disruption scenario . Let  be the 
set of scenarios. Each scenario ∈  is defined and generated as a vector of random 
values ∈ , indicating post-event performance of all components of an 
unprepared system. Component performance after expansion, retrofit, and response can 
be calculated through equations (13)-(17) given corresponding action level decisions. 
Suppose that the effects of retrofit are linear to system performance. Then,  
 . (13) 
The distribution function of  as a function of  (retrofit effort) is depicted 





have equivalent distribution functions. When 1, , ∀ , inferring that 
no disruption can impact the performance of component .  
  
Figure 3-6 Discrete probability function of  as a function of  
 
Component performance values between these extremes are derived from linear 
interpolation as is done in similar contexts (e.g. Liu et al. 2009, and Du and Peeta 2012). 
Retrofit does not impact the probability of event occurrence. However, with increasing 
retrofit level, the range on post-event performance narrows leading to higher 
expectation and lower variance. Moreover, the probability of higher post-event 
performance level increases. Thus, post-event component performance, and ultimately 
system performance, is decision-dependent. 
The pre-event performance of component a expanded by level  is computed 
by equation (14). Post-event performance of the expanded component is presumed to 
be a linear function of the expansion level  in equation (15). This infers that any 
disaster impact on the operation of an existing component will similarly affect the 
expanded portion of the facility. Effects of new materials, etc. may be considered. The 









ξ can be computed by equation (16) assuming that when a component is expanded the 
same level of retrofit is applied throughout. 
1  ,  (14) 
1   (15) 
1    (16) 
For each component a and disruption realization , post-recovery performance 
, for ∈ , can be computed as in equations (17).  
  (17) 
The cost and implementation time required for taking response actions is 
considered when determining the level of recovery action to execute. For a given 
component a,   and   give the costs of retrofit and expansion, respectively. The 
cost of resource availability, , is presumed to be linear in  and independent of  
and . That is: 
1   , (18) 
 , and (19) 
 ,	 (20) 
where , , and  are unit costs of retrofit, expansion and resource 
availability, respectively, in component a.. Level of retrofit is not included in equation 
(19) so that associated costs are applied only once in equations (18).  
Let the implementation cost and time of post-event response actions in system 
component ,  and , be defined as nonlinear functions of response and resource 
availability levels. Then,  
  , and (21) 
  , (22) 
where  ( ) and  ( ) are unit implementation costs (times) of response 





level of resource availability, respectively. How the implementation cost and time 
functions change with level of response and resource availability is shown in Figure 3-
7. With a higher level of resource availability, less effort is required to achieve a given 
performance level. Once the decision on action level is made, the corresponding 
specific action to take can be identified from a mapping of action level to 
implementation cost and time functions.  
 
Figure 3-7 Implementation cost (time) of response actions as functions of resource availability and 
response levels 
 
3.4. Infrastructure Protection Optimization 
In this section, a general optimization program of this Infrastructure Protection Problem 
(IPP) is formulated to determine the maximum attainable system performance level 
using the point performance concept and identify an optimal investment in 
preparedness and responsive actions needed to achieve this level. It accounts for 
uncertainty in post-event performance of the system, since which event, if any, will be 
realized cannot be known in advance. The model selects the optimal retrofit, expansion 
and resource availability actions to take a priori (pre-event) so as to maximize system 










once the disaster circumstances are realized. Recourse options may also depend on the 
choice of preparedness actions.  
The IPP exploits a network representation of the system infrastructure. Let 
, , where 1,… ,  and 1,… ,  are the set of nodes and links that 
connect the nodes. For instance, for a rail-based transport system, stations are 
represented by nodes and tracks along which trains travel are represented through the 
links. In a road transport network, nodes may represent demand source locations, like 
houses, businesses, or parking lots. At a higher level, these locations may represent an 
area, such as Traffic Analysis Zones (TAZ), entire towns or even countries. 
Alternatively, the nodes may merely denote a decision point between roadways. Links 
represent physical connections between nodes or actual roadways. In the electric power 
grid, generators, stations and consumers are taken to be the nodes of the network and 
power lines are represented by its links. Note that nodal components can be expanded 
accordingly.  
3.4.1. The general model for IPP 
The IPP is formulated as a nonlinear two-stage, stochastic program. Preparedness 
options are considered in the first-stage and remedial actions that can be taken in 
response to knowledge of the disaster scenario are determined in the second-stage in 
the form of recourse decisions. For simplicity, let , , , and  be vectors of action 
levels in network links, and  and  be vectors of component- and system-level 
performance for all ∈  and ∈ . The IPP is formulated generically, permitting its 
application in measuring and optimizing system performance with respect to any of the 






First stage:  
, ,
	   (23) 
s.t.  
, , ∈   (24) 
Second stage:   
, ,
	 ̅ , 	 (25) 
 s.t.  
, (26) 
, (27) 
∈ ,  (28) 
, , 0. (29) 
 
The objective function (23) seeks to maximize the expected system 
performance measure value given first-stage preparedness and second-stage recourse 
decisions for the set of possible disruption scenarios.  is the maximum value of 
the desired point performance measure ̅ , ,  {coping capacity, preparedness, 
robustness, flexibility, recovery, resilience}, for disruption scenario , that can be 
attained given specified maximum recovery period duration and budgetary limitations, 
enforced through constraints (26) and (27), respectively, in the second stage.  
Component-level action implementation cost and time variables in (26) and 
(27) are determined from equations (18)-(21). First-stage variables belong to the set 
, , :		 , 1, , , ∈ , enforcing non-negativity and retrofit and 
resource availability limits. Constraints (28) enforce non-negativity in second-stage 
decision variables. Finally, a general function  defined in constraints (29) describes 
the relationship between system-level performance  and component-level 





(17). A schematic of the how elements of the IPP contribute to the system performance 
level sought through its objective function is given in Figure 3-8.  
 
Figure 3-8 Schematic connecting IPP elements to its objective function 
This formulation builds on a two-stage stochastic program introduced by 
Miller-Hooks et al. (2012) for the problem of measuring and maximizing resilience 
specific to intermodal freight transport. In that earlier work, preparedness and recovery 
actions are given by a set of discrete options, creating an integer stochastic program. 
The IPP expands on that program to provide a general model for measuring and 
maximizing not only resilience, but coping capacity, preparedness, robustness, 
flexibility, and recovery (Figure 3-2). It further permits its use over a wide array of 
applications. These performance measures are affected by the system’s inherent 
characteristics and actions that can be taken through expansion, retrofit, resource 
availability and response actions, together comprising the components of the proposed 
IPF as described in Figure 3-2 and Table 3-1.  
A more generic representation of actions is permitted through the use of 
continuous action variables related to expansion, retrofit, resource availability and 
response. This permits an abstract notion of action and, thus, an infinite set of choices 
in terms of action levels. In the prior work, a response action would be defined in a 
very specific way. For example, it might be exercising an option to borrow two gantry 

























remove water from a flooded area. In the proposed IPP, the response action is given by 
an action level. Action level 0.5, thus, indicates that a response action of some type 
should be taken to increase the post-event performance of a specific system component 
by 50% of its pre-event performance level. Thus, if the component’s performance is at 
25% of its pre-event performance level, the resulting performance level of the 
component will be raised to 75% of its pre-event performance level. This use of 
continuous decision variables aids in clarifying the effects of budget limitations, 
permitted recovery period durations, and interaction effects between variable classes. 
3.4.2. Mathematical structure of IPP 
The general IPP is a nonlinear, stochastic program with nonlinear first and second-stage 
constraints and potentially nonlinear objective functions for both stages. The properties 
of the objective functions depend, in part, on the performance measure that is 
employed, which is a function of the application (e.g. a measure of connectivity needed 
to assess performance of computer systems or a measure involving travel time 
applicable for passenger transport systems). The mathematical properties of the IPP are 
explored in this section.  
Several bilinear terms are employed within the constraints of the IPP, resulting 
in nonconvexity in the feasible region. Bilinear terms involving first-stage decision 
variables  and  appear in the budget constraint (27) and component-system 
relationship constraint (29), which uses link performance equations (16). Bilinear terms 
involving the multiplication of first- and second-stage decision variables, specifically	  
and , appear in constraints (26) and (27) which depend on equations (21) and (22). 





model. For example, if one seeks the coping capacity of a system, all of the decision 
variables associated with preparedness and response actions will drop out of the model.  
Table 3-4 synopsizes both the application of the IPP in terms of which decision 
variables or model parameters will be eliminated and which constraints will drop out 
as a consequence of variable elimination and general problem properties that result. 
Whether or not additional nonlinearities or nonconvexities exist within the 
model depends on the specific application. That is, the specific form of the objectives 
and constraints depends on the performance specification and goals. Consider an 
application where the goal is to maximize throughput. The objective can be given as a 
linear function of flow with linear flow conservation and limitation constraints. Now, 
consider an alternative application where the objective is to minimize total travel time 
and travel time is a function of flow. Such a problem will be nonlinear, but convex. 
Last, consider an application seeking a user equilibrium solution as is typical in 
vehicular traffic applications. In such an application, the objective is identical to that 
of the system optimal problem, but the program will contain complementarity 
constraints needed to ensure that the solution assigns traffic such that no user can 
improve his/her travel time by unilaterally switching paths (Wardrop 1952). Such 
complementarity constraints introduce nonlinearities and nonconvexities. Additional 
constraints associated with the specific application will appear as part of constraints 































nd stage variables 
Coping capacity , , ,  All except , , 0      
Preparedness  (17), (21)~(22), (26) ‐  -  
Robustness 	 ,  (17), (20)~(22), (26) ‐  -  
Flexibility ,  
(13)~(16), (17) for ∈
, , , , (18)~(19) 




(13)~(16), (17) for ∈
, , , , (18)~(19) 
-     - 
Resilience - - - -  - 
 
3.4.3. Solution methodology 
The most general version of the IPP is nonlinear and nonconvex. Decomposition by 
stage results in a second-stage program that is linear in the level of response variable 
λ. Thus, for applications where constraints (29) are convex, the second-stage problem 
for fixed values of first-stage variables is convex and solution can be obtained using a 
generalized L-shaped method designed for nonlinear, stochastic programs. Such a 
method is based on generalized Benders decomposition (GBD) developed from 
concepts of Benders decomposition (Geoffrion 1972). In general, these methods 
decompose the program into stages that exploit a temporal (or sequential) relationship 
between decision variables. Solution first projects the problem onto first-stage 
variables and then applies a cutting plane technique to solve the resulting problem. 
Optimality cuts are also generated for inclusion in the first-stage program, iteratively 





convergence is achieved between solution values of the two stages. The projection of 
IPP onto , , and  can be formulated as in (30).  
, ,
, , 			 . .		 , , ∈ ∩ , (30) 
where , ,
, ,
	 ̅ , 		 . .		 , , , , , , 0  for 
, , , , , , 0 representing second-stage constraints (26)~(29). 
The additional restriction on the feasible set of first-stage variables is enforced by 
, , :	 . With , feasibility of , ,  is guaranteed (complete 
recourse), i.e. , , :	 , , , , , , 0 for some ∈ . 
The problem (30) is decomposed into a master problem (MP) and a set of subproblems 
(SP), one for each disruption scenario realization, :  
:  
, , ,
	 			 . .		 , , , , , ∈ ∩  (31) 
:   
, ,
	 ̅ , 				 . .		 , , , , , , 0  (32) 
The MP is an equivalent version of the original IPP (30) involving a set of 
optimality cuts given by , , , where  is an approximation of , , . In 
iteration , the solution value of the MP, , provides an upper bound (UB) on the 
optimal solution value of (30). The values of , ,  are tentatively fixed to , , and 
, i.e. the solution from the MP, in each SP. Thus, , , , computed over 
solutions of the SPs, provides a lower bound (LB) on the optimal solution. Solutions to 
the SPs are used within a cutting plane technique to generate a new optimality cut for 
inclusion in the MP. The solution process continues until UB LB, at which point 
optimality is achieved. An overview of Benders-based decomposition methods is given 






Figure 3-9 The general flowchart of Benders-based decomposition methods 
For some measures, like preparedness and robustness, when constraints (29) are 
convex, the SPs will be convex since there are no bilinear terms. Thus, the conventional 
L-shaped method of Van Slyke and Wets (1969) designed for separable, linear and 
stochastic programs may also be applied. In this method, optimality cuts are generated 
by linear programming duality. Let second-stage constraints be represented by 
, , , , , , where  and  are separated 
functions of first- and second-stage variables, respectively, and  is a vector of 
modeling parameters that depend on disruption scenario . The optimality cut is 
generated by replacing , ,  in (31) by its dual objective function:  
 – , , , , (33) 
where  is the value vector of dual variables corresponding to second-stage 
constraints at iteration v.  
If, on the other hand, constraints (29) are nonlinear but convex, the generalized 
L-shaped method, which exploits Lagrangian relaxation of , ,  in (31), will be 
required:  
̅ , 	 , , , , , , , 0, (34) 
Stop
 Solve SPs on , ,  
 Update LB 
Initialization Solve MP , , ,  
Add 







where , , , and  are vectors delineating the optimal solution and 
corresponding optimal Lagrangian multipliers for the SPs associated with scenario  at 
iteration v.   
For applications involving flexibility, recovery and resilience, bilinear terms   
exist in equations (21)-(22), which ultimately feed into (30), resulting in 
nonseparability of decision variables in the SPs. Consequently, Benders-based 
decomposition methods fail to generate valid optimality cuts, and thus, will not 
guarantee convergence to the global optimum (Geoffrin 1972, Floudas et al. 1989). In 
fact, these methods require that a certain property (property P), in which the explicit 
form of the optimality cuts must be generated independent of first-stage variables, hold 
(Geoffrin 1972); however, this property does not hold where the variables are 
nonseparable, the case here. Local optimality is, however, achieved through the 
application of the generalized L-shaped method (Floudas et al. 1989, Bagajewicz and 
Manousiouthakis 1991). The quality of the solution depends largely on the starting 
values of first-stage decision variables. A multi-start version of the generalized L-
shaped method may lead to improved local solutions. For the most difficult nonconvex 
programs with bilinear terms, for small problem instances, it is possible to obtain 
globally optimum solutions using, for example, a branch-and-reduce solution 
methodology as found in commercial software packages like BARON (Sahinidis and 
Mohit 2007). Alternatively, bilinear terms can be linearized as suggested in 
(McCormick 1976), where a linear relaxation of the bilinear terms using convex 
envelopes is proposed. The conventional L-shaped method can be applied to the relaxed 





For applications involving coping capacity, action variables are forced to zero. 
As variables are forced out of the program, some constraints drop out. Consequently, 
the stochastic program is decomposable by scenario. If constraints (29) are convex, and 
each scenario-dependent program will be a convex deterministic program, making the 
problem easy to solve. If, on the other hand, constraints (29) are nonconvex, solution 
of nonconvex, deterministic, scenario-dependent programs will be required. In both 
cases, however, decomposition by stage is not required. 
Table 3-4 summarizes the properties of the IPP for each measure assuming 
convexity in constraints (29). Generally, when constraints (29) are nonconvex, dual 
decomposition methods can be applied. See, for example, (Rockafellar and Wets 1991; 
Caroe and Schultz 1999). Relying on concepts of column generation, these methods 
decompose the problem by scenario. Convexity is not required. Alternatively, 
convexification methods, including outer approximation techniques (e.g. Horst et al. 
1992), can be applied; however, solutions obtained through such approximate methods 
do not guarantee locally or globally optimal solutions for the original problem. 
3.5. Illustrative Numerical Example 
The IPP can be applied to study the performance of many networked infrastructure-
based systems. For a chosen application, p and P must be specified. To show how the 
proposed framework and modeling construct operates, the IPP framework is applied to 
the freight-rail problem class addressed in (Miller-Hooks et al. 2012), where the 
resilience concept involving inherent coping capacity, along with preparedness and 





In the context of freight flows, p is a vector of link flows and P represents total 
throughput. Numerous applications, including passenger transport, water transport 
through pipes, and electricity supply through power grids, involve flow-based 
performance. 
3.5.1. Specifying the example IPP 
To specify the IPP for this application, constraints (29) must incorporate flow 
conservation, link capacity and demand limitation constraints. For background 
purposes, a generic path-based maximum flow (throughput) formulation is given by 
(T). 
 (T)   	 ∑ ∑ ,∈∈    
s.t.  
∑ ,∈ ,					 ∈    
∑ ∑ . ,∈∈ , ∀ ∈    
0 ,				∀ ∈ ,     
where ,  is the flow though path  between O-D pair .  is the set of O-D pairs 
and   is the set of paths  connecting O-D pair . The objective is to maximize the 
flow between all O-D pairs representing system-level performance while 
simultaneously limiting flow along all paths between a particular O-D pair  to the 
demand of that O-D pair, . The component-level performance is captured in the 
vector of link flows,  the flow along link , which is limited by the link’s capacity, 
. Path-link incidence indicators,  , are set to 1 if path k uses link a for shipping 
flow between O-D pair w, and zero otherwise. For ∈  and ∈ , 	, let 





be the flow and capacity for link a under scenario . Constraints (29) in the IPP 
formulation are captured by linear constraints (35)-(37). 
∑ , ,∈ ,					∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ ,   (35) 
∑ ∑ . , ,∈∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , 	  (36) 
0 ,				∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ ,     (37) 
System-level performance is measured by ∑ ∑ , ,∈∈ , 
for ∈  and ∈ , . ∑ ∈ , assuming that all demand can be served 
within level-of-service bounds prior to a disruption event. This term will appear in the 
denominator of the objective function. For performance in terms of resilience, these 
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s.t.   , , ∈ ∩ . 
 
3.5.2. The network  
The model from Section 3.5.1 and related versions of the IPP-T that seek to maximize 
coping capacity, preparedness, robustness, flexibility and recovery are demonstrated 
on the Double-Stack Container Network (shown in Figure 3-10), representing a rail 
freight network connecting 8 cities in the western United States (Morlok and Chang 
2004). 17 O-D pairs are chosen for this case study. Five classes of disruption scenarios, 
based on scenarios developed in (Chen and Miller-Hooks 2012), are considered: 
bombing, earthquake, flooding, terrorist attacks, and intermodal attack. In practice, 





unprepared system: ∈ . Correlation between link capacities under each scenario 
helps structure the event by type.  
 
Figure 3-10 Double-stack container network (Morlok and Chang 2004)   
 
Table 3-5 Values of modeling parameters 
Link 
Action implementation costs (×$1000) Response action implementation time (days) 
       
1 78 1560 35 39 156 18 90 
2 37 31 9 10 39 3 15 
3 273 819 37 41 164 12 60 
4 334 167 26 29 117 9 45 
5 35 702 16 18 70 6 30 
6 240 200 56 62 250 18 90 
7 91 273 12 14 55 6 30 
8 457 228 36 40 160 12 60 
9 103 2067 47 52 207 15 75 
10 105 87 25 27 109 9 45 
11 351 1053 47 53 211 15 75 
12 669 334 53 59 234 18 90 
13 117 2340 53 59 234 18 90 
14 210 175 49 55 218 18 90 
15 475 1424 64 71 285 21 105 
16 490 245 39 43 172 12 60 
17 70 1404 32 35 140 12 60 
18 168 140 39 44 176 15 75 
19 273 819 37 41 164 12 60 
20 279 139 22 24 98 9 45 
21 68 1365 31 34 137 12 60 
22 300 250 70 78 312 24 120 
23 462 1385 62 69 277 21 105 
24 446 223 35 39 156 21 105 
 
The Monte Carlo method that captures this correlation structure described in 




































specifically 100 realizations for each scenario classification.  is set to $400,000 and 
recovery period  is assumed to be two days. Parameter settings are given in Table 3-
5. These parameters are hypothetical and are chosen only to illustrate the proposed 
concepts and solution methodologies.  
3.5.3. Application of solution methodologies 
As a result of convexity of constraints (35)-(37), for any measure considered herein 
and for a fixed set of first-stage variables, the second stage problem of IPP-T is convex 
and Benders-based decomposition methods can be employed. The solution 
methodology is implemented in GAMS calling CPLEX and BARON solvers for linear 
and nonlinear problems, respectively.  
For coping capacity, IPP-T is decomposed by scenario, producing a set of linear 
programs, each of which can be solved using the linear solver in CPLEX. For 
preparedness and robustness, the conventional L-shaped method can be applied. Each 
nonlinear MP is solved by BARON, which guarantees a global optimum. A faster 
alternative with the capability of solving larger problem instances is to linearize bilinear 
terms   in MP using the convex relaxation method of McCormick (1976). This 
permits solution using any linear solver. In McCormick’s method, four constraints are 
introduced that restrict the variables in the bilinear term in relation to lower and upper 
bounds. Specifically, let   represent the MP bilinear term for ∈ , and 
, , , and  be lower and upper bounds of retrofit and expansion level variables. 
McCormick’s constraints are formulated for each link  in (39). 
 , 
(39) 






, ∈ .  
Specifically in IPP, =0 for ∈ . According to feasibility set , 
1 for ∈ . Using constraints (27), in conjunction with definitions of (18) and (19), 
	  can be defined by setting other action level variables equal to zero. Then, 
 for ∈ . Given these bounds, constraints (39) can be replaced by the following 
constraints (40). These constraints are added to the MP.  
0, , , , ∈ . (40) 
Three different approaches are applied to solve the IPP-T associated with each 
of these measures. First, the extended version of each stochastic program, in which 
constraints are explicitly defined over all realizations, is solved by BARON permitting 
an optimality gap of 1%. To assess the applicability of the generalized L-shaped 
method, this method is applied with a starting point in which all first-stage variables 
are set to zero. As mentioned in Section 3.4.3, this approach can only guarantee locally 
optimal solutions for this application. Finally, bilinear terms are convexified using 
McCormick’s method. This approach creates linearity and separability in the IPP-T. 
  terms in the SPs are replaced by a vector  in which each element 
  for ∈ . Lower bounds of involved action level variables 0. 
With respect to the feasibility set , the upper bound of resource availability, , is set 
to be 1, i.e. 1. According to constraints (26), a valid upper bound of response 
action level, , is set to , assuming 1, and the following linear 





 , ,  
 , 0, ∈ .  
(41) 
In the case of resilience,   terms must also be convexified. This can be 
achieved through a similar replacement of terms and addition of bounding constraints 
(39) in the MP. 
3.5.4. Numerical results 
Results of the numerical experiments for competing solution methodologies are given 
in Figure 3-11. Solutions were obtained quickly and, thus, computation times are not 
reported. Analysis of the results shown in the figure indicates a system coping capacity 
of 56%. Thus, with no preparedness and response actions, the system has an expected 
throughput of just above half of its desired value. Preparedness and robustness 
measures are identical at 77%, indicating the value of preparedness actions. Their 
equivalence is expected, because these measures only differ in the inclusion of resource 
availability, which can only contribute to improved performance if response actions 
can be taken that exploit their existence. Greater improvement is obtained through 
response actions, including those that take advantage of resources made available 
through preparedness steps, as compared with other preparedness actions, as indicated 
by a flexibility value of 83%. 26% of system throughput is due to recovery actions taken 
in isolation, i.e. performance in terms of recovery is 26%. Thus, if complete system 
failure were to occur as a consequence of a disaster event, recovery actions could result 
in this level of throughput. Finally, taking all actions permissible, a resilience level of 





Figure 3-11 Comparison of results using different solution methodologies for each optimization 
measure 
Modeling the action levels over a continuum permits sensitivity studies and 
enables insights that do not depend on the specific choice of potential available 
preparedness and response actions (i.e. a toolbox of pre- and post-event options) 
required in prior related works. For instance, the impact of budget and recovery time 
on resilience can be depicted, as in Figure 3-12, through resilience indifference curves, 
requiring continuous values of action level variables that contribute to resilience.    








Decomposition by scenario (global solution)
L-shaped decomposition (global solution)
BARON solver (local solution)
L-shaped method with convexified bilinear terms (upper bound)




















3.6. Conclusions and Extensions 
The proposed conceptualization of resilience and related measures, along with 
optimization framework and solution methods, provide a structure and needed tools for 
assessing system performance under potential future disruption scenarios. These 
further aid decision-makers with prioritization of preparedness and response actions 
and, thus, the development of investment strategies. Improvements in pre-event 
preparedness and post-event response capabilities aid in protecting the civil 




















Chapter 4: Resilience of Airport Runway and Taxiway 
Pavement Networks  
4.1. Introduction 
Air transportation is one of the fastest growing modes of transportation globally. A 
recent market outlook (Boeing, 2012) forecasts a steady annual growth in demand of 
approximately 5%, implying that air traffic should double every 14 years. Currently, 
there are about 44 thousand airports worldwide, of which approximately one third have 
a paved network of runways and taxiways (CIA, 2012). The latter subset, which is the 
focus of this study, carries the vast majority of air passengers and cargo. In comparison 
with road or rail systems, airport pavement networks are compact in size and have a 
reduced degree of topological interconnectivity. Also, they provide service to 
‘vehicles’ that are less tolerant to physical distress than other means of motorized 
transportation. As a direct consequence, the functionality of an entire airport may be 
impaired considerably even when a small part of its runway and taxiway network 
sustains damage. Pavement damage can be classified into four generic types, applicable 
to both asphalt and concrete pavements (FAA, 2007): (i) cracking - unplanned fracture 
lines traversing the surface, (ii) disintegration - breakup and fragmentation of the 
materials into small loose particles, (iii)  distortion - permanent change in surface shape 
and elevations relative to original grades, and (iv) loss of skid resistance - increased 
surface slipperiness. The occurrence of any of the above distress types can lead to loss 






There are a myriad of events that might cause the aforementioned pavement 
damage types; these can also be classified into four broad categories: (i) extreme 
climate or geological events, (ii) random operational events, (iii) natural deterioration 
in combination with ill-timed maintenance, and (iv) intentional malicious acts such as 
terrorism or war. The first category encompasses those meteorological conditions not 
envisioned or not accounted for in the design of the facility. As an example, extreme 
high or low ambient temperatures (or fast transition between them) can cause airport 
pavements to abruptly buckle and crack or become locally distorted. When weather 
events include long dry spells or exceptional wet conditions, pavements founded on 
active soils can become severely cracked and distorted (McKeen, 1981). Snow/ice 
events negatively affect not only skid resistance - they can also induce cracking and 
distortion. In thunderstorms, when lightning strikes a concrete surface, spalling is 
usually the result (The Aberdeen group, 1984). Also included under this category are 
earthquakes, floods and tsunamis that can bring about crippling damage from any of 
the four abovementioned generic types.  
Under random operational events, pavement damage can be caused by tire 
blowouts during takeoff or landing resulting in surface gouging (i.e. disintegration and 
distortion). Another probable ‘operational’ event can be a localized oil or fuel spill, 
which reduces the pavement skid resistance and produces disintegration (especially for 
asphalt pavements) leading to Foreign Object Debris (FOD) danger. Additionally, the 
need may arise to permit pavement overloading, i.e. allow aircraft operations with 
weights that far exceed the original design. This may come about in disaster relief or 





emergency landing. In such cases, the sudden ‘abuse’ may be detrimental to the 
pavement network.  
As for the third damage category, it is not uncommon in these economically 
constrained times to find runways and taxiways that have deteriorated to the verge of 
functionality loss, ‘setting the stage’ for subsequent unexpected shutdowns and 
unplanned demand for remedial actions to be taken. This situation usually arises when 
the natural pavement deterioration curve accelerates with age. Finally, acts of terrorism 
or war may involve targeted attacks on airports, with the aim of disabling the runway 
and taxiway systems to disrupt or completely disable takeoff and landing capabilities. 
This is usually ‘accomplished’ by cracking and distorting select/critical network 
components by means of explosives.  
The economic impact of runway or full airport closure can be very significant. 
Specific impact estimates are given in (ARTBA, 2010) with respect to three major 
recent airport and airspace shutdown events. An 8-day shutdown of the Bangkok 
Airport in 2008 due to protests is reported to have cost the Thai economy over $8 
billion. Incurred losses affected not only the well-being of stranded passengers, but 
specific industries with valuable, perishable cargo, as well as tourism to the area. $1.4 
and $1.7 billion in revenue losses resulted from the three-day nationwide airport 
shutdown after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and multi-nation airport shutdown for the 2010 
Eyjafjallajökull volcanic eruption in Iceland, respectively. On a smaller scale, daily 
runway shutdowns for pavement maintenance have significant local impact. For 
example, European airports shut down nearly 4 hours per month due to FOD incidents 





airport annually are on the order of $20 million. The cost to the top 300 European 
airports alone, including indirect costs due to, for example, fuel inefficiencies and delay 
costs, result in an estimated $12 billion in annual FOD-related expenses (McCreary, 
2008). Additionally, cost estimates due to cancelling, ground holding and rerouting 
flights for only a one hour closure of runways at London’s Heathrow Airport are 
between 700,000 and 1,250,000 euros (Pejovic et al., 2009). These estimates exclude 
additional substantial emissions costs due to increased fuel burn and other external 
costs. 
The overall objective of this work is to transfer and apply the concept of 
resilience, as proposed in (Miller-Hooks, 2012) for rail-based intermodal cargo 
container networks, to the airport arena. Taking a multi-hazard perspective, resilience 
is measured in terms of the system’s ability to provide for continuity of operations via 
existing attributes (topological and procedural) post-event. In this definition, the innate 
capability to resist and absorb disruption impacts through redundancies and 
underutilized capacity, the effects of adaptive actions that can be taken post-event, and 
the preparedness decisions that support these actions, are all integrated into the concept 
of resilience.  
A plethora of works in the literature consider resilience, robustness, flexibility 
and other notions of network performance under disruption in the context of 
transportation and other critical civil infrastructure systems; see for example (Miller-
Hooks et al., 2012; Bruneau et al., 2003; Amin and Horowitz, 2008; Shinozuka, 2009; 
Xu, 2009; Gopalakrishnin and Peeta, 2010). However, none of these consider 





systems have also been developed in the literature for risk analysis of critical 
infrastructure systems in natural disasters, such as flooding (Multi Infrastructure Map 
for the Evaluation of the Impact of Crisis Scenarios (MIMESIS) (Rosato et al., 2011)), 
earthquake (e.g. Risks from Earthquake Damage to Roadway Systems (REDAR) 
(Werner et al., 2006)), human-caused malicious acts (e.g. Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Decision Support System (CIP-DSS) (Bush, 2005)), and “all-hazards” (e.g. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Modelling and Analysis (CIPMA) (Australian 
Government, 2009)). These systems generally include a disaster scenario generator to 
create system inputs and support decisions by providing estimates of decision 
consequences and infrastructure risk to damage and failure. As compared to the above 
cited tools, the approach suggested herein offers greater specificity to the airport arena 
with a high level of mathematical rigor. In effect, the vast majority of works related to 
civilian airport disaster management focus on aviation security and vulnerability and 
do not address the physical infrastructure that supports take-offs and landings. 
Perhaps the most related work in the literature to the problem at hand deals with 
military airfields under wartime situations. Wegner (1982) addressed the optimal 
sequencing of repair actions by a single team to damaged taxiways. A simple, ad-hoc 
path-based heuristic is proposed for use on a reduced network containing only damaged 
arcs that seeks the schedule that minimizes average time that aircraft located at parking 
areas are denied access to the runways. Several limiting assumptions were made, 
including the availability of only one repair team, suggesting that all repair actions be 
taken in series, and deterministically known repair times. Solution quality of the 





branch-and-bound for 100 problem instances each associated with a single damage 
situation. Several works from the 90’s describe pavement materials and procedures for 
Rapid Runway Repair (RRR) applications (Chang, 1990; Saroni, 1990). More recently, 
a methodology for computing the repair duration of a given Minimum Operating Strip 
(MOS) was proposed to aid in MOS selection, and thus, time to operation (Duncan, 
2007). The Critical Path Method was suggested on an activity network representation 
of repair tasks to determine the repair duration.  
In this chapter, the problem of evaluating and optimizing the resilience of a 
single airport’s runway and taxiway network, referred to herein as the Airport 
Resilience Problem (ARP), is conceptualized and mathematically formulated as a two-
stage stochastic integer program. The program captures complexities of modeling 
taxiway/runway capacities with bi-directional operations, optimal runway 
configuration selection under varying meteorological conditions, and minimum 
operating strip (MOS) restrictions, among other practical requirements (see Section 
4.2). Novel modeling techniques and constraint specifications with applicability in 
airport ground traffic management beyond this emergency application and system-wide 
interactions are captured through a flow-based formulation. Budgetary, time, space, 
and physical resource limitations are also imposed. The program considers a myriad of 
potential future network disruption scenarios from multiple hazard classes based on the 
aforementioned distress-types and causal-categories, as well as their occurrence 
probabilities and potential consequences. Randomly arising meteorological conditions 
and their effects are also taken into consideration. An exact solution methodology based 





mathematical model and solution methodology might be embedded within a decision 
support tool is described (Section 4.4). The tool is subsequently applied to a specific 
case study on which its capabilities and applicability to the airport and pavement arenas 
are demonstrated (Section 4.5). 
4.2. Formulation of the Airport Resilience Problem 
The mathematical formulation of the ARP exploits a network representation of an 
airport’s runway and taxiway pavement infrastructure. Let ⋃ , ,
⋃ ⋃  be an undirected graph, where  represents a supersource, i.e. the 
terminal, and  represents a supersink, i.e. the airways.  and  are sets of arcs (or 
links) representing taxiways and runways, respectively, and  is the set of vertices 
representing connections between these facilities.  is the set of virtual arcs 
connecting physical network elements to the supersource and sink. While runway and 
taxiway arcs are undirected, any arc can only be used in one direction at a given point 
in time. Where appropriate, directed arc terminology is adopted.  
The network is considered under a set of disruption events (i.e. network states) 
characterized by damage severity, type (climate/geological, operational, natural 
deterioration, and terrorism) and location, along with current meteorological conditions 
in terms of temperature, wind velocity, precipitation and visibility. The 
interrelationship between damage to the network and meteorological conditions is also 
considered. Damage may occur in multiple locations and its distribution over the 
pavement network depends on its cause. The likelihood of an event falling within any 





Thus, each disruption event is equivalently a damage-meteorological scenario denoted 
by	ξ. 
A unique runway usage-pattern, in which particular runways operate in a pre-
specified direction, called the runway configuration (Swedish, 1981), is selected 
through the specification of binary variables ∈ , where  is the set of possible 
runway configurations that could be taken in different conditions and  indicates 
whether or not runway configuration  is ‘selected’ under damage-meteorological 
scenario ξ. Specification of the airport pavement network also involves runway and 
taxiway capacities on network flow rates. Flows are distinguished by aircraft size 
(small/large) and maneuver type (takeoff/landing). Capacities associated with each arc 
in  and  describe the rate at which aircraft can be served by the taxiways and 
runways, respectively. This rate depends on both meteorological conditions and facility 
use details.  
The ARP seeks the optimal preparedness actions (resources that are made 
available) given all randomly generated ‘disruptions’, their probabilities of occurrence 
and the knowledge that the optimal recourse action will be invoked given available 
resources if an event is actualized. Mathematically, the solution takes the form of a 
two-stage integer stochastic program. Given that one of hundreds or thousands of 
potential disruption events may arise in the future, the first stage seeks optimal 
decisions pertaining to putting the appropriate personnel and agreements in place from 
which repair crews of skilled and certified workers (e.g. equipment operators, 
engineers, and electricians) will be formed and purchasing and prepositioning of heavy 





taken a priori, i.e. prior to the occurrence (generation) of a disruption event. The second 
stage determines the post-event, i.e. a posteriori, recourse actions required to 
ameliorate damage impact once the event has occurred and damage assessment has 
been conducted. Thus, decisions taken a priori must support response actions needed 
for a host of damage situations.  
Repair materials (e.g. aggregates, hot mix asphalt, Portland cement concrete, 
sealants) are assumed to be readily obtainable when needed. The choice of a repair 
action depends on a variety of factors, including: the damage type and extent, 
meteorological conditions, availability and cost of existing resources, available repair 
time, expected repair life and therefore willingness to tolerate long-term maintenance 
requirements, and willingness to restrict landing and/or take-off operations. The time 
interval required for implementing a chosen repair action depends on the type and 
dispersal of the damage, whether the task is undertaken using internal resources or if 
external resources (involving added start-up time) are used, and prevailing 
meteorological conditions. The latter conditions affect not only the repair time due to 
material properties and human/machine efficiency (Duncan, 2007), but may even 
necessitate selection of a different repair technology to cope with the situation. These 
conditions are accounted for in the model through repair-time multipliers. The solution 
is guided by an objective function that seeks the maximum expected post-event, post-
repair taxiway and runway flow rates over all aircraft classes and runway maneuvers.  
Nomenclature employed within the mathematical program is as follows: 
 = set of links ( ∪ ∪ , where  is the set of taxiways,  is the 
set of runways, and  is the set of added dummy links  
 = set of runway configurations  
, ́ ⊂  = subset of taxiways connected to a runway ́ ∈  (entrance/exit taxiways)  





́  = set of segments of runway ́ ∈   
́ ⊂ ́  = subset of segments of runway ́ ∈  following (leading to) entrance (exit) 
taxiway ∈ , ́   
,  = super source and sink nodes  
W = set of maneuver types ∈ ,  for arrival and departure 
maneuvers between nodes  and , respectively  
 = set of repair actions   
 = set of equipment types   
 = maximum number of equipment type  that could possibly be provided    
 = maximum number of teams that might be deployed    
 = set of aircraft classes (sizes)   
,  = required storage space for n pieces of equipment type   
 = total available storage space 
, ,  = set of active paths  for runway configuration , maneuver type  and 
aircraft class   
,  = original demand for maneuver type  and aircraft class  (arrival and 
departure demands)  
 = capacity envelop for taxiway ∈  representing directional flow tradeoff 
 = capacity of taxiway ∈  for both directions  and  under meteorological 
conditions of scenario  
 = overall capacity envelop for runway configuration  representing total 
arrival and departure flow tradeoff  
́  = capacity envelop of runway ́ ∈  representing arrival and departure flow 
tradeoff of that individual runway  
 = large scalar 
,
, , ,  = taxiway path-link incidence (=1 if path  for runway configuration  with 
maneuver type  for aircraft class  uses direction  of taxiway ∈ , and 
=0 otherwise) 
́ ,
, ,   runway path-link incidence (=1 if path  for runway configuration  with 
maneuver type  for aircraft class  uses runway ́ ∈ , and =0 otherwise) 
,  = scenario-repair relationship parameter, which is set to 1 if repair action  can 
be taken under the meteorological conditions of scenario , and 0 otherwise. 
́ ,  = equipment-repair relationship parameter, which is set to 1 if equipment  is 
needed for a team to take repair action , and 0 otherwise. 
= cost of employing  teams ( 0, 1, … ) 
,  = cost of providing  pieces of equipment type   
, , ,  
= implementation cost and time of repair action  by external resources in 
taxiway ∈  under the meteorological conditions of scenario , 
respectively 
, , ,  = implementation cost and time of repair action  by internal resources 
(employed teams and equipment) in taxiway ∈  under the 
meteorological conditions of scenario , respectively 
́ , , ́ ,  
= implementation cost and time of repair action  by external resources in 
segment  of runway ́ ∈  under the meteorological conditions of scenario 
, respectively  
́ , , ́ ,  = implementation cost and time of repair action  by internal resources 
(employed teams and equipment) in segment  of runway ́ ∈  under the 
meteorological condition of scenario , respectively 
, , ́ ,  = maintenance cost of taxiway ∈  and segment  of runway ́ ∈  if 
repair action  is taken, respectively   
 = maximum allowed repair time under scenario  
 = total budget 





functional, and =0 otherwise), respectively  
́ , ́  = pre- and post-repair damage state of segment  of runway ́ ∈  under 
scenario  (=1 if functional, and =0 otherwise), respectively  
́  = length of runway segments  of runway ́ ∈  
,  = MOS requirements (minimum required length of runways for maneuver type 
 and aircraft class  to use that runway) 
, ́  = length of consecutive of post-repair active segments of runway ∈  
following (leading to) entrance (exit) taxiway ∈ , ́  under scenario  
,  = binary variable indicating whether or not , ́  is longer than ,  of 
maneuver type  and aircraft type  under scenario  (= 1 if longer, and = 0 
otherwise) 
Pre-event decision variables: 
 
 
= binary variable indicating that  teams are employed (= 1 if exactly  teams 
are employed and = 0 otherwise) 
,  = binary variable indicating if  units of equipment type  are purchased (= 1 if 
provided and = 0 otherwise) 
Post-event decision variables: 
 = binary variable indicating whether or not runway configuration  is selected 
under scenario  (= 1 if selected, and = 0 otherwise) 
, , ,  = binary variable indicating whether or not repair action  is taken by external 
and internal (airport repair team and equipment) resources, respectively, on 
taxiway ∈  under scenario  (= 1 if taken and = 0 otherwise) , 
respectively 
́ , , ́ ,  = binary variable indicating whether or not repair action  is taken by external 
and internal resources, respectively, on segment  of runway ́ ∈  under 
scenario  (= 1 if taken and = 0 otherwise), respectively   
, ,  = post-repair flow rate along path  for runway configuration , maneuver 
type  and aircraft type  under scenario  
 
Airport Resilience Problem-ARP:  
		   s.t. {resource limitations: (4)-(8)}, (1) 
where  




{Taxiway capacity estimation: (9)-(16)    
 Runway capacity estimation: (17)-(20)   
Operational constraints: (21)-(24-1,2)    
 Runway configuration selection: (25)-(27)    
 Taxiway/runway segment post-repair damage states: (28)-(32)  
 Repair period limit: (33)-(36)   
 Budget and post-repair flow restrictions: (37)-(39)}  
 







The objective of the ARP is to maximize resilience. Airport resilience,	 , , can be 
mathematically defined as in (3) as the expected fraction of total pre-event demand in 
terms of arrival and departure flows that can be met post-repair with repair time 
limitation  and budget B. 
 ,




	    
(3) 
Noting that the denominator is a constant, the denominator can be dropped from 
the objective function and reintroduced after solution of the ARP is obtained.  
4.2.2. Resource limitations 
Resources in terms of repair crews and equipment must be put into place in advance if 
they are to support repair operations. While a virtually infinite supply of personnel and 
equipment can be obtained, limitations on the availability of these resources are applied 
to align with reasonable practice in a civilian airport environment and work-space 
restrictions that if violated would hamper productivity. While space may be copious in 
many locations, space may be limiting for airports located in highly populated locations 
and for those located in close proximity to water or other physical barriers. In the first 
stage, space for equipment storage is restricted. Binary first-stage variables as well as 
space limitations for equipment storage are defined through first-stage constraints (4)-
(8). Note that teams are assumed to be homogeneous and trained for all considered 
repair options.  
∑ 1   (4) 





∑ , ,,    (6) 
∈ 0,1 ,									 1,… ,  (7) 
, ∈ 0,1 ,				 				  ∀ ∈ , 1, … ,  (8) 
 
4.2.3. Taxiway capacity estimation 
For a given scenario, the capacity of a taxiway is a function of its original capacity 
under the same meteorological situation and whether or not it is functioning. A taxiway 
may be functioning if it was never damaged or if it was damaged and repaired. 
Specification of the capacity requires information about meteorological conditions and 
is thus given as a function of scenario: for each taxiway ∈ ,  represents 
capacity in terms of number of aircraft that can be served in one direction per unit time 
under meteorological conditions present under scenario  assuming no damage. The 
capacity is set to zero if the taxiway is damaged and not repaired under the given 
scenario. Considering a flow of aircraft with minimum headways, the capacity  
can be calculated based on the taxiway speed and minimum separation requirements 
under meteorological conditions of  (adapted from (Clayton and Capozzi, 2004)):   
,										   ∀ ∈  (9) 
where ̅  and ̅  are average taxiing speed (meters per hour) and minimum 
separation requirement (meters), respectively, for taxiway ∈  under 
meteorological conditions of scenario . A taxiway that is used alternatively for 
movements in both possible directions will have lower capacity than one used in only 
one direction, since the taxiway needs to be entirely cleared before a second aircraft 
may enter from the other direction. Therefore, the hourly capacity in a chosen direction 





2 / ̅  [= ̅ / ̅ ∙ 2 / ̅ ], where  is the length of the taxiway 
(meters).  
Let ,  be the flow in direction ∈ ,  of taxiway  under 
configuration . 
, ∑ ∑ ,
, , , , ,
∈ , ,, ,  ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ ,   (10)
where  and  refer to left and right directions under meteorological conditions of 
scenario . Taxiway flow in either direction is limited by lower and upper bounds, 0
, . 
In circumstances when two or more aircraft coming from the same direction are 
scheduled to use the same taxiway one directly after the other, a small capacity 
reduction is incurred. However, when consecutive aircraft movements along a taxiway 
are in opposing directions this capacity reduction is significantly larger. The rate of 
reduction in capacity per aircraft movement diminishes with increasing number of such 
movements. This is captured through consideration of tradeoffs in opposing flows. The 
tradeoff between flows by direction of any taxiway link can be written as ,
, . This tradeoff can be viewed graphically using a taxiway directional 
capacity envelope depicted in Figure 4-1.  
This depiction assumes a symmetric, nonconvex, piecewise linear function 
∙ ; it further presumes independence in the operation of taxiways, as well as 
runways. To address the non-convexity of ∙ , a piecewise linearization method of 
Sherali (2001) is employed in the formulation. As shown in the figure, the range on 





 for flows in both directions. Let ,  and ,  be disaggregated 
convex-combination weights associated to left and right endpoints of affine segment 
∈ 1,2,3 , and ,  be a binary variable indicating whether or not flow takes a value 
within that segment in taxiway  (=1 if flow takes a value within that segment, and =0 
otherwise).  
  
Figure 4-1 Directional capacity envelop in taxiways 
 
Thus, ∙  is given by constraints (11)-(15):  
, 	 , , ,
, 	 , ,    
∀ ∈ , ∈  (11)
, 	 	 , , ,
, ,   
∀ ∈ , ∈    (12)
, , , ,   ∀ ∈ , 
∈ 1,2,3   
(13)
∑ , 1,   ∀ ∈  (14)
, ∈ 0,1 ,   ∀ ∈ , 
∈ 1,2,3   
(15)
An advantage of this method to piecewise linearization is that it maintains a 













2001). A taxiway is assumed to function if it was never damaged or if it was damaged 
but repaired, i.e. 1; this is modeled through constraints (16). 
, ,   ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ ,    (16)
 
4.2.4. Runway capacity estimation 
Runway throughput rates are diminished when runways are used for both takeoffs and 
landings. They ultimately depend on the alternating pattern of maneuvers that is 
exercised. Likewise, minimum separation distances between aircraft using the 
runways, which directly affect runway flow rates, depend on the aircraft size mix and 
related wake vortex restrictions (Gilbo, 1993). Other physical impediments and 
operational dependencies, such as runway crossings, will further constrain flows. A 
common approach to modeling tradeoffs due to joint arrival-departure maneuvers on 
any runway and additional effects of capacity dependencies between runways is to use 
capacity envelopes. Capacity envelopes are given at the airport level and are estimated 
from historical data at the specific airport. The capacity envelopes are often convex and 
piecewise linear. They specify maximum effective arrival and departure flow rates 
achievable under chosen operating conditions by category (Visual Flight Rules (VFR), 
Marginal VFR (MVFR), Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), and Low IFR (LIFR)) and 
runway configuration, including runway dependencies (Gilbo, 1993). Noise and 
environmental ordinances may further limit capacities (Gilbo, 1993; FAA, 2004). 
Capacity envelopes are often developed from historical data at airports (e.g., (Frolow 
and Sinnott, 1989; Gilbo, 1993; Clayton and Capozzi, 2004), but optimization and 
statistical methods of estimation have also been proposed (Hu et al., 2007; Gilbo, 2003; 





Let ́ ,  be the total flow of maneuver type ∈ ,  through the set 
of runways exploited for configuration , , under meteorological conditions of 
scenario .  
́ , 	 ∑ ∑ ∑ ́ ,
, , , ,
́ ∈∈ , ,   ∀ ∈ , ∈ ,   (17)
Convex capacity envelopes of a runway configuration  can be given in terms 
of the total arrival flow as a function of total departure flow through active runways.  
́ , 	 ́ , ,    ∀ ∈  (18)
Typical airport-level capacity envelopes as produced by the FAA (2004) are 
presented in Figure 4-2 for a specific runway configuration under VFR and IFR 
conditions. As depicted in the figure, when the number of arrivals and/or departures is 
small, or when there are significantly more of one type than the other, runway 
capacities for both arrivals and departures remain at their highest levels. However, 
when there is significant mixing of both arrivals and departures, arrival and departure 
capacities decline. Because runway capacities are generally more restrictive than 
taxiway capacities, overall airport capacity is governed by the runway capacities.  
 














In addition to imposing capacity restrictions at the airport-level, capacities of 
individual runways are further restricted.  The individual runway capacity envelopes 
have similar form to that of the capacity envelope of a given runway configuration. Let 
́ ́
,  be the flow of maneuver type ∈ ,  in a runway ́  using 
configuration  under meteorological conditions of scenario . 
́ ́
, ∑ ∑ ́ ,
, , , ,
∈ , ,    ∀ ∈ , ́ ∈ , ∈ ,   (19)





, ,    ∀ ∈ , ́ ∈  (20)
where ́ ∙  is the capacity envelope of an individual runway ́ ∈  representing the 
arrival flow as a function of departure flow in an individual runway ́ ∈  under 
meteorological conditions present under scenario  . The effects of disaster impact on 
runway operations are described in the operational constraints section.  
4.2.5. Operational constraints 
Capacities of individual runways given the occurrence of a disruption scenario must be 
modeled. A runway will be affected by any damage it incurs, but it may be partially or 
fully operational for certain purposes if an MOS remains or is restored due to the 
intelligent selection of repair actions within the runway when multiple segments have 
sustained damage. It is recognized that in civilian airports (unlike military applications) 
the use of a runway that has incurred damage to any portion is typically prohibited. 
Nonetheless, the concept of MOS may be relevant in extreme conditions and is, 
therefore, considered by the model for the sake of generality. It is easily annulled by 





 The capacity of a runway with given MOS for a given maneuver and aircraft 
class is nonzero only if the runway meets the minimum length requirement for that 
maneuver type and aircraft class. This is captured through constraints (21)-(29). The 
flow rate associated with a given maneuver type and aircraft class under a chosen 
configuration is permitted along an entrance (exit) taxiway ∈ , ́  only if the length 
of combination of post-repair active segments of the connected runway ́ ∈  
following (leading to) that taxiway,	 , ́ , meets corresponding minimum length 
requirements, i.e. , 1. 
∑ ,
, , , , ,
∈ , ,
, ,   ∀ ∈ , ́ , ́ ∈ , ∈ , ,




, ́    ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ́ , ́ ∈   (22)
, ∈ 0,1 ,					  ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (23)
The functional runway length , ́  is calculated through the following 
nonlinear equation:  
, ́ ∑ ∏ ́∗ ́∈ ́    ∀ ∈ ́ , ∈ , ́ , ́ ∈   (24)
where that ∗ is the segment of set ́  at which taxiway  is connected to runway ́ . The 
term ∏ ́∗  in (24) is a source of nonlinearity. Let  
́ ∗, ∗ ,…,
∏ ́∗ ,   ∀ ∈ ́ , ∈ , ́ , ́ ∈   
where variables ́ ∗, ∗ ,…,  indicate whether or not all binary variables, ́ , for 
 from ∗ to , are equal to one. Hence, linearization can be achieved through 
replacement of constraints (24) by constraints (24-1) and (24-2).    
, ́ ∑ ́ ́ ∗, ∗ ,…,∈ ́ ,  ∀ ∈ ́ , ∈ , ́ , ́ ∈  (24-1) 
́ ∗, ∗ ,…,
,								    ∀ ∈ ∗, ∗ 1, … , , ∈ ́ , 







4.2.6. Runway configuration selection 
Constraints (25)-(27) are imposed in the model to select a single configuration under 
realized scenario conditions. These constraints further ensure that no flow can be 
shipped along paths that are not available given the chosen configuration.  
∑ ∑ , ,∈ , ,, ,    ∀ ∈  (25)
∑ 1     (26)
∈ 0,1 ,								  ∀ ∈  (27)
 
4.2.7. Taxiway/runway segment post-repair damage states  
Post-repair damage states of taxiway and runway segments,  and ́ , are 
determined as functions of corresponding pre-repair damage states,  and ́ , 
as well as repair actions taken though constraints (28)-(32), respectively. 
1 ∑ , ∙ , ,
,		
∀ ∈ 	 (28)
́ 1 ́ ∑ , ∙ ́ ,
́ , ́   
∀ ́ ∈ , ∈ ́  (29)
, , , , ́ , ́ , ∈ 0,1 ,    ∀ ∈ , ́ ∈ , 
∈ ́ , ∈  
(30)
∑ , ∙ , , 1,    ∀ ∈   (31)
∑ , ∙ ́ , ́ , 1,    ∀ ́ ∈ , ∈ ́   (32)
 
Repair actions that cannot be applied under the given meteorological conditions 
are precluded. The possibility of outsourcing one or more repair jobs is permitted 





resources, can be chosen for each taxiway/runway segment as guaranteed through 
constraints (31)-(32). 
4.2.8. Repair period limit 
The resilience of the airport pavement network, and thereby operational capacities, are 
evaluated at time . Thus, repair actions can affect only capacities of those 
damaged segments that have been repaired by time . 	  can be a function of 
the meteorological conditions that exist under each scenario; hence, repair 
implementation time constraints are imposed in the model’s second stage. A range on 
 between four and 24 hours may be reasonable for given circumstances associated 
with civilian applications. In rapid runway repair applications associated with military 
operations, a duration limit of four to seven hours may be more appropriate (Duncan, 
2007). The longer the duration required to attain reasonable airport runway and taxiway 
capacity rates comparable to pre-event rates, the greater the potential monetary losses 
due to forced cancellations and diversions. Repair time limitation is captured through 
second-stage constraints (33)-(36). 
∑ , ́ , , ,∈ ,
∑ , ́ , ́ , ́ ,́ ∈ , ,   
∙ ∑ ,∈ ,  
∀ ∈  (33)
∑ , , ,∈ ,
∑ , ́ , ́ ,́ ∈ , , ∙ ∑ ,  
  (34)
∑ , , , , ∀ ∈  (35)
∑ , ́ , ́ , , ∀ ́ ∈ , ∈ ́   (36)
Constraints (33)-(34) restrict the use of each piece of available equipment to 





multiple pieces of the same equipment type at multiple damage sites when more than 
one team exists that can be allocated to repair activities. In constraints (35)-(36), the 
possibility of outsourcing one or more repair jobs is permitted.  
4.2.9. Budget and post-repair flow restrictions 
Budget constraints are included within the model to guarantee that the budget available 
for both preparedness and recovery actions is not exceeded. The budget can be 
allocated (through first stage decisions) to preparedness actions that support repair 
operations. All or some part of the budget may be kept in reserve to address damage 
post-event. If teams and equipment have been put in place as a preparedness strategy, 
they can service repair tasks. If all or some portion of the repairs will require external 
resources, a portion of the budget must be reserved for this purpose. This is imposed 
through the budget constraint (37), to be satisfied under each individual scenario.  
∑ ∑ , ,, ∑ , ∙ , , ,∈ ,
, , , ∑ , ∙ ́ ,́ ∈ , ,
́ , ́ , ́ , ́ , ́ ,        
(37)
Whether undertaken internally or externally, multiple repair options may exist 
for addressing certain damage. Consider, for example, that a pothole can be repaired 
through a temporary fill or by repaving a portion of the affected pavement segment. 
The duration of the repair and, thus, the long-term costs of addressing the damage, are 






Finally, arrival and departure flow rates by aircraft class  are restricted to be 
less than the corresponding pre-event demand through constraints (38). Flow is 
restricted to be non-negative in constraints (39).   
∑ , ,∈ , , , ,  ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈  (38)
, , 0, 							  ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , , 	    (39)
 
4.3. Solution Methodology 
The ARP is formulated as a two-stage stochastic program with binary first-stage and 
binary and integer second-stage decision variables. To solve the ARP, an effective, 
exact solution methodology, the integer L-shaped method developed by Laporte and 
Louveaux (1993), is applied. This approach has been used to address a myriad of 
problems arising in a host of arenas.   
The integer L-shaped method decomposes the original program into a master 
problem (MP) and set of subproblems (SPs) each of which relates to a realization of 
the network, i.e. a network state:   
 
MP   
	      (40)
s.t.   
(4)-(6)   
, , , 0   (41)
∑ ∑ , ,,     (42)
0 1, 1,… ,  (43)








∑ ∑ , ,∈ , ,, ,      s.t.  
(10)-(39), 
 (45)
where  in is the approximation of expected second-stage objective function in 
MP. Constraints (41) are optimality cuts generated during iterations. To ensure the 
feasibility of budget constraints of the SPs, constraint (42) is added to the MP to limit 
the allocated budget for provision of equipment and teams to be less than the total 
budget. With constraints (42), the solution of the MP always results in a feasible 
solution for the original problem. Decision variables, ,  and , are given through 
solution of the MP and are, therefore, fixed in each SP. 
An optimality cut is a function of , absolute upper bound of subproblems , 
first-stage decision variables and expectation of second-stage objective functions. A 
tight upper bound can speed up the solution process. The method requires the problem 
to be bounded to a finite , which can be obtained from the total demand rate over 
all aircraft classes, i.e. ∑ ,, . Let  represent all first-stage variables for 
∈ Ω, where Ω , ∀ , ∪ ∀ . The number of feasible first-stage solutions is 
limited due to their binary nature, here indexed by 1,2, … , Ε; thus, the algorithm is 
guaranteed to converge in a finite number of steps. First, solution of the MP with 
relaxed integrality constraints, given in (43)-(44), continues through a Branch-and-
Bound process until a feasible solution is achieved (binary solutions for all first-stage 
variables ). Let Ω | 1}, Ω | 0} and  be the expectation 
over second-stage objective functions corresponding to feasible first-stage solution . 





|Ω | 1 ∑ ∈ ∑ ∈
, 
(46)
where  is the expectation over second-stage objective functions corresponding to 
feasible first-stage solution .  
Details of the integer L-shaped method specified for the ARP are outlined next 
following a similar structure to the description of the general integer L-shaped method 
presented by Laporte and Louveaux (1993). Let  be the objective value of the original 
problem and  be the lower bound of :   
Step 0: Set	 0 and	 0. The value of  is set to an absolute upper bound. A list is 
created that contains only a single pendant node corresponding to the initial 
subproblem. 
Step 1: Select a pendant node in the list to specify the current problem; if the pendant 
node list is empty, stop. 
Step 2: Set	 1. Solve the current problem. If the current problem has no feasible 
solution, fathom the current node; go to Step 1. Otherwise, let ,  be an optimal 
solution. 
Step 3: Check for integrality. If integrality is violated, create two new branches in 
which the most fractional variable is set to 0 or 1. Append the two nodes to the pendant 
node list, and go to Step 1. 
Step 4: Solve the sub-problems and compute . . If , update 
lower bound . 
Step 5: If , then fathom the current node and go to Step 1; otherwise, 





4.4. Framework for a decision support tool 
The ARP is modeled with the fidelity needed to capture the many important operational 
considerations associated with airport taxiway and runway operations. To support 
airport operators in decisions pertaining to investment in preparedness and response, as 
well as other matters associated with creating a resilient airport pavement system, the 
model and solution methodology can be embedded within a decision support tool. A 
schematic overview of such a tool is depicted in Figure 4-3.  
 
Figure 4-3 Schematic overview of the decision support framework. 
As can be seen, the computational process is decomposed into three steps: (i) 
input data, including scenario generation; (ii) optimization core, consisting of the 
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3; and (iii) modeling outcomes. Details associated with the input and output steps are 
presented next. Two key input category requirements of the tool are stipulated: airport 
characteristics and a host of possible meteorological - damage scenarios. As means of 
expressing the interrelations between damage characteristics and meteorological 
conditions, conditional probabilities are employed in generating scenarios. The 
probability of each scenario is assumed to be known a priori. Thus, the probability of 






The scenario generation process is summarized in the flowchart of Figure 4-4. 
Using the computational results, performance indicators, such as measured post-repair 
capacity rates for take-offs and landings that can be achieved through the inherent 
coping capacity of the system and use of limited funds for preparedness and recovery 
actions, can be computed. Application of the tool culminates in equipment purchase or 
lease decisions, number of repair teams to train, repair actions to be taken for each 
generated scenario, post-repair taxiway and runway capacities in terms of potential 
flow rates and performance measures including coping capacity and resilience.  
Given that the resilience of the airport pavement network is evaluated at time 
 (see Section 2), a range of  values between four and 16 hours is explored in 
the following section. Restricting  to less than a day reflects the criticality for the 
airport to provide operational continuity and low tolerance for shutdowns or delays. 
Additionally, this restriction precludes the model from considering major 






Figure 4-4 The flowchart of scenario generator 
4.5. Illustrative case study 
4.5.1. Case study details 
The mathematical solution framework through its inclusion in the decision support tool 
is demonstrated in an application on a pavement network modeled from New York’s 
LaGuardia Airport (LGA). Referring to Figure 4-5, the pavement network consists of 
two intersecting runways (04-22 and 13-31), each about 2,100 meters long, supported 
by an array of taxiways. The airport is represented with 68 nodes and 104 links, 
consisting of 10 dummy, 2 runway, and 92 taxiway links. The runway links are 
partitioned at 100 meter intervals with a shared segment at the crossing; the structural 
section for all segments is assumed asphaltic. 
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Figure 4-5 Study network representation. 
It is presumed that the airport serves a fleet consisting of two aircraft classes 
like the Boeing 737 and Airbus A319, with average weights of 50 and 65 tons, 
respectively. The first (second) aircraft class requires 1700 (700) meters and 2000 
(1800) meters for landing and takeoff, respectively. These values are specifically for 
LGA with nearly sea-level elevation under normal meteorological conditions. Landing 
length requirements should be increased by 15% for wet and slippery pavement 
conditions (FAA, 2006). The capacity of the airport taxiways is taken a computed 
maximum of 200 aircraft per hour based on 15 kilometers per hour average speed and 
a minimum separation distance of 100 meters. Taxiway links are categorized into three 
taxiway length classes, namely 50, 100, and 200 meters. These classes are used in 
computing capacity reduction in one direction due to flow in the opposite direction; 
taxiway directional capacity envelopes are captured by constraints (10)-(17).   
In theory, there are 12 directional configurations by which the two runways can 
be utilized for takeoffs and landings: 04|04, 04|13, 04|31, 22|22, 22|13, 22|31, 13|13, 
13|04, 13|04, 31|31, 31|04, and 31|22. In this notation, the first (left) number indicates 













starting point for departure (takeoff). For this specific airport, the most commonly used 
runway configurations are 22|13 and 4|13 (FAA, 2004). Two additional configurations 
are considered for this case study as they may be preferable under certain disruption 
scenarios: 4|4 and 13|13. Table 4-1 provides information about the performance of the 
airport runways under each of these four possible directional configurations (developed 
from information from (FAA, 2004)). The capacity envelopes for configurations 4|4 
and 13|13 also represent capacity envelopes of single runways 04-22 and 13-31, 
respectively. The capacity envelopes depend also on the visibility conditions in terms 
of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and Instrument flight rules (IFR). 
 
Table 4-1 Capacity envelopes for different runway configurations and visibility conditions 
Runway configuration 







The meteorological conditions associated with the scenarios are selected in 
accordance with the airport location. For LGA, located in a bay area on the waterfront 
and sheltered from the North Atlantic Ocean by Long Island, six viable combinations 
of temperature, precipitation, and visibility levels were chosen (Fisk, 2012): (i) very 
hot, no precipitation, VFR (with probability 0.05); (ii) very hot, high precipitation, VFR 
(0.05); (iii) moderate temp., no precipitation, VFR (0.65); (iv) moderate temp., high 





















cold, snow/ice, IFR (0.05). As can be seen, temperature level is categorized 
qualitatively as: very hot, moderate, and very cold. Precipitation intensity is also 
addressed qualitatively as either low or high. Visibility is categorized as: IFR and VFR.  
Next, the scenario generator randomly produces ‘disruption events’ that lead to 
damage (out of the four generic types). Probabilities of disruption events in the 
following example are selected to be as realistic as possible. Nonetheless, they are 
given purely for demonstration purposes. As shown in Table 4-2, eight specific 
disruption events are considered in the case study, falling under one of three categories 
arising with given probabilities: extreme climatic or geologic event (flood, snow/ice, 
and extreme heat; probability 0.19), operational events (oil spill, overloading, and jet 
blast; probability 0.69), and intentional malicious acts (guided and unguided attacks; 
probability 0.12).  
The fourth category mentioned in Section 4.1 dealing with natural deterioration 
(in combination with ill-timed maintenance) was excluded for the example. It is noted 
that the probabilities of the weather-related disruptions (i.e. first category) are 
determined through their conditional probabilities with respect to the six 
meteorological situations. Ten possible damage types resulting from the disruption 
events were identified and are presented in Table 4-2. The numbers in parentheses 
indicate the maximum number of affected segments. In this connection, the damaged 
segments used in the simulation were randomly generated between zero and the 
maximum number of affected segments (in each case) assuming a uniform probability 
density function. Overall, 36 possible combinations could be pooled from the 8 





combinations, like snow/ice under the first meteorological condition (very hot, no 
precipitation). Ten scenarios were randomly generated from each of these 36 
combinations, resulting in a total of 360 scenarios. 








































- - - - -  (5) - 
Very hot 0.045 - - - - - 
 
(2) 





Oil spill 0.280 - - - - 
 
(5) 
- - - - - 
Overloading 0.220 (10) - - - - - - - - - 
Jet Blast 0.190 - - - 
 
(3) 











attack 0.060 - - - - - - 
 
(10) 
- - - 
*Indicates that consecutive segments affected; otherwise, damage need not be 
adjoining. 
 
Damage type linked to each disruption event was predicted based on the 
underlying governing mechanisms (Shahin, 2005; ASTM, 2011). For example, 
alligator cracking is a fatigue-related distress and hence linked to pavement 
overloading. Excessive rutting and bleeding are more likely to develop in asphalt 
pavements when surface temperatures are abnormally high causing bitumen expansion 
and loss of mix stability. Slippery surface conditions can be associated with ice/snow 
events. 
Table 4-3 lists 19 types of machinery/tools that are required for damage repair; 





latter were computed from hourly rates and number of working hours as suggested in 
(US Army Corps of Engineers, 2011). As a starting point, the airport is assumed to self-
own one of each of the first 15 items on the list. The cost associated with self-owned 
equipment is disregarded in the model assuming they serve in non-emergency 
situations. To address their disaster-related costs, 10% of annual purchase, depreciation 
and maintenance costs are considered in the table for the additional four equipment 
items on the list, as well as for adding units from the self-owned items. 











1 Small asphalt 
paver 
8100 11 Tack coat sprayer 1800
2 Mechanical 
sweeper 
8500 12 Seal injector/melter 1500
3 Small milling 
machine 
6500 13 Crack chasing saw 2700
4 Small asphalt 
roller 
1400 14 Small mixer 1350
5 Asphalt cutter 1700 15 Water pump 1350
6 Salt Sprinkler 2550 16 Large milling 
machine 
9500
7 Snow shovel 4800 17 Vibratory roller 2210
8 Front loader 8160 18 Motor grader 25000
9 Backhoe 13600 19 Large asphalt paver 32000
10 Dump truck 11650    
 
It is further presumed that five repair crews can be assembled from existing 
employees with regular duties associated with non-emergency day-to-day operations. 
Table 4-4 defines the repair actions required for every damage type out of the possible 
ten (see Table 4-2) for a single taxiway or runway segment. In each case, the table 
identifies the equipment needed (from Table 4-3), the nominal repair time, and the 
nominal cost involved if the work is done with internal resources. The costs of repair 
actions with internal resources include associated operating costs of required 





teams (US Army Corps of Engineers, 2011). Given a typical team of eight people and 
an hourly labor rate of $40, the hourly team cost for completing repairs is $320. 
Additional costs of $18,000 are associated with quarterly training, certifying repair 
crew personnel, and associated position backfill. 
Table 4-4 Repair actions, implementation costs and execution times 
Damage 


















1 2 3 4 5 6 
Alligator 
cracking 
1,2,4,8,10,15,16 5 2510 9 4267 1 10 1 10 1.5 2 
Block 
cracking 
2,11,12 2 736 6 1251 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Transverse 
cracking 
2,11,12 2 736 6 1251 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Jet Blast 2,4,5,8,9,10,15 4 1912 8 3250 1 10 1 10 1.5 2 
Raveling 2,4,5,8,9,10,15 4 1912 8 3250 1 10 1 10 1.5 2 









6 4374 10 7435 1 10 1 10 1.5 2 
Slippery 
surface 
2,4,14,15,18 1 461 5 783 1 1.5 1 1.5 2 10 
Bleeding 2,4,5,6,13,17 3 1665 7 2830 1 10 1 10 1.5 2 
 
The option of external repair is also included, in which case it can be noticed 
that the repair duration and cost are higher; equipment scarcity is not an issue if repairs 
are externally completed. Repair action costs using external resources are presumed to 
be 70% higher than repairs made through internal resources. Four hours more are added 
to the implementation duration to account for the time needed to arrange for the 
services and for the services to mobilize. Table 4-4 also includes weather-dependent 
multipliers, which are unitless numbers that depend on one of the six meteorological 
conditions; they multiply both the duration and costs (in each case) to represent 





weather conditions. A multiplier of 10 essentially means that the weather conditions 
preclude taking the associated repair action. 
4.5.2. Tool output 
Results from runs of the tool on the study airport are hereafter presented and discussed. 
While data are presented and analyzed, the main aim here is to demonstrate the tool’s 
capabilities created through the proposed mathematical modeling and solution 
framework and types of general support that it can provide. Before producing the 
results, the model was first verified by checking consistency with capacity envelopes. 
That is, under normal operating conditions (i.e. meteorological condition 3 given 
probability-one of no disruption and zero budget for preparedness and recovery actions) 
the model produced the maximum total flow rate (i.e. number of takeoffs and landings) 
of 64 maneuvers per hour. This maximum flow rate was used as a benchmark for 
assessing subsequent performance metrics, such as coping capacity and resilience, and 
is consistent with FAA runway capacity estimates (FAA, 2004) for the study airport. It 
provides the denominator for the computation of resilience in equation (3). 
The first decision question addressed using the tool deals with trade-offs 
between annual budget and . For the case study, the outcome is depicted both 
numerically and graphically in Figure 4-6. The resilience indifference curves are 
plotted for a budget in the range of 0 to $100,000 in combination with  in the 
range of 0 to 16 hours. To generate this figure, Tmax was varied by four hour intervals 
(i.e. 0, 4, 8, 12, and 16) and only four budget levels were considered (0, $25,000, 
$50,000, and $100,000). Intermediate levels of resilience shown were interpolated with 





0.54 (no budget, or short , or both) and a maximum of 0.88 (maximal budget and 
long ).  
The minimal value of 0.54 is the airport’s coping capacity (akin to zero-budget 
resilience); it indicates that about 54% of the pre-event takeoff and landing flow rate 
can be achieved in expectation over the 360 random scenarios if no recovery actions 
are considered in evaluating the system’s performance. The performance of the airport 
pavement network was investigated further for an annual budget of $25,000 and  
of 8 hours. In this case, the performance improves to about 0.67 if repair actions can be 
taken externally and 0.68 if this is further supplemented by the use of existing 
equipment by teams that are trained through preparedness plans. When the system can 
avail itself of all preparedness and repair actions, a resilience level of 0.71 can be 
attained. Thus, the tool enables investigation of the airport’s inherent capability to cope 
with and adapt to the considered random events within a specified time period and 
given available monetary resources. Moreover, the tool quantifies the trade-offs 
between resilience and level of  or the budget through sensitivity analysis. For 
example, given a chosen  of five hours, it can be seen from the figure that 
increasing the budget over and above about $35,000 does not induce a corresponding 
increase in resilience; thus, with such a figure, airport management can optimize 
associated resources. 
The tool can also be used to study the frequency with which runways can be 
expected to operate with a MOS for each aircraft class. The impact on resilience level 
of repair opportunities can be quantified, and the likelihood that only one or no runways 





ascertained. For the airport study location, with no budget for preparedness or response, 
the likelihood that all runways will operate (resilience of 1) is approximately 0.36 and 
that none will operate (resilience of 0) is 0.17. With a budget of $50,000 and  of 
8 hours, the former likelihood rises to around 0.48 and the latter decreases to roughly 
0.08. 
  
Figure 4-6 Resilience indifference curves for different combinations of budget and Tmax 
 
The probability of a given resilience level can be further investigated by causal 
category, an example of which is depicted in Figure 4-7. With no budget, the likelihood 
of the event resulting in a shutdown or low operating capacity (resilience 0 or 0.25) is 
highest for extreme climatic events. This is partially ameliorated when resources can 
be expended. Likewise, operational events are most easily absorbed. This is a positive 
finding for airport managers as these types of events have the greatest likelihood of 
occurrence.  
Figure 4-8 depicts the proportion of the budget that is expended on internal and 
external resources for the purpose of completing repair actions for given budget and 
 levels. The figure shows the tradeoffs between the efficiencies associated with 





limited repair durations, e.g. =4, and small budgets, there is insufficient time or 
funds to take advantage of external resources. 
(a) No budget (coping capacity) (b) B=$50000, Tmax=8 hrs 
Figure 4-7 Resilience probabilities under each disaster type for budget (B) and combinations. 
 
 
(a) Budget=$25,000 (b) Budget=$50,000 (c) Budget=$100,000 
Figure 4-8 Proportion of budget assigned to repair actions through internal and external resources 
 
In connection with resource allocation, output from the model enables 
prioritization in the response to damage in infrastructure components. That is, it aids in 
the identification of key runways or taxiways within the pavement network. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 4-9, where the frequencies of chosen configurations over the 
possible scenarios are displayed for varying levels of budget and . This depiction 
highlights the utility of runway configuration 04|04. This runway is the most likely 







































































with more than 0.35 probability even when no repair actions are taken into 
consideration in performance evaluation. It can be observed from the network topology 
(Figure 4-5) that this runway has connectivity to redundant taxiways not available to 
the second runway. Additional insights can be garnered from these results; for example, 
the shorter , the more likely that only one runway will be operating post-repair. 
That is, the model chooses to focus its resources on repairing one runway to support 
operations by both aircraft classes rather than only smaller aircraft on two runways. 
Likewise, the longer , the higher the likelihood that configurations with two 
operating runways will be chosen post-repair. Thus, quantities computed by the tool 
can aid airport managers in ascertaining the criticality of airport pavement assets. 
  Figure 4-9 Runway configuration probabilities over scenarios. 
In the immediate aftermath of a disruption, on average, the airport serves 
demand at 54% of its pre-disruption rate. With a budget of only $25,000 and of 
16 hours, this rate can be increased to 83% through outsourcing. When the budget is 
increased to $75,000  (which pays for two teams and one of each equipment type 12, 
13, 16, and 17, along with costs associated with both internal and external repair 
operations), this rate can be further increased to 86%. A gain of only 2% in capacity is 




























train three teams that will use only existing equipment. This change in strategy can be 
explained by the large cost associated with training each team. It also illustrates how 
the discrete and combinatorial nature of the problem makes intuition about optimal 
solutions difficult without assistance of quantification methodologies 
4.6. Summary and Remarks 
The developed mathematical modeling and solution methodology techniques, and 
concepts for their inclusion in a decision support tool employing a scenario generator 
for multiple hazard classes, fills the need for a quantification methodology to assess the 
readiness of an airport to cope with damage to its paved network of runways and 
taxiways. Inherent uncertainties associated with disaster and disruption planning are 
explicitly recognized and directly addressed. The mathematical model differentiates 
small and large size aircraft. It further accounts for reductions in capacity due to joint 
take-off and landing maneuvers on common runways, reconfiguration strategies that 
consider bidirectional flows, weather effects, applicability and benefits of repair 
operations, implementation time and cost trade-offs related to conducting recovery 
actions taken in-house versus outsourcing, a range of disruption scenarios including 
those with multiple damage locations, multi-team response, limited equipment 
availability and a reasonable timeframe for conducting recovery operations. A 
mathematical tool with these capabilities makes it possible for optimal decisions to be 
derived for the large combinatorial and stochastic problem instances that are associated 
with real airports. It is also worth noting that, while it is not intended for use in real-





second state provide optimal recovery plans that can be used post-disaster once the 
disaster situation is understood. 
Additional contributions are derived from insights gleaned from results of the 
tool’s application on a case study based on the topology and meteorological conditions 
of an existing airport. To this end, the effectiveness of investment strategies that 
balance preparedness and recovery choices is explored in relation to the system’s 
ability to cope with and adapt to unforeseen disruption scenarios, i.e. the system’s 
resilience level. While the details of the optimal preparedness and response actions 
determined by the tool for the case study may have limited intrinsic value, they provide 
tangible examples of the tool’s capabilities and potential utility in decision support in 
other comparable circumstances. For large airports, such as Baltimore Washington 
International (BWI) or San Francisco International (SFO) airport, both with 4 runways, 
if solution is difficult to obtain in a reasonable timeframe, one can reduce the 
combinations of actions that are permissible to greatly decrease solution time. 
Airport managers may benefit from use of this tool and its methodologies in a 
variety of ways. Solutions from various what-if situations can be compared and trade-
offs between investment approaches, use of limited internal resources and time can be 
assessed to evaluate proposed tactics for coping with major disruptions. Optimal 
solutions provide information about which equipment will be most important to have 
at the ready, how many repair crews should be on hand, and what outsourcing contracts 
to have in place. Benefits exist from merely considering the potential scenarios that 
might arise, but also from investigating which scenarios would be most problematic if 





from the tool would offer insights into not only what assets to pre-position, but where 
to locate them. Likewise, the tool can identify critical pavement system components 
and reveal system design weaknesses and other vulnerabilities. When appropriate 
external funds are made available for airport security, the tool can be used to analyze 
and back monetary requests. For example, it can quantify the potential performance 
















Chapter 5: Stochastic Models for Emergency Shelter and Exit 
Design in Buildings under Stochastic Optimum and User 
Equilibrium Conditions  
5.1. Introduction and motivation 
Regional evacuation studies have previously dealt with the problem of determining the 
optimal location and size of public shelters to which people can be evacuated in case 
of events such as floods and hurricanes. Studies on building evacuation, on the other 
hand, have mainly dealt with the question of how users can be evacuated as fast as 
possible to predefined building exits during an emergency. In practice, it might not be 
possible for all users to vacate a large or tall building in time. This may be true in 
particular in the case of disabled or elderly users. In other cases, it might be possible 
for the users to reach an exit, but this will not be the safest option because of the 
presence of internal hazards such as fire or smoke on the path of evacuation inside the 
building, or because of external hazards that originate outside the building.  
A possible alternative is to evacuate building users to shelters inside buildings, 
which offer a certain level of protection. This policy is already being implemented in 
some countries, such as Singapore and Israel, where buildings are required to contain 
air-raid shelters in every dwelling or on every floor. As is standard in some countries, 
shelters have a protective envelope of 20-30 cm thick reinforced concrete walls and 
ceilings, as well as blast-proof doors and windows and an air-filtration system. They 
usually contain a single room that serves an additional purpose, such as a bedroom in 





are built one on top of another, sometimes with trap-doors and ladders that internally 
connect the shelters and can serve as an alternative evacuation route if staircases have 
become unusable. This creates a stable tower of shelters that will remain intact even if 
the rest of the building is heavily damaged. Such spaces have replaced the underground 
communal shelters that were originally built for this purpose in basements or even in 
public parks – serving several surrounding buildings. External communal shelters 
became less useful as buildings became higher, and the required time for evacuation 
decreased due to changing threats. This required shelters to be brought inside buildings 
and elevated to higher stories, so that they could be reached in time by evacuees. While 
the main purpose of existing shelters in buildings is to protect building users from 
missile attacks, they also offer protection during earthquakes. The possibility of using 
such shelters to protect users from additional hazards, such as fire or storms, is also 
considered herein.  
While most shelters inside buildings are designed to house no more than a few 
dozen evacuees, local shelters, which serve an entire neighborhood, may house 
hundreds of evacuees. Such shelters are often located in public facilities, like schools 
or subway stations, and can serve the residents of buildings that do not contain internal 
shelters. Choice of where to locate these facilities depends on the type of hazard from 
which they are designed to protect. Regional evacuation may include even larger 
shelters, such as stadia that can house thousands of evacuees. The goal of this chapter 
is to develop mathematical models that supports the planning of shelters and evacuation 
paths in buildings designed to accommodate a limited number of people. The objective 





both during the evacuation as well as after reaching their destinations. The objective 
function is therefore defined to minimize the risk to which evacuees may be exposed, 
rather than minimize evacuation time. The models support identification of the shelters 
to which a population should evacuate in various emergency scenarios, in light of 
possible hazards on the evacuation paths. Moreover, the models can aid in investigating 
if it is preferable for building users to evacuate to shelters inside the building, rather 
than to building exits. A network representation is used in the model to represent the 
layout of a building’s circulation systems (i.e. the passageways along which building 
users can travel). A set of nodes may represent spaces inside buildings such as rooms 
and corridors. A set of links represents connections between these spaces. The 
movement of evacuees towards shelters is represented as flows on the links. The 
capacity of links and the risk exposure endured in traversing them may vary during 
emergencies as a result of structural failures or the spread of fire and smoke inside the 
building. 
Different types of hazards may endanger a population's safety and require its 
evacuation. These may be natural (e.g. earthquakes), human-made (e.g. terror attacks), 
internal (e.g. fire) or external (e.g. hurricanes). Restricted construction budgets, and the 
difficulty to prepare evacuees for more than one evacuation procedure, imply the need 
to accommodate different hazards in a single solution. A multi-hazard approach is 
therefore adopted, in which the performance of a plan is tested under various possible 
future emergency scenarios. This chapter presents a solution for the problem of 
designing a single building so that its users can minimize their exposure to risk in an 





to as the Building Evacuation Design Problem (BEDP). To solve the BEDP, a bi-level, 
two-stage stochastic program is defined. The program falls under the class of Stochastic 
Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (SMPECs).  
At the upper-level of the proposed bi-level program, decisions are made 
regarding the location of shelters in the building, their size and level of protection, as 
well as the location of building exits, with the objective of minimizing the exposure of 
evacuees to risk over all scenarios. The uncertainty in the scenarios that will be realized 
is taken into account. It is assumed that construction costs are limited to a certain 
budget. This budget can be used for the planning of shelters that offer a high level of 
protection. Alternatively, the budget can be allocated for a partial fortification of 
sections of the hallways and staircases through which users evacuate to increase the 
level of protection that they offer, for widening hallways to increase their capacity, or 
for the construction of additional or redesign of existing building exits. The advantages 
of allocating the available budget for the construction of shelters can thus be weighed 
against the benefits of using it to add or redesign exits or to reduce the risks for evacuees 
on certain sections of the evacuation paths by fortifying or widening them. 
At the lower-level of the program, the choice of evacuation paths by the users, 
following the upper-level decisions on the location of safe locations (shelters, fortified 
hallways) and exits, is modeled either as a User Equilibrium (UE) problem, or as a 
System Optimization (SO) problem. When modeled as a UE problem, it is assumed 
that users are homogenous, that they are perfectly informed of the conditions in the 
building or region, and choose a path with minimum risk. Evacuees will choose 





fortified hallway. On the other hand, when the choice of evacuation paths is modeled 
as a SO problem, it is assumed that evacuees are assigned to an exit or shelter and told 
which path to use to reach that location. The SO approach uses the available system 
resources optimally, but requires command and control by a trained staff to direct the 
evacuees. It may require some evacuees to follow paths or take cover in shelters that 
are not necessarily optimal for them individually. The UE approach ensures that no 
evacuee can do better by taking an alternative decision, but requires that evacuees be 
familiar with the building and with the risks imposed by the hazard, in order to have 
full information about all alternatives. 
Four variants of the BEDP are formulated using concepts of stochastic 
programming and robust optimization each under UE and SO conditions. UE models 
involve the bi-level formulation described previously. By recognizing that the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality, these 
models are reduced to equivalent single-level, two-stage stochastic integer programs. 
All variants are nonlinear. Using a disjunctive constraints transformation method and 
piecewise linearization, the models are linearized and integer L-shaped decomposition 
is proposed for solution of each of these mathematical programs. The capabilities of 
the modeling and solution techniques are illustrated on an office building using the 
original architectural plans. Trade-offs between system optimal and UE solutions and 
their implications in terms of their application, as well as in the use of stochastic 





5.2. Literature review 
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no prior works in the literature that 
address optimal shelter and exit location in buildings. However, models with relevance 
to the BEDP have been developed in the literature for locating shelters in the context 
of regional evacuation problems. These works are reviewed next. 
It appears that Sherali et al. (1991) were the first to study the shelter location 
problem for regional evacuation planning. They proposed a nonlinear mixed integer 
program to determine the shelter locations, resources allocations and assignment of 
evacuees to minimize evacuation time.  They suggest a SO approach, which assumes 
that a central authority controls the flow of evacuees. The model uses a single given 
hazard scenario. A deterministic, multi-objective p-median problem formulation is 
proposed by Alcada-Almeida et al. (2009) for locating p shelters in a given area so as 
to minimize demand-weighted distance traveled, incurred risk and travel time 
associated with an evacuation. Similar deterministic and system optimal assumptions 
are made. Congestion is not considered.  
Kongsomaksakul et al. (2005) proposed a bi-level programming model for 
determining locations and sizes of shelters that can be used by evacuees to minimize 
evacuation time in the event of a flood. The model is intended for pre-disaster planning. 
The upper-level problem determines the number and locations of shelters among a 
given set of potential locations, and the lower-level problem is a combined trip 
distribution and assignment problem. The inclusion of the lower-level problem allows 
evacuees to freely select their preferred shelters and choose the shortest route to their 





Wardrop equilibrium is assumed to be reached. A genetic algorithm is employed to 
solve the problem. It is tested through a simulated flood scenario. Ng et al. (2010) also 
propose a bi-level programming model for regional shelter location, but optimize the 
shelter assignment in the upper-level problem, instead of assuming that evacuees 
themselves choose the shelters to which they will evacuate, as in Kongsomaksakul et 
al. (2005). A simulated annealing heuristic is proposed.  
These earlier models all use a single given hazard scenario for locating shelters. 
Therefore, the identified solution may not be optimal for a wider range of hazard 
scenarios. Further, these models disregard the uncertain nature of disaster events. 
Kulshrestha et al. (2011) take into account uncertainty in demand for shelter capacity 
in a robust, bi-level program to determine the locations and sizes of shelters. As in 
Kongsomaksakul et al. (2005), it is assumed that the number of shelters, their locations 
and capacities are determined by a central authority, while the evacuees choose shelters 
and routes to access them. Although a set of possible demand scenarios is considered, 
other uncertainties regarding the type of hazard and the level of its severity are 
disregarded. An exact cutting plane algorithm is presented. Li et al. (2011) study 
sheltering network planning and operations for natural disaster preparedness and 
response with a two-stage stochastic program. In their study, the number of evacuees 
present at each origin at the start of the evacuation period (i.e. the evacuation demand) 
and transportation costs are assumed to be known only with uncertainty. In the first 
stage, the locations, capacities and resources required to supply the shelters are 
determined. In the second stage, the evacuees and resources are distributed to shelters 





the L-shaped method can be employed. The proposed model and solution method were 
applied on a case study involving the Louisiana Gulf Cost.  
Another paper that explicitly addresses the uncertainties inherent in disaster 
situations is by Li et al. (2012). They developed a scenario-based, bi-level stochastic 
program for optimal shelter location that considers a range of possible hurricane 
scenarios. The program seeks to minimize expected total travel time and unmet shelter 
demand under one of a host of possible disaster scenarios. Such scenarios differ in the 
area of impact. A dynamic user equilibrium is sought in the lower-level. Unlike earlier 
works, this work considers the possibility that evacuees will exit the area, and will not 
necessarily use the shelters. While Li et al. (2012) is the most relevant to this work, it 
only considers only a single type of hazard. Moreover, the problem is solved using a 
heuristic rather than exact solution methodology. 
 This literature is summarized in Table 5-1. The contributions of this chapter 
are, in light of existing relevant works: (1) a mathematical formulation to address 
shelter and exit design and location, possible fortification of hallways with reduced risk 
exposure, and selection of evacuation routes for buildings; (2) a multi-hazard approach 
with applicability to not only a multitude of disaster types, but simultaneous 
consideration of special and competing needs arising from these hazard types; (3) 
explicit consideration of risk exposure and its relation to the effects of user route choice 
on travel congestion; (4) simultaneous consideration of shelter and exit use; (5) a 
comparison of stochastic programming and robust optimization modeling; (6) an 
evaluation of the role of cooperative behavior and related need for command and 





applications; and (7) an exact solution methodology that addresses problem 
nonlinearities for a set of complicated SMPECs and stochastic nonlinear programs 
(SNLPs). 
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5.3. Problem definition 
5.3.1. Notation 
In modeling the BEDP, a network representation ,  of the building circulation 
system layout is used. A set of nodes  corresponds with locations inside the building, 
such as evacuation points of origin, transition points, candidate shelter locations, 





∪ ∪  connects these locations.  is a subset of the links representing 
hallways, staircases, doorways and other passageways.  is a subset of the links 
connecting existing and candidate shelters and fortified hallways, i.e. safe locations, to 
supersink . Note that  is subset of links similarly connecting existing and candidate 
emergency exits to supersink . This network representation is illustrated in Fig. 5-1. 
The movement of evacuees in the circulation system is represented as flows along the 
links. The introduction of a supersink reduces the related network flow problem to that 
of a multi-source, single-sink problem.  
 
Figure 5-1 Building network representation scheme 
 
The network is considered under a host of potential states (or scenarios) that 
might arise for a building under no-notice disaster events. Unlike disaster events with 
notice, such as a hurricane with two to three days advanced warning, notification of 
such a no-notice event in the context of buildings, perhaps provided by an alarm 
system, may entail only minutes. In this context, it is assumed that such notification 
provides information to the evacuees and building managers on the disaster type and 
possibly the location within the building (e.g. fire on a particular floor). This 
information may be imperfect, but can permit assessment of risk exposure associated 
Supersink node 
Candidate shelter locations 
Existing emergency exit 
Dummy links connecting the network to 
Candidate fortification 
Hallways, doorways, staircases 
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with evacuee options, both in terms of safe locations and exits, as well as the paths that 
lead to these locations.  
In the network representation, a particular state is given by the realization of 
parameters of link risk exposure functions. Risk exposure associated with a link 
consists of the likelihood of exposure while using the link and potential consequences. 
The longer the time spent en route to a safe location, the greater the likelihood of 
exposure. Thus, risk exposure is a function of travel time, which will depend not only 
on the link’s length, but also on the number of people using it. It is assumed that the 
evacuees can assess risk exposure perfectly from the information they receive, and that 
all evacuees perceive risk identically. Risk associated with each safe location or an exit 
is also incorporated in the risk exposure functions. In the problem formulations 
proposed herein, evacuees choose or are guided to a safe location or exit with the goal 
of minimizing total risk exposure. 
With this in mind, risk exposure associated with a link a is defined as a linear 
function of the link’s flow-dependent travel time: , 
where parameter  converts the time it takes to evacuate through the hallways, 
staircases and doorways to risk exposure, and parameter  is a measure of the risk 
associated with staying in a shelter or hallway, or exiting the building. Both parameters 
are a function of the scenario. Different emergency scenarios, , may induce different 
behaviors or decisions to reduce risk exposure. For example, when an internal hazard 
occurs (e.g. a fire event), exiting from the building will be of the highest priority; 
whereas, in the case of an external hazard (e.g. a storm), taking refuge within the 





The BPR travel time function, originally used to estimate travel time on road 
networks, is adapted in the following form to estimate the evacuation travel time in a 
link ∈ , , as a nonlinear function of link flow,  (see Schomborg et 
al. 2011). The travel time along link ∈ ∪  is also set to zero: 
0.15 , ∀ ∈
0,																	 ∀ ∈ ∪
  (1) 
where  and  are the freeflow travel time and capacity of link ∈  under 
scenario , respectively. The BPR function is generally formulated based on the 
velocity-density fundamental diagram for vehicle movement in road networks. 
Schomborg et al. (2011) argue that, in the context of macroscopic modeling, this 
function can also be utilized to estimate the pedestrian travel time using the parameter 
values adopted in equation (1).  
Nomenclature used in the remainder of the chapter is provided next. 
  = set of shelter/hallway fortification types  
  = set of exit types/sizes 
 = cost of fortification of type ∈  in link ∈  
́   = cost of construction of exit type ∈  in link ∈  
 = total budget for exit design and shelter/hallway fortification 
 = capacity of shelter type ∈ , ∈  
  = number of evacuees originating at node ∈   
  = set of paths containing no cycles originating from node ∈   
,   = link-path incidence matrix (=1 if link  belongs to path  originated 
from node , and =0 otherwise)  
Ξ  = set of possible scenarios ∈ Ξ 
 
Pre-event variables: 
 = binary variable indicating if fortification of type ∈  is selected for 
application to link ∈  (=1 if selected, and =0 otherwise)  
́  = binary variable indicating if exit type ∈  is selected for 
construction in link ∈  (=1 if selected, and =0 otherwise) 
 
Post-event variables: 
 = flow along path ∈  from demand node  under scenario  





 = travel time along link ∈  under scenario  
 = risk exposure associated with link ∈  under scenario ; assumed 
to be a linear function of link travel time: 
  = risk exposure on path , for ∀ ∈ , ∈  
 
5.3.2. Problem formulations 
Four BEDP formulations are presented. The programs use either Stochastic 
Programming (SP), which takes into account the expectation in performance over all 
future scenarios, or Robust Optimization (RO) with emphasis on the worst-case 
scenario imposing the highest evacuation risk exposure. The latter is a conservative 
approach, which may require a more expensive solution to attain the same level of risk 
exposure. Two of the models adopt a bi-level structure, where the evacuees choose 
their own routes to minimize their own risk exposure (taking a UE perspective). The 
remaining two models are single-level and assume the evacuees will follow system 
optimal instructions (taking a SO perspective). This latter perspective requires 
command and control for implementation. That is, users are commanded toward safe 
locations or exits that meet the system’s goals and control is in place to ensure 
compliance (Feng and Miller-Hooks, 2012). These four programs are referred to by 
their acronyms: BEDP-SP-UE, BEDP-SP-SO, BEDP-RO-UE, and BEDP-RO-SO. The 
modeling specifications of these problems are summarized in Table 5-2.  
Objectives that minimize the maximum or expected maximum risk exposure 
are proposed herein, because they indirectly address issues of equity and consider the 





the literature. For both emergency and nonemergency applications, it is common to 
minimize total travel time or other disutility measures. 
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This BEDP-SP-UE problem is formulated as a bi-level, two-stage stochastic program 
with equilibrium constraints, a type of stochastic MPEC.  
  
Upper-level:  	 ∈   (2)
s.t. 
∑ ∑ ∈∈ ∑ ∑ ́ ́∈∈   (3)
∑ ∈ 1,			 	∀ ∈   (4)
∑ ́∈ 1,			 	∀ ∈    (5)






Lower-level: ∑     (8)
s.t. 
∑ ∈ ,					∀ ∈   (9)
∑ ,∈ ,				 ∀ ∈   (10)
∑ ∈ ,					∀ ∈ (11)
0,				∀ ∈  (12)






At the upper-level, the problem is to determine the optimal location of exits, 
location and size of shelters to be constructed, and hallways to be fortified, as well as 
corresponding level of protection, aiming at minimizing the expectation of the worst-
case risk exposure experienced by the evacuees over all scenarios. Construction costs 
are limited to an available budget in constraint (3). Constraints (4)-(6) ensure that only 
one type of fortification is constructed at any candidate location.  
At the lower-level is a path-based capacitated user equilibrium problem with 
side-constraints adapted from Larsson and Patriksson (1995). Evacuees rationally seek 
to minimize their risk exposure, assuming that they have perfect information on the 
risks associated with the evacuation path choices under a given scenario ξ  and the 
building design options (including the shelter capacities) determined at the upper-level.  
Evacuees are assigned to paths through constraints (9). Link flows are defined 
in constraints (10) as the total flow in terms of evacuees traveling from any origin along 
any path containing that link. In constraints (11), flow is allowed through a link ∈  
if a shelter of any type ∈  is constructed along that link. The flow is limited to the 
shelter’s capacity, . An infinite capacity is presumed for all exit doors ∈ . Non-
negativity requirements for link and path flows are captured through constraints (12)-
(13). 
The formulation can be readily extended to permit shelter capacities as a 
function of hazard type. This is important in real applications, because the amount of 
space required per evacuee while sheltered depends on the amount of time the evacuee 
will remain in the shelter. The longer the required time, the greater the required space. 





it appears that there is more space, constructing shelters for the worst-case as is 
supported by the proposed objective functions is desirable. 
b) BEDP-SP-SO 
As an alternative modeling approach, safe locations, exits and evacuation routes are 
designed to support a system optimal flow of evacuees under the assumption that 
evacuees are directed in emergency situations by trained staff or through commands 
given electronically. Thus, it is presumed that the evacuees will follow the instructions 
they are provided. This problem is formulated as a single-level, nonlinear two-stage 
stochastic program.   
  






∙ 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈    (16)
 
As in the BEDP-SP-UE, the objective function is to minimize the expectation 
of the maximum evacuation risk exposure evacuees experience over all scenarios. 
 is defined as the worst (highest) evacuation risk exposure from node . Through 
additional constraints (16), only the risk exposure of active paths from node  is used 
to determine . That is, the inequality  is imposed if 0. 
c) BEDP-RO-UE and BEDP-RO-SO 
By focusing on the worst evacuation risk exposure under the worst-case scenario rather 





optimization model is even more conservative than the BEDP models that use 
stochastic programming (BEDP-SP-UE and BEDP-SP-SO). Scenario probabilities are 
not included in robust optimization. Two problems, BEDP-RO-UE and BEDP-RO-SO, 


















	    s.t. (9-13), (16) (20)
 
Both formulations seek to minimize the maximum evacuation risk exposure 
over all scenarios. 
5.4. Solving the BEDP variants 
5.4.1. Complementarity constraints 
 a) BEDP-SP-UE and BEDP-RO-UE 
A common approach to solving bi-level programs is, when possible, to eliminate the 
lower-level problem by incorporating the original lower-level constraints along with 





creates an equivalent single-level program. In the context of the BEDP-UE-SP and 
BEDP-UE-RO formulations, this includes constraints (9)-(13) and (21)-(24): 
  
∙ ̂ 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈    (21)
̂ 0,					∀ ∈ , ∈   (22)
∙ ∑ ∈ 0, ∀ ∈ (23)
0,					∀ ∈   (24)
 
Building on the work of Larsson and Patriksson (1995) who considered the 
capacitated assignment problem in which users selfishly seek to minimize their 
experienced disutilities, it is assumed that a generalized Wardrop equilibrium can be 
reached. In such an equilibrium, no evacuee can unilaterally switch routes and improve 
his/her disutility (risk exposure in the context of this work). 
In constraints (21)-(24),  indicates the minimum risk exposure incurred 
by evacuees originating from node ∈  under scenario  and ̂  is the generalized 
path risk exposure adapted from Larsson and Patriksson (1995): 
̂ ∑ ,∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (25)
In addition, ∑ ,∈  is the risk exposure on path , for 
∀ ∈ , ∈ , and  is the Lagrange multiplier for link ∈  associated with 
complementarity constraints (23).  can be interpreted as the additional risk 
exposure that users passing through a saturated link are willing to endure to use the link 
(i.e. the link’s shadow price).  
In their compatible formulation, Larsson and Patriksson showed that the KKT 
conditions are both necessary and sufficient for optimality. Constraints (21) and (23) 
fo the KKT conditions fall under the class of complementarity constraints, and thus, 





approach, initially introduced in (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981), is employed in 
which the introduction of binary variables converts these constraints into equivalent 
linear mixed-integer constraints.  
The implementation of this methodology given in Wang and Lo (2010) is 
followed herein. Thus, constraints (13) are replaced by constraints (26)-(28):       
∙ ∙ 1 , ∀ ∈ , ∈    (26)
∙ ̂ ∙ , ∀ ∈ , ∈    (27)
∈ 0,1 ,						∀ ∈ , ∈   (28)
where  and  are very large negative and positive numbers, respectively, and  is a 
very small positive number. Binary variable  indicates whether or not path  
from origin node  receives a flow, i.e. 0 resulting in ̂  if 
0; =1, otherwise.  
Similarly, constraints (23) are replaced by constraints (29-31): 
∙ ∙ 1 , ∀ ∈    (29)
∙ ∑ ∙ , ∀ ∈    (30)
∈ 0,1 ,						∀ ∈ 	  (31)
where binary variable  indicates whether or not flow along link a reaches the link 
capacity. When the flow along link a reaches the link’s capacity limitation, 0, 
resulting in 0; and 1, otherwise. 
 b) BEDP-SP-SO and BEDP-RO-SO 
BEDP-SO-SP and BEDP-SO-RO do not involve UE constraints, and thus the need for 
the complementarity constraints described in the prior section is eliminated; they are, 
thus, single-level problems. However, complementarity constraints (16) are required to 
ensure that risk exposure is considered within the objective only for active paths. Thus, 
the programs are nonlinear. Again, a disjunctive constraints transformation approach is 





∙ ∙ 1 , ∀ ∈ , ∈    (32)
∙ , ∀ ∈ , ∈    (33)
∈ 0,1 ,						∀ ∈ , ∈    (34)
where  is a binary variable indicating whether a path is active or not: 0 
if 0; and  1, otherwise 
5.4.2. Piecewise linearization of the travel time function 
For each link ∈ , the nonlinear travel time function is replaced by a piecewise 
linear function using a method presented by Sherali (2001) (also applied in (Farvaresh 
and Sepehri, 2011)). The first step of this technique is to bound link flow  by 
lower- and upper-bounds. One simple approach to setting these bounds is to use zero 
and total evacuation demand from all origin nodes, i.e. 0 ∑ ∈ , 	 ∈
. Next, this range is partitioned into  non-overlapping segments. Let the link flow 
 be represented as follows:  
∑ , , , , , ∀ ∈  (35)
where ,  and ,  are link flow values at endpoints of segment , and ,  and ,  
are convex-combination weights of that segment such that equations (36) and (37) hold. 
, , , ,					∀ ∈ , 1,2, . . ,   (36)
∑ , 1,					∀ ∈   (37)
where 
, , , 0,		 		∀ ∈ , 1,2, . . ,   (38)
θ , ∈ 0,1 ,					∀ ∈ , 1,2, . . ,   (39)
Then, the link travel time function can be replaced by the piecewise linear 
function given in (40).  
. ∑ , , , , , ∀ ∈   (40)
An advantage of this linearization method is that the matrix of coefficients in 
these added constraints (constraints (36)-(39)) is totally unimodular, making it possible 





Given the above mathematical replacements, the nonlinear BEDPs are 
reformulated as SMIPs presented in Table 5-3.  
Table 5-3 BEDPs reformulated as two-stage SMIPs 









































































































   - -   
  * CC: Complementarity Constraints 
5.5. Solution methodology 
The integer L-shaped method, introduced by Laporte and Louveaux (1993), is adopted 
to solve the four variants of the BEDP each having only binary decision variables in 
the first-stage as required by the procedure. This method is exact. It decomposes the 
original program into a master problem and set of subproblems representing second-
stage problems  for each scenario. Let ∈ , ́ ∈ ∪ , ∈ , ∈  represent 
all first-stage variables. The master problem is generally formulated as follows.  
	      (41)
s.t.   
(3-5)   
0 1  (42)






where the objective is to minimize , an approximation of the expectation (maximum) 
of the second-stage objective functions  over all scenarios ∈ Ξ for a general 
stochastic program or in robust optimization. Constraints (42) are relaxations of 
integrality constraints (6) for first-stage variables.  
To solve the master problem, branch-and-bound steps are integrated within the 
procedure to obtain binary solutions at each iteration. The binary variables of these 
solutions are fixed in the subproblems. Optimality cuts (43) are iteratively generated 
and added to the master problem based on solution of the subproblems, creating a 
tighter feasible region. No feasibility cuts are required, since the master problem 
solution is always feasible for the subproblems.  
Let  be the th vector of feasible solutions, i.e. binary solutions from the 
master problem including the sets of 1’s and 0’s: | 1} and |
0}. Valid optimality cuts are generated by (44).  
∑ ∈ ∑ ∈ | | 1 ,  (44)
where | | is the cardinality of the set , and  is a finite lower bound that can be 
set to zero in this problem. A tighter lower bound could significantly improve the 
solution time, however. One suggestion to find a better lower bound is to relax the 
budget constraint and solve the subproblems assuming best-quality shelters are 
constructed in all candidate locations.  
Laporte and Louveaux (1993) proved that cuts given by (44), where 
∈ ,  (i.e. the expectation over second-stage objective functions 





Therefore, cuts (44) can be directly applied to solve both the BEDP-SP-UE and BEDP-
SP-SO. In this work, these cuts are further modified for solving robust optimization 
versions: BEDP-RO-UE and BEDP-RO-SO.  
Proposition 1. Let 
∈
,  be the maximum second-stage 
objective function over all scenarios ∈ Ξ corresponding to first-stage feasible 
solutions . Modified optimality cuts (46) are valid cuts for BEDP-RO-UE and 
BEDP-RO-SO.   
∑ ∈ ∑ ∈ | | 1 .  (45)
  
Proof. The inequality ∑ ∈ ∑ ∈ | | always holds; thus, the right-hand 
side of (46) takes a value less than or equal to . In the extreme case where ∑ ∈
∑ ∈ | |, the right-hand side will be equal to . Therefore, the cuts (45) will 
never eliminate the globally optimal solution, and it is valid to impose them on first-
stage solutions. □  
Note that in numerical experiments described in Section 6, to improve the 
implementation time of the UE-based problems, the corresponding SO-based problems 
were solved first and their objective function values were used as the  in optimality 
cuts (44) and (45). 
The general algorithm of the integer L-shaped method (Laporte and Louveaux 
1993) to solve the BEDPs is presented in the following. Let ̅ be the upper bound of 
the desired stochastic program or robust optimization model , and  be the algorithm 





Step 0: Set	 0, upper bound	 ̅ ∞. The value of  is set to ∞ or other absolute 
lower bound. A pendant node list is created that contains only a single pendant node 
corresponding to the initial subproblem. 
Step 1: Select a pendant node in the list. Stop if the pendant node list is empty.  
Step 2: Set	 1 and solve the current problem. If the problem is infeasible, 
fathom the current node and go to Step 1. Otherwise, let ,  be an optimal 
solution. 
Step 3: Check for integrality. If violated, create two new branches in which the most 
fractional variable is set to 0 or 1. Append the two nodes to the pendant node list and 
go to Step 1. 
Step 4: Given the first-stage solutions , solve the sub-problems ,  for each 
scenario . If the model is a stochastic program, calculate the expectation value over 
all scenarios, 
∈
, . Otherwise, if the model is of robust optimization 
models, calculate the corresponding maximum value over all scenarios, 
∈
, . If ̅, update upper bound ̅ .  
Step 5: If , then fathom the current node and go to Step 1; otherwise, 
impose an optimality cut to the master problem, and return to Step 2. 
5.6. Numerical example 
5.6.1. Network representation 
Numerical experiments were conducted using the design of an actual office building. 





that surround an inner courtyard. In the original design of the building, each wing has 
a core containing a shelter. The layout of the building is illustrated in Fig. 5-2.  
Two exits (E1 and E2) were already included in the initial building design. One 
additional emergency exit (E3) is also considered for incorporation in the design, and 
is represented by dashed lines. Seven locations are taken as candidates to fortify as 
shelters represented by dashed ovals (S1-S7). Four hallways (H1-H4) are already 
included in the building evacuation plan as relatively safe locations for evacuees in case 
of a hazard. One additional hallway, H5, is also considered in this example as a 
candidate for fortification. The network representation includes 75 links, as well as 15 
dummy links that connect the locations of shelters, exits and fortified hallways to the 
supersink node.  
Figure 5-2 Office building layout 
 
40 rooms in the building are considered evacuation origin nodes. The number 
of evacuees in these rooms is estimated based on their maximum occupancies from the 

















Table 5-4 Maximum occupancy of rooms in building 
Room # Max occ. Room # Max occ. Room # Max occ. Room # Max occ. 
1 4 12 6 22 4 39 4 
2 4 13 2 23 5 40 4 
3 2 14 2 24 1 41 4 
4 2 15 4 25 2 42 4 
5 3 16 4 26 4 43 4 
6 5 17 4 27 5 44 4 
7 1 18 4 28 2 45 4 
8 2 19 4 32 5 49 6 
10 4 20 4 33 5 50 6 
Total building occupancy =150 people 
 
5.6.2. Modeling parameters 
In this example, only one fortification or construction type is considered for each 
location in terms of level of protection, cost and capacity. However, the general 
formulation of the optimization model allows different design options to be considered 
for any single location out of which one option can then be selected through the 
optimization. The costs and capacities (in terms of number of evacuees) of the design 
options are given in Table 5-5. These were estimated based on current average 
construction costs. 
Table 5-5 Costs and capacities of design options 
Design option ID Design cost ($) Capacity 
Shelter 
S1 6,700 35 
S2 4,100 15 
S3 5,600 25 
S4 5,000 25 
S5 3,700 15 
S6 3,900 25 
S7 4,100 15 
Unfortified hallway  
H1 - 30 
H2 - 30 
H3 - 30 
H4 - 30 
Hallway fortification H5 3,600 40 






Five disaster scenarios are generated assuming 20% occurrence probability of 
each: one scenario for an external malicious act which is likely to affect the whole 
building equally, and four scenarios for an internal fire in different parts of the building 
(north, south, west, and east). The stochastic nature of these scenarios is captured 
through parameters  and  in the risk exposure function.  represents the 
slope of the risk function line converting the evacuation time through passageways to 
a risk exposure value, and  represents the risk imposed by exiting the building or 
staying in a safe location.  
To quantify the risk to which evacuees are exposed, a range of 0-100 points is 
considered, where 0 indicates no risk exposure and 100 indicates a maximum risk 
exposure (which can be interpreted as a high risk of death). To find risk equivalency of 
evacuation time, it is assumed that the maximum tolerable evacuation times is equal to 
a risk exposure of 100 points and occurs at 120 seconds for an external malicious act 
and 180 seconds for an internal fire. This results in  values of 0.83 (=100/120) and 
0.55 (=100/180), respectively. Moreover, given the range of 0-100, the risk exposure 
of using each individual evacuation option under different hazard types is estimated 
and is given in Table 5-6.  
 
Table 5-6 Scenario-dependent values of parameter  in risk exposure function 
Scenario 
Evacuation option  
Exit Shelter Unfortified hallway Fortified hallway 
External malicious act 100 5 30 10 
Internal fire 0 20 100 40 
 
The travel time function is divided into 20 linear segments with respect to link 
flow, and the function parameters for passageways ∈ ,	  and , are estimated 





passageway lengths, widths, and average speed of evacuees. These are presented in 
Table 5-7. Finally, four budget levels of $0, $7500, $15,000 and $42,000 (a sufficient 
budget for the construction of all the design options) are considered for experimental 
runs. 
 

























1 C 2.5 2 26 C 5.6 2 51 C 4.5 2 
2 C 3.0 2 27 C 2.7 2 52 C 4.3 2 
3 C 2.1 2 28 D 3.1 1 53 C 4.1 2 
4 D 3.1 1 29 C 4.0 3 54 D 4.9 1 
5 C 2.3 2 30 D 9.5 1 55 C 3.6 2 
6 C 2.6 2 31 D 4.1 1 56 C 3.5 2 
7 C 1.7 2 32 D 8.2 1 57 C 3.1 2 
8 C 2.1 2 33 D 6.6 1 58 C 4.7 2 
9 C 2.5 2 34 C 2.3 3 59 D 10.8 1 
10 C 3.2 2 35 D 2.8 1 60 C 0.8 3 
11 C 4.0 2 36 S 4.3 1 61 D 8.5 1 
12 C 4.3 2 37 C 4.6 2 62 D 1.7 1 
13 C 4.4 2 38 C 3.5 2 63 D 3.7 1 
14 C 3.6 2 39 C 3.4 2 64 S 2.4 1 
15 D 5.2 1 40 D 5.6 1 65 D 7.6 1 
16 D 5.6 1 41 S 2.8 1 66 C 3.0 3 
17 C 4.1 2 42 D 3.9 1 67 D 7.0 1 
18 C 4.3 2 43 D 2.1 1 68 D 7.9 1 
19 D 3.7 1 44 D 8.6 1 69 D 3.3 1 
20 C 3.8 2 45 D 2.0 1 70 D 3.9 1 
21 C 2.2 2 46 D 9.8 1 71 S 4.8 1 
22 C 2.4 2 47 D 9.7 1 72 D 3.2 1 
23 C 3.5 2 48 C 20.8 2 73 C 4.2 2 
24 C 3.4 2 49 D 6.4 1 74 C 3.8 2 
25 C 3.5 2 50 C 2.2 2 75 C 3.6 2 
*D=Door, C=Corridor, S=Stairs 
5.6.3. Experimental results 
The SP (BEDP-SP-UE, BEDP-SP-SO) and RO (BEDP-RO-UE and BEDP-RO-SO) 
model results are reported in Tables 5-8 and 5-9, respectively. The RO and SP 
approaches lead to different design solutions. Scenarios with external hazards 





scenarios, the RO design solutions are best, because they target these worst-case 
situations. 
Table 5-8 SP run results 
Problem BEDP-SP-UE BEDP-SP-SO 
Budget ($×1000) 0 7.5 15 42 0 7.5 15 42 
Selected design 
options 
- S7, H5 
S4, S7, 
H5, E3 




Expected risk 61.8 36.7 34.7 26.6 58.3 33.8 31.0 25.8 
Max. risk 66.3 54.6 49.1 32.5 63.7 50.1 41.6 27.7 




Table 5-9 RO run results 
Problem BEDP-RO-UE BEDP-RO-SO 
Budget ($×1000) 0 7.5 15 42 0 7.5 15 42 
Selected design 
options 
- S6, E3 
S4, S5, 
H5, E3 




Expected risk 61.8 45.6 37.1 26.6 58.3 40.0 37.2 25.8 
Max. risk 66.3 53.3 47.5 32.5 63.7 46.5 39.7 27.7 






















As expected, modeling under SO results in slightly lower evacuation risk 
exposure compared to modeling under the UE condition for the same level of budget. 
This is also true in those cases in which the same optimal design solution was identified 
under SO or UE conditions. The difference in objective function values quantifies the 
benefits to the system of enforcing SO-derived routes and shelter/exit assignments. 
With a budget of $15,000, for example, the reduction in expected risk exposure 
achieved by enforcing the SO solution over allowing individuals the freedom to choose 
their own paths is approximately 12%. 
Moreover, the maximum as well as the dispersion of risk data points over all 
scenarios (measured by standard deviation) diminishes through a RO approach. That 
is, RO modeling results in better solutions. Similar reduction in standard deviation is 
noted when comparing implementations with SO and UE conditions. That is, as 
expected, the SO solutions outperform the UE solutions. Of course, their practical 
implementation requires some level of support to ensure that evacuees adhere to 
directives. 
The optimal design solutions were also determined under only internal fire 
scenarios given a budget of $7,500. The corresponding results are reported and 
compared with the design solutions under both internal and external scenarios in Table 
8 and resulting designs are depicted in Table 5-10. Identical solutions are found for SPs 
under UE and SO conditions. However, a design shift is made from fortification of 
hallway 5 to construction of exit 3 for internal only scenarios. Evacuating out of the 
building through an emergency exit is the least desired option under the external 





evacuation from the building will produce best results. Such diametrically opposed 
optimal design solutions highlights the importance of pursuing a multi-hazard 
approach. 
















The mathematical program presented in this chapter allows the identification of 
building design solutions that ensure the safety of evacuees during emergencies. The 
program can be used to investigate different alternatives for the design of shelters, 





exposure of evacuees to risks under various hazard scenarios. This solution requires a 
novel approach that differs from previous studies on building evacuation, which deal 
mainly with the analysis of a predefined building design, as well as previous studies on 
regional evacuation problems, which have focused on the minimization of evacuation 
time for a single type of hazard. The explicit consideration of risk exposure includes 
not only the time evacuees will spend in different locations in the building (which in 
turn depends on the length of the path traveled as well as on  the number of people 
using that path), but also the level of protection from hazards that these locations 
provide. 
This study follows a multi-hazard approach, in which different types of hazards 
are simultaneously taken into account when searching for an optimal solution. This can 
be crucial, since for each type of hazard a different solution may produce the best 
results, but eventually a single design solution must be chosen. All other relevant works 
in the literature consider only a single hazard class. Furthermore, the program allows 
the use of an objective function based on expectation, which gives weight to a range of 
hazard scenarios, or a more conservative RO approach, which focuses on the worst-
case scenario in terms of evacuation risk exposure. 
Finally, the program allows different types of user responses to be considered 
by embedding either SO or UE conditions. The SO approach assumes that evacuees 
will be guided by a trained staff person who is fully informed of the conditions in the 
building. This may be appropriate in certain types of buildings (e.g. train stations), in 
certain circumstances in which a building may be used (e.g. a concert or sporting 





an internal fire). The UE approach assumes that fully informed evacuees will 
themselves choose their evacuation paths and destinations, and that the evacuees have 
full information about their options. This may be appropriate in buildings with which 
the evacuees are highly familiar (e.g. their home or workplace), and for certain types 



















Chapter 6: Travel Time Resilience of Roadway Networks in the 
Presence of Non-recurring Disruptions 
6.1. Introduction 
More than 4 million miles of U.S. public roads serve approximately 90% of passenger 
transport in the country (BTS, 2013). Natural and human-caused hazards threaten this 
roadway network, and the possibility for significant economic loss due to damage to 
this network is significant. Damage caused by Hurricane Irene to the Vermont 
transportation network amounted to $65 million (Lunderville, 2012). The collapse of 
the I-35W Bridge over the Mississippi River interrupted more than 140,000 daily 
vehicular trips causing more than $0.4 million increase in daily passenger trip costs due 
to traffic rerouting (Zhu et al., 2010). The repair and reconstruction costs of 
transportation infrastructure systems after Hurricane Katrina were estimated to have 
exceeded $32 billion (Sundeen and Reed, 2006).  
Transportation infrastructure systems are also attractive targets for malicious 
acts. Recent examples include bombings of passenger rail systems in London (2005), 
Madrid (2004), and Mumbai (2006). Since the 1990s, more than 25% of terrorist 
attacks have either targeted surface transportation systems or used them to provide 
access to other targets (Murray-Tuite, 2008). In addition to resulting physical damage, 
these events have long-term socio-economic and psychological impacts. Furthermore, 
they affect traveler decisions. Gordon et al. (2007) identified a 6% reduction in 
passenger trips and a sizable shift from public transit services to private automobiles 





To prevent significant loss from disaster events, whether caused by a malicious 
act, an accident or technology failure, or nature, the transportation system must be 
resilient, and thus able to cope with disaster impact. Resilience is a measure of a 
network’s ability to absorb disruption consequences (see for example: Bruneau et al., 
2003; Rose, 2004; Sheffi, 2005; Cox et al., 2011; Chen and Miller-Hooks, 2012). 
Faturechi et al. (under review) provide a synthesis of approximately 200 works in the 
literature on resilience and other related measures, including coping capacity, 
robustness, flexibility and recovery, in the context of transportation. In addition to 
works that focus on resilience estimation, there are works that determine optimal pre-
event mitigation or preparedness strategies (Losada et al., 2012), post-event response 
actions (Chen and Miller-Hooks, 2012; Vugrin et al., 2010) or both (Miller-Hooks et 
al., 2012) with the goal of maximizing resilience. A single paradigm for understanding 
and optimizing resilience and related measures that builds on the existence or 
nonexistence of possible actions that can be taken pre- or post-disaster is provided in 
(Faturechi and Miller-Hooks, 2013).  
All prior works related to the maximization of resilience consider only 
applications in which resilience enhancing actions are chosen with the aim of achieving 
a system optimal solution. Such solutions inherently assume that the users of the system 
will follow the system optimal directives. For example, traffic might be centrally 
directed to use predetermined routes seeking a system optimum implementation. This 
is appropriate in many applications, such as in freight networks where the goods to be 
moved are not cognizant. Several relevant works involving network design under 





own decisions regarding their path choice, often with the goal of selfishly maximizing 
their own utility functions. This is discussed in detail in (Nagurney and Qiang 2012). 
These works generally involve a bilevel program structure, where design decisions, 
such as capacity expansion of a network link, are taken at the upper level, while the 
response of travelers to the supply offerings is assessed at the lower level. Supply 
uncertainty typically arises from day-to-day incidents, like traffic accidents, that may 
cause degradation in network performance. The impact of demand uncertainty is 
typically measured through variations in travel speeds and, thus, travel times. Chen et 
al. (2011) provide an extensive review of this literature. 
A few works in the literature employ a similar bilevel structure in addressing 
network design or enhancement problems in the context of disaster mitigation. 
Specifically, these works consider retrofit (Fan and Liu, 2010) and expansion (Lo and 
Tung, 2003; Dimitriou and Stathopoulos, 2008) actions with the aim of reducing the 
impact of potential disaster events on network performance. These works may be 
viewed as seeking to maximize system reliability or robustness through pre-event 
actions. Link capacities are only known with certainty post-disaster, however, these 
works build in the capacity uncertainty within the lower-level problem, where the 
system users take decisions only after the disaster scenario is realized. These earlier 
works suggest the use of inexact solution techniques in which the complicating 
complementarity constraints are relaxed or other heuristics methods. A general 
discussion on the properties of related problem classes and potential solution 





In the earlier works where uncertainty in supply (e.g. link capacities) was 
considered in the lower-level, a UE is determined for each potential event scenario 
given upper-level decisions, and upper-level decisions are taken deterministically. 
Achieving a UE assumes fully-adaptive behavior by system users. The users are 
presumed to have perfect information about the state of the roadway network in 
choosing their paths. In the context of disaster events, this assumption might be valid 
only long after the event’s initial occurrence at which time system users have enough 
information to adapt their travel behavior to the new situation, and a new UE is 
established. However, shortly after the event occurrence, such an assumption is likely 
erroneous. Despite the rich literature on travel behavior, modeling such behavior under 
disruption has received little attention and is conceptually complex (Zhu et al., 2010).  
The subject of this lower-level problem is the period arising shortly after the 
occurrence of a disaster event in which short-term, contingency plans can be 
implemented. According to a user behavior survey of De Palma and Rochat (1999), 
users have high flexibility in their route choice shortly after the occurrence of an event. 
That is, user behavior is characterized as being semi-adaptive given limited 
information, including information on damage and completion of repairs, on network 
conditions (Iida et al., 2000). Thus, the lower-level problem is formulated as a Partial 
UE (PUE) traffic assignment problem. This concept of a PUE was introduced in 
Sumalee and Watling (2008).  
This chapter incorporates user behavior in the measurement and maximization 
of travel time resilience for roadway networks given under a set of possible disaster 





Travel Time Resilience Problem (TTRP)) is formulated as a bilevel, three-stage 
stochastic program with lower-level equilibrium constraints. Both upper- and lower-
level problems involve capacity uncertainty. The upper-level includes a three-stage 
decision making process in which both pre- and post-event resilience enhancing actions 
may be taken. The decision process is informed by information that is revealed at each 
stage, as is compatible with the Disaster Management Life-Cycle (DMLC) (Waugh, 
2000): (1) pre-event expansion and retrofit as mitigation options to enhance the coping 
capacity of the road network, (2) pre-event preparedness where resources are acquired 
and prepositioned shortly in advance of a predicted event occurrence to facilitate 
response actions, and (3) post-event short-term response actions taken post-disaster to 
restore network capacity, minimize the extent of damage, and/or protect the remaining 
facilities. A multi-hazard perspective is taken, whereby actions that may be effective 
in one scenario may be ineffective in another. An exact Progressive Hedging algorithm 
is presented for solution of a single-level equivalent to this bilevel, three-stage 
stochastic program.  
 Whether addressing day-to-day incident-induced traffic congestion or disaster 
events, including pre-event or both pre- and post-event actions for enhancing system 
performance, or employing a UE or PUE, these problems involving uncertainty in 
available system capacity in which user response to network supply decisions is 
captured can be mathematically modeled as Stochastic Mathematical Programs with 
Equilibrium Constraints (SMPECs). Thus, they are a type of Stochastic Network 
Design Problem (SNDP). In addition to its contributions to resilience measurement, 





are its consideration of supply uncertainty in both upper- and lower-level problems, 
incorporation of a three-stage stochastic program in the upper-level to capture key 
relevant DMLC stages, use of a PUE in traffic assignment rather than a UE as is 
appropriate for the disaster-context, and application of cutting-edge linearization 
methodologies for dealing with complementarity constraints and nonlinear, 
nonseparable travel time functions.  
The next section introduces the problem formulation. This is followed by 
description of the solution method in Section 6-3, and application on an illustrative 
example in Section 6-4.  
6.2. Problem formulation 
At the upper level of the proposed TTRP, mitigation, preparedness and response actions 
are chosen with information from the lower level about the resulting total travel time 
for all O-D pairs that can be expected given upper level choices. The upper level acts 
as the leader, determining the optimal supply decisions. The lower level acts as the 
follower, wherein affected system users selfishly determine their paths with knowledge 
of the upper-level decisions. The optimal solution to the bilevel problem results at a 
Stackelberg equilibrium (Gibbons, 1992).  
The upper-level problem is a three-stage stochastic program that accounts for 
the occurrence of one of a set of potential disaster events, as well as the information 
that is revealed about these events and their consequences over time. In the first stage, 
possible disaster events and their consequences are known probabilistically. At the end 
of this stage, after some passage of time, certain attributes of the disaster event may be 





state. Here, this information includes the disaster event type and its temporal and spatial 
properties/distributions. The third information stage arises, revealing a final 
information state, once the event has occurred and quick assessment of the disaster 
region has been completed.  
This information process can be captured through the concept of a scenario tree 
(Table 6-1) within which each node represents an information state and each link 
carries with it the probability of transitioning from one information state to the next 
over time (or stages). Decisions taken at each stage are depicted. The tree, thus, captures 
all possible outcomes, and each path from the root of the tree to a leaf (i.e. from the 
first-stage to the last) gives a possible scenario. Where a finite set of possible disaster 
scenarios is considered, the scenarios can be completely enumerated and are known a 
priori. Notation employed in describing the travel time resilience problem is given 
next, followed by the problem formulation. 
A network representation of the roadway system is exploited. The network’s 
topology is given by , , where  is the set of nodes and  is the set of links. 
Associated with each link is its travel time and capacity limitation, both of which are 
random variables. Network performance is measured under a set of possible disaster 
scenarios, each of which is defined by a disaster event type, affected links and its impact 
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6.2.1. A measure of travel time resilience in roadway networks 
Total travel time, , to serve a given O-D demand is chosen as the system-level 
measure of performance. The disruption profile given in figure 6-1, graphically 
captures the variation of a roadway network’s  over the DMLC, from pre-event 
conditions in which a UE is reached until recovery is complete and a new UE state is 
established given new network conditions. Changes in the network conditions may 
result from long-term activities, such as reconstruction. Users adapt their travel 
behaviors to this new situation, creating a new UE. Immediately after the occurrence 
of a disaster event, i.e. post-event (confusion), capacity is degraded and users may not 
be able to ascertain the disaster’s impact on potential routes. Thus, they may be 
confused or indecisive, creating inefficiencies in the use of a network that is 























































reaching a PUE, as the network capacity is partially restored to a satisfactory level 
through the implementation of short-term repairs, and users have received limited 
information on network conditions and improvements.  
 
Figure 6-1 Travel time disruption profile for passenger traffic in a roadway network, where , , 
and  are the total travel times at the end of the pre-event, confusion, and response stages 
 
Total travel time is employed in assessing resilience, , , under a given 
budget, B, for taking mitigation, preparedness and response actions and given time 
allotted for response action implementation, T. As in equation (1), the reciprocal of 
total travel time achieved in reaching a PUE at the end of the response stage divided by 
the reciprocal of the total travel time achieved in a UE pre-event and pre-action is taken 
to quantify resilience.  
,
	  , 
 , 	
  (1) 
 
6.2.2. Notation 















Sets   
= set of links, a, in the roadway network 
  = set of network nodes, , representing roadway intersections and 
points of demand 
 = set of origin-destination (OD) pairs  
  = set of paths  between OD pair ∈ W 
  = set of disaster types ∈   
  = set of stages, 1,2,3, over which information is gained: 
1 refers to  a pre-event stage where the current state is known 
deterministically, but possible future disaster events in terms 
of type, location and consequences are known only 
probabilistically; 2 refers to a later point in time when the 
event type and location are known deterministically (either 
pre- or post-event), but the impact on the system is unknown, 
and the probability distribution of the event’s potential or 
perceived consequences is updated; and 3 refers to the 
point in time after the event has occurred and all event 
characteristics, as well as the system state, are known 
deterministically.   
 
Modeling parameters 
  = information process capturing the state of knowledge,	 , about 
the system’s current and future states at stage ∈ :  
captures pre-event conditions deterministically and probability 
distributions of future conditions;  specifies event type and 
location, but updates the probability distributions of future 
conditions that are associated with the impact of the event on 
the system;  specifies conditions of the network once the 
event is fully realized. 
 = vector of OD travel demand, … , , …  ∀	 ∈  
  = known vector of pre-event path flows, 
… , , , …  ∀ ∈ , ∈   
,   = known vectors of pre-event link flows and capacities, 
… , , …  and … , , …  
∀ ∈ , respectively  
  = vector of pre-event link travel times, 
… , , …  ∀ ∈ , respectively 
 = vector of post-event link capacities under information state , 
… , , …  ∀ ∈  
∆  = link-path incidence matrix, ∆ ∆ , ,  ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈
 (∆ , , 1 if path ∈  uses link , and = 0 otherwise)  
  = OD pair-path incidence matrix, Λ ,  for ∀ ∈ , ∈
(Λ , 1 if path  connects OD pair  and Λ , 0 
otherwise) 






,  for ∀ ∈ , ∈  ( , 1 if the 
path ∈  is affected given , and , 0 otherwise)
  = disaster type matrix … , , … , where 
1 if when reaching information state  the disaster 
event that has occurred is of type , 0 otherwise 
  = available budget  
  = response time  
 
1st stage variables  
  = vector of first-stage action variables, 
, , ,  where , … , , , …  is 
the vector of link capacity expansion levels ∀	 ∈ , and 
, … , ,
, , …  is the vector of link retrofit 
levels ∀ ∈ , ∈  . Since  is revealed from the start of 
the decision horizon,  is given as  for simplicity. 
 
2nd stage variables  
  = vector of disaster-specific link preparedness (resource 
availability – second stage) action levels given information 
state , … , , , …  ∀ ∈ , ∈  
 
3rd stage variables 
  = vector of disaster-specific link response (third-stage) levels 
under information state , 
… , , , …  ∀ ∈ , ∈   
,   = vectors of post-response link flows and capacities under 
information state , … , , …  and 
… , , …  ∀ ∈ , respectively 
  = vector of post-response link travel time as a function of link 
flow and capacity, … , , … 	∀	 ∈  
  = vector of post-response path flows under information state , 
… , , , …  ∀ ∈ , ∈  
   vector of post-response path travel times under information 
state	 , … , , , …  ∀ ∈ , ∈  
  = vector of post-response shortest travel times under information 







The TTRP formulated as a bi-level, three-stage, stochastic, nonlinear program for 
maximizing travel time resilience of roadway networks is now presented. The program 
involves stochasticity in both upper- and lower-levels.  
Upper-level problem:  
∈
	
∈ , ∈ ,
,    (2)
s.t.  
1 , ∑ ,
,
, , ∀ ∈   
(3)
, , ∀ ∈ , ∈    (4)
∑ , ∑ ,
,
, ,∈∈   (5)
 
In the upper-level formulation, the first-stage feasibility set for mitigation 
actions is given by , , ̅ , , 0 ,
, 1, ∀ ∈ , ∈ 	  with 
,  and ̅ ,  for link a as lower- and upper-bounds on capacity expansion level, 
respectively. The retrofit variable ,
,  sets the desired fortification level for link a for 
each disaster type s. More than one retrofit action can be taken on the same link. ,
,  
ranges between 0 and 1, where ,
, 1 refers to the highest fortification level 
obtainable for link  such that no damage will be incurred as a consequence of the 
occurrence of a disaster of type . The range on second-stage preparedness levels is 
defined by the feasibility set , 0 , 1, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , 
where , 1 means all resources required to repair damage following a disaster 
of type  are provided in advance upon realizing information state . ,





set for information state , where , 1 infers that capacity along link  is 
restored to the pre-event capacity. 
The objective function (2) seeks to maximize the expectation of network 
resilience over all possible scenarios given by each possible information state . The 
numerator of the resilience measure , ,  , , is constant and scenario-
independent, representing UE-based total travel time under pre-event, pre-action 
conditions. Thus, the objective seeks to minimize the post-response expected total 
travel time forming the denominator of , ,  , . Thus, objective 
function (2) can be replaced by equation (6):  
∈
	
∈ , ∈ ,
 ,    (6)
 
Post-response link capacity is defined in equations (3) as a function of the links’ 
pre-action, pre-event capacity, as well as first-stage link expansion and retrofit 
decisions and third-stage link response decisions. The effects of decisions are presumed 
to be linear to the original link capacities. Inclusion of parameter  ensures that 
the effects of specialized link retrofit and response actions have effects that are 
consistent with disaster type s and associated information state . Second-stage link 
preparedness actions do not directly affect link capacity, and are not included in the 
equation. 
Constraints (4) guarantee that, for each information state , all response 
actions that are to be taken are completed before the end of the response period, i.e. by 
time . The budget limitation is assured through constraint (5). Link expansion, retrofit, 





implementation times of constraints (4) are as assumed to be functions of action level 
as described through constraints (7) - (11).  
, ,  , , ∀ ∈  (7) 
,
, 1 ,  ,
,  ,
, , ∀ ∈ , ∈   (8) 




, , , , , 





, , , , , 
∀ ∈ , ∈  
(11)
where ,  and ,
,  are first-stage unit costs of expanding link a or, for a given 
disaster event of type s, retrofitting link a, respectively. The implications for retrofit 
costs of link expansion are captured in constraints (8). In constraints (9), ,  
denotes second-stage unit costs of link preparedness actions for a given disaster event 
of type s and information state . Third-stage unit costs and times required for 
implementing response actions are defined in constraints (10) and (11), respectively. 
Both are functions of response and preparedness levels, wherein the effects of 
preparedness in advance of an event affect the efficiency of post-event response 
actions. , 	 ,  and , 	 ,  are post-disaster (having realized 
information state ) costs [times] of complete reconstruction of link . In the former, 
it is presumed that no preparedness actions were taken, while in the latter all appropriate 
preparedness actions were taken. Thus, cost or time for taking response actions 
accounts for related preparedness actions having been taken. Incurred costs or 





, is included in constraints (9) and (1) to capture the increasing expense and 
effort required to address situations with higher damage levels. 
The link flows needed to compute the objective function of the upper-level 
problem are determined through solution of the lower-level problem (12) for each 
information state . The lower-level problem seeks a flow pattern that achieves a PUE 
given actions taken in solution of the upper-level problem. In a PUE, user behavior is 
characterized as semi-adaptive and assumes that only those who are affected are likely 
to reconsider their original route decisions. 
Lower-level problem:  
∈
∑ , ,  (12) 
 
where Ω | ∆ ∆ diag , diag ,
, 0  is a feasibility vector set of post-response link flows in which the diagonal 
matrix diag
⋱ 0 0
0 , 3 0
0 0 ⋱




 is the 
identity matrix of the same size. The formulation is path-based and is adapted from 
(Sumalee and Watling (2008). The equation ∆ ∆ diag , 
where diag , defines the link flow as the summation of the post-
response flows of affected paths using that link, as well as the pre-event flows of 
unaffected paths. That is the summation of post-response flows on affected paths 
between an OD pair  equals the total pre-event flow between that OD pair. Note that 
presuming the traffic demand adjusts to pre-event pattern in spite of unrepaired damage 
(Iida et al., 2000), a fixed demand vector, … , , …  for ∀ ∈  is assigned to 





6.3. Solving the TTRP 
The bilevel TTRP (2)-(12) is solved by first reducing it to a single-level problem as is 
often done in the literature. To accomplish this, the lower-level problem is eliminated 
and corresponding Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions are embedded within the 
upper-level problem. Larsson and Patriksson (1995) showed, in a similar context 
involving a bilevel program with a UE in the lower level, that use of the KKT 
conditions in place of the lower-level problem is both necessary and sufficient for 
optimality. Their proof can be directly extended to this application. 
The resulting single-level program is a three-stage stochastic program with 
nonlinear objective and constraints, e.g. complementarity constraints. Obtaining a 
globally optimal solution to such a program is formidable. Thus, linear approximations 
are employed. 
Complementarity constraints are transformed into mixed integer constraints 
through Schur’s decomposition (Horn and Johnson, 1985) using Special Ordered Sets 
of Type 1 (SOS1) variables (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2013). SOS1 variables are defined 
as a set of variables at most one of which can be non-zero. That is, they are employed 
to mathematically capture the “if-then” condition in UE constraints implying that a path 
can take flow only if it is the shortest path. Alternative methods use a disjunctive 
constraint approach (e.g. Wang and Lo (2010)), employing binary variables and 
exploiting the global optimality of MILP solutions. This type of approach requires 
extensive computational resources. Moreover, the corresponding solutions are highly 






Moreover, cutting-edge linearization techniques from Vielma and Nemhauser 
(2011) are employed to handle non-separable continuous travel time functions, as well 
as nonlinear design decision terms. These transformations are described in the next two 
subsections. They lead to a single-level, three-stage Stochastic Mixed Integer Linear 
Problem (SMILP). An exact solution technique based on concepts of the Progressive 
Hedging Algorithm (PHA) initially introduced in (Rockefeller and Wets, 1991) is 
presented in Subsection 6.3.3. 
6.3.1. Single-level TTRP 
The single-level problem can be formulated encompassing the upper-level problem 
with addition of the UE constraints (14) and (15) given the feasibility set Ω  
representing the lower-level problem:  
∈
	
∈ , ∈ , , ∈




0  (15) 
 
where, ∆ … , , , … , is the vector of post-response path 
travel time, and … , , …  is the vector of post-response shortest path, 
for ∀ ∈ , ∈  given information state . The resulting problem is a three-stage, 
nonlinear, nonconvex stochastic problem. 
6.3.2. Linear approximations 





The approach for transforming complementarity constraints with linear components 
into an equivalent set of linear constraints using Schur’s decomposition and SOS1 
variables introduced in (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2013) is employed here for handling the 
UE constraints (14). Specific to the TTRP, this decomposition of constraints (14) is 





where  and  are Schur’s decomposition vector functions. Since 
, 0, 0. Thus, only the positive square root of 
∙  is feasible and bilinear constraints (18) can be reformulated as in (19).  
| | 0  (19) 
To eliminate the absolute value function, | |, constraints (19) are 
transformed through the introduction of SOS1 variables  and . 
0.  (20) 
 
 b) Objective function  
The objective (13) of the TTRP seeks to minimize the expectation of total travel time 
incurred along the shortest time paths over all O-D pairs. The objective requires the 
multiple of flow and travel time variables, and thus, is nonlinear. A technique for 
linearizing the objective function introduced by Wang and Lo (2010) is employed. This 





under UE conditions. Given fixed demand vector, … , , … , and information 
state , objective (13) can be replaced by (21). 
∈
	
∈ , ∈ , , ∈
 ,   (21)
  
c) Link travel time function  
The link travel time is estimated using the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) function 
(equation (22)). Given post-response link flow and capacity random variables, for a 
given link ∈  this function is a two-dimensional, nonseparable function. 
, ∈    (22)
where  is the link free flow travel time, and  and  are BPR function 
parameters (herein, 0.15, and 4). In this chapter, a novel logarithmic 
piecewise linearization technique introduced by Vielma and Nemhauser (2011) for 
general multidimentional functions is applied herein in linearizing this link travel time 
function. It has been shown to outperform other existing piecewise linearization 
techniques (Vielma et al., 2010). The following describes the application of this 
technique for the TTRP. 
Using this method, link flow and capacity variable domains are partitioned into 
segments. The travel time domain is thus defined by a two-dimensional flow-capacity 
domain. In general, any point in an -dimensional domain can be uniquely represented 
by a convex combination of  +1 points (Carathéodory, 1911). For two-dimensions, 
three points, thus, are required, and therefore, the link travel time domain can be 





 Any flow-capacity pair falls within a single triangle and is given by a convex 
combination of the associated triangle’s corner-point coordinates. The link travel time 
values associated with the corner-points are directly calculated using equation (29). 
Vielma and Nemhauser’s (2011) method identifies the active triangle containing the 
flow-capacity pair under consideration, and approximates the corresponding travel time 
through the convex combination of the travel time values at the corner-points of this 
active triangle. Binary variables and constraints are introduced to determine the active 
triangle. The number of variables and constraints is logarithmic in the number of 
segments, and the active triangle is determined through a binary branching scheme of 
a logarithmic depth in three steps. 
Let  and  be represented by the vector of segments 
… , , , …  and … , , , … , for ∀ , ∈ 0,1, … , , respectively, where  
is a power of two. The domain of the corresponding travel time function will be 0,  
with the segments represented within the matrix … , , , , , … , for	∀ ∈ . 
This domain is triangulated using the  Union Jack triangulation approach (originally 
proposed by Todd (1977)).  
Figure 6-1 graphically depicts the  Union Jack triangulation of the two-
dimensional domain of the link travel time where the domain 0,  is covered by 
copies of a 2×2 size square (highlighted in Figure 6-1), each encompassing 8 triangles. 
The entire domain is partitioned into 2  triangles, accordingly. As shown in Figure 
6-2, there are groups of white and gray triangles such that each square contains one 






Figure 6-2  Union Jack triangulation of link travel time domain 
 and  are formulated as convex piecewise-linear functions of ,  
and ,  points, respectively, in equations (23)-(26).  
∑ ,, ∈ , , , ∀ ∈   (23) 
∑ , , ,, ∈ , ∀ ∈   (24) 
∑ , , 1, ∈ , ∀ ∈   (25) 
, , 0,			∀ ∈ , , ∈  (26) 
where , ,  are convex combination weights under information state . 
Accordingly,   
∑ , , , , ,, ∈ , , , 0. . (27) 
In the first step, an independent SOS1 type branching is employed to select the 
active column of 1×1 size squares containing the active triangle. Let 1,… ,  be 
the set of columns in the link travel time domain for ∈ . A corresponding set is 
defined as 1,… , log  containing a logarithmic number of columns. Let 
: → 0,1  be a general bijective function with special structure such that 
 and 1  are allowed to be different in at most one vector element for ∀ ∈
 
,     
,  
,        
,       
















\ . Let  be the support of vector . SOS1 type branching is implemented 
on the logarithmic set  to find the active column. 
∑ ∑ , ,∈ , ,∈ , , ∀ ∈ , ∈   
(28) ∑ ∑ , ,∈ , ,∈ 1 , , ∀ ∈ , ∈    
, ∈ 0,1 ,			∀ ∈ , ∈ , 
where , , ∈ : ∀ ∈ , ∈  and , , ∈
: ∀ ∈ , ∉ . Next, a similar SOS1 type branching is employed to 
select the active row of 1×1 size squares which contains the active triangle.  
∑ ∑ , ,∈ , ,∈ , , ∀ ∈ , ∈   
(29) ∑ ∑ , ,∈ , ,∈ 1 , , ∀ ∈ , ∈    
, ∈ 0,1 ,			∀ ∈ , ∈  
Given a square (i.e. equal number of columns and rows) in the link travel time 
domain 1,… , ,	 ∈ , can also be used to represent the rows. The active 
square is, thus, determined through the selection of active columns and rows.  
In the final step, the active triangle is determined. A single binary variable, 
, for ∈ , is introduced in the following constraints to identify the color (grey 
or white) of the active triangle ( 1 if the active triangle is white, and 
0, otherwise).  
∑ ∑ , ,∈∈ , ∀ ∈      
(30) ∑ ∑ , ,∈∈ 1 , ∀ ∈   
∈ 0,1 ,			∀ ∈  
where 0,2, … , ⊂  and 1,3, … , 1 ⊂  are subsets of even and 
odd elements of , ∀ ∈ , respectively.  
A schematic of the logarithmic three-step process for selecting the active 
triangle in a general travel time domain is given in Figure 6-3. Suppose that each axis 
is partitioned into two segments; that is, the domain contains 8 2 2 ) triangles 





The gray triangle P is targeted as the active one. One binary variable (=log 2) is 
introduced to select the active column, , and another one to select the active row,	 . 
Binary variable, , is added and determines the triangle’s color. First, the active 
column is selected by setting 0. Setting 0 in the second step, the active row 
is determined that when coupled with the first step column selection reveals the active 
square.  
Finally, 0 indicates the gray color of the active triangle and distinguishes 
it for the other white triangle in the active square. Note that the black areas in this figure 
indicate the union of triangles forbidden to be selected in the process based on the 
setting of the corresponding binary variables. 
 
Figure 6-3 The schematic of the three-step process of active triangle selection in Vielma and 
Nemhauser (2011)’s logarithmic piecewise linearization method 
Having  as a power of two involves no loss of generality. One might define 

















(a) Selection of active 
column 
(b) Selection of active row (c) Selection of active 





generally partitioned into  and , respectively, with the following extra constraints 
for ∀ ∈ : 
∑ ∑ , ,
,,
0, ∀ ∈ .	      (31) 
 
 d) Design decision terms  
There are bilinear action level terms , ∙ ,
,  and , ∙ ,  in post-response link 
capacity equations (3) and link retrofit cost equations (8), as well as trilinear terms , ∙
, ∙ ,  expressed in response action time and cost equations (10)-(11).  
The bilinear terms are approximated using the LP relaxation of their convex 
envelops introduced by McCormick (1976). Let first-stage variable ,
, ∙ ,
,  
and third-stage variable ,
, ∙ ,  ∀ ∈ , ∈ . The convex 
relaxation of the first bilinear terms is implemented through change of variables in (3) 
and (8), and addition of constraints (32) as the outer-approximation of the rectangular 
feasible region , , ̅ , ,
, , ̅ ,
,  giving upper and lower bounds on ,  and 
,
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, , ∀ ∈ , ∈  
 
Given boundaries , , ̅ ,  and 0 ,
, 1, constraints (32) are 





















, , , , ∀ ∈ , ∈  
 
Similarly, , , ̅ ,  and 0 , 1 produces constraints (34).  
,
,
, ,			∀ ∈ , ∈  
(34) ,
̅ , ,
, ̅ , , ∀ ∈ , ∈  
, ̅
,




, , , ∀ ∈ , ∈  
 
A generalization of McCormick’s relaxation method was proposed by Misener 
and Floudas (1995) for trilinear terms. Their generalized convex envelops are used to 
linearize trilinear terms , ∙ , ∙ , . Let ,
, ∙ , ∙
, , ∀ ∈ , ∈  and replace the trilinear term in constraints (10)-(11) through a 
change of variables. Given , , ̅ , , 0 , 1, and 0 ,
1, additional constraints (35) are introduced. 
, 0,			∀ ∈ , ∈  
(35) 
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, , ∀ ∈ , ∈  
 
The original TTRP (2)-(12), a 3-stage SMPEC, is transformed into an 




∈ , ∈ , , ∈
 ,     
(36) 
s.t. 
(a) three-stage action decision constraints (3)-(5) 
(b) UE constraints (20)  





(d) LP relaxation of bilinear and trilinear action level terms (33)-(35)} 
6.3.3. Progressive hedging algorithm (PHA) 
Problem (36) contains pure continuous first- and second-stage variables and mixed 
integer third-stage variables. Benders-based decomposition methods, e.g. 
Disjunctive Decomposition-based branch-and-cut (D2-BAC) approach by Sen and 
Sherali (2006), are computationally intensive, and the Lagrangian-based 
decomposition method by Caroe and Schultz (1999) which might ordinarily be 
applicable will not guarantee a globally optimal solution for this problem class. Thus, 
an exact solution method that is based on concepts of progressive hedging (Rockefeller 
and Wets, 1991) is presented. This method decomposes the problem by scenario using 
Lagrangian decomposition.  It is particularly attractive here, because it guarantees 
global optimality for problems with pure continuous first- and second-stage variables; 
convexity is not required.  
In this approach, first- and second-stage variables,  and , are converted 
into third-stage scenario-dependent variables,	  and , respectively. This 
allows decomposition of the problem by third-stage information states (i.e. scenarios). 
The following non-anticipativity constraints are added to force  to take a single 
value  over all third-stage information states, , and to force   to take identical 
values  over those third-stage information states with identical type and spatial 









The PHA solves each scenario-specific problem (39) separately wherein non-
anticipativity constraints are relaxed. 




(a) three-stage action decision constraints (3)-(5) 
(b) UE constraints (20)  
(c) Link travel time function linearization constraints (23)-(30) 
(d) LP relaxation of bilinear and trilinear action level terms (33)-(35)} 
 
 If non-anticipativity constraints (37) and (38) are met, identical solutions for 
all first- and second-stage variables regardless of the information state  will be 
guaranteed and the problem is solved. However, this is rarely the case. If all first-stage 
variables are equal, then they are also equal to their expected value. Similarly for 
second-stage variables. Given the solutions of (39) for all scenarios , the expected 
values of first- and second-stage variables are computed:  and 
, respectively. The deviation in their values from the expected 
value is measured. The optimal solution is obtained when the values converge to the 
expected value: ‖ ‖, ‖ ‖ , where  is a small number 
representing the convergence factor.  In future iterations, the relaxed anticipativity 
constraints are penalized in the objective function through Lagrangian relaxation. This 
objective function is given in (40). 
∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈
 ,   , 
 ,  ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖   
(40) 
   
where  and  are the vectors of dual variables corresponding to non-
anticipativity constraints (37)-(38), and 0 is a penalty parameter. The quadratic 





solution process. Thus, these terms are replaced by related absolute terms 
| | and | |. These absolute terms are piecewise linear and 
can be expressed through the introduction of pairs of continuous nonnegative variable 
vectors:   and , and  and , respectively. Consequently, the 
objective function (40) is replaced by (41), a linear function.  
∈ , ∈ , ∈ , ∈
 ,   , 
 ,    
(41) 
 
Thus problem (39) is given with its new objective function (41) and the 




At each iteration	 , the expected values of first- and second-stage variables are 
updated given the new solutions. The penalization terms  and  are revised 




An overview of the PHA is depicted in the flowchart of Figure 6-4. Global 
convergence of the proposed PHA in finite time is assured. A proof is given in 
(Rockefeller and Wets, 1991) for similar two-stage problems with pure continuous 








Figure 6-4 The PHA flowchart 
 
6.4. Numerical experiment 
The model and solution method are illustrated on a test network from (Suwansirikul et 
al., 1987). This network has 6 nodes and 16 links as shown in Figure 6-5 and has been 
used for similar purposes in many works (e.g. Li et al., 2012).  
   
Figure 6-5 Test network (Suwansirikul et al., 1987) 
 
The network is presumed to represent a roadway with highway bridges given 





Solve each scenario w/o penalization 
, 0  
Calculate expected values of 1st-stage variables 
,   
‖ ‖, ‖ ‖ ? 
Yes 
No

























demand is reported in Table 6-2. The network data, including the values of link travel 
time function parameters from equation (22) are given in Table 6-3, and are identical 
to values suggested in (Suwansirikul et al., 1987). It is presumed that 4 for all 
links.  
 
Table 6-2 The values of link travel time function parameters 
OD ID  Origin Destination Travel demand  
1 1 6 10  
2 6 1 20  
3 4 1 5  
4 6 2 10  
 
 
Table 6-3 The values of link travel time function parameters 
Link ID Link type    
1 Roadway 1 10 3 
2 Bridge   2 5 10 
3 Roadway 3 3 9 
4 Roadway 4 20 4 
5 Bridge 5 50 3 
6 Bridge 2 20 2 
7 Roadway 1 10 1 
8 Roadway 1 1 10 
9 Bridge 2 8 45 
10 Roadway 3 3 3 
11 Roadway 9 2 2 
12 Roadway 4 10 6 
13 Roadway 4 25 44 
14 Roadway 2 33 20 
15 Roadway 5 5 1 
16 Roadway 6 1 4.5 
 
Three disaster categories (earthquake (s=1), flood (s=2) and malicious 
acts(s=3)) are considered in the numerical experiments. A specialized version of Monte 
Carlo simulation by Chang et al. (1994) is employed to generate disaster scenarios 
while addressing spatial dependencies that relate to each hazard (see Chen and Miller-





are generated corresponding to each disaster type to capture possible consequences in 
terms of the level of damage to network links, i.e. 90 scenarios in all.    
All network links except for bridges are candidates for capacity expansion with 
lower and upper bounds of 0 and 10 units, respectively. The bridge links (2, 5, 6 and 9) 
can be retrofitted for protection against earthquakes or specific malicious acts. Links 
10, 11 and 13-16 at the eastern end of the network may be subject to flooding, and are 
candidates for related mitigation actions. Second-stage preparedness decisions are 
considered when flooding is predicted. When the event relates to an earthquake or 
malicious act, no preparedness actions will be available in this stage. Finally, response 
actions are considered as options for restoring capacity of all network links that may 
be affected by any disaster type. The unit action costs as well as unit implementation 
times of response actions are given in Table 6-4.   
Table 6-4 Unit cost of actions 
Link 
ID  
 Actions  
 
Expansion 




,  ,  ,  ,  , ,  , 	 ,  , 	 ,  
1 2 - - - - - - 3.5 (7) - - 
2 -   6 - 2 - - - 5.5 (11) - 4 (8) 
3 5 - - - - - - 8 (16) - - 
4 4 - - - - - - 7 (14) - - 
5 - 8 - 2 - - - 5 (10) - 3 (6) 
6 - 6 - 2 - - - 5 (10) - 3 (6) 
7 4 - - - - - - 4.5 (9) - - 
8 3 - - - - - - 4 (8) - - 
9 - 8 - 2 - - - 6 (12) - 4 (8) 
10 5 - 3 - - 0.5 - 6.5 (13) 4.5 (9) - 
11 6 - 3.5 - - 0.5 - 10 (20) 7.5 (15) - 
12 8 - - - - - - 12 (24) - - 
13 5 - 4 - - 0.5 - 6 (12) 5 (10) - 
14 3 - 2 - - 0.5 - 5.5 (11) 3.5 (7) - 
15 6 - 4 - - 0.5 - 7.5 (15) 5 (10) - 
16 1 - 2 - - 0.5 - 2.5 (5) 1.5 (3) - 
*Note that the perfect preparedness in advance is presumed to reduce response cost (implementation 






Resilience indifference curves resulting from solution of this problem instance 
for different combinations of limited budget  and response time  are provided in 
Figure 6-6. As depicted in this figure, resilience is generally more sensitive to budget 
than to response time. However, when response times are short, resilience is almost 
unaffected by budget level. Likewise, when the budget is small, resilience is almost 
unaffected by a response time increase. In the former case, this is because time available 
to take action is too restrictive regardless of budget level. In the latter case, funds are 
unavailable to take additional actions.  
Figure 6-6 Resilience indifferent curves for the numerical experiment 
 
Detailed results are given through plotting the cumulative distribution of 
network resilience in Fig. 6-7 for three sample strategies: , 0,0 , ,
3,0 , and , 3,3 . Each point in Fig. 6-7 represents the network resilience 
under a particular scenario, called point resilience. This concept with respect to 











Figure 6-7 Cumulative distribution function of point resilience  
 
This figure illustrates that the range and variance of the distribution decreases 
with larger budget and response time. Moreover, the resilience under the worst-case 
scenario, which occurs at the lowest probability level for each data set, improves with 
increasing budget and response time. For example, given , 0,0 , the range of 
resilience values is between 0.12 and 1, while with subsequent increases in budget and 
response time in strategy , 3,3 , the range reduces to between 0.56 and 1.  
Additional runs were conducted assuming a UE could be achieved post-event 
and after the response time has elapsed. Results of these runs are compared in Figure 
6-8 with those assuming only a PUE is obtained. From this comparison of results, it is 
seen that the expected total travel time (the numerator of the resilience measure) is 
slightly larger under a UE than under a PUE. Through further investigation into the 
results, it was found that for results from individual sampled scenarios, response actions 






















a PUE, the target of the response was on only impacted arcs, while under the UE 
assumption, unaffected arcs were also improved. 
 
   
Figure 6-8 The network’s total travel time under UE and PUE  
 
6.5. Conclusions 
This chapter proposes a novel stochastic network design formulation for maximizing 
travel time resilience for roadway networks. In particular, it targets freeway networks. 
The problem explicitly addresses the first three stages of the decision processes of the 
disaster management life cycle, specifically pre-event mitigation and preparedness, and 
post-event response. Decisions are taken at each stage based upon the evolution of 
uncertainty over the stages. The problem is formulated as a bilevel stochastic 
mathematical program with user equilibrium constraints. The three-stage decision 
process is embedded within the upper-level problem and user response to the upper-
level decisions is modeled in the lower-level problem.  
This problem differs from previous studies on stochastic transportation network 
design in which supply uncertainty is explicitly modeled in that these prior works have 
primarily addressed long-term mitigation planning applications. In these applications, 
















this application where this behavior seeks travel time estimates for the period 
immediately following a disaster and some quick response actions, a PUE is proposed. 
The PUE accounts for route choice decisions taken by the system users assuming that 
only affected users will have information on the disaster event’s impacts and even these 
users will have limited information on network damage and repairs.  
A multi-hazard approach is employed, and decisions are disaster event-
dependent. Thus, mitigation actions may target different hazard scenarios even before 
the hazard event type is known. In fact, the model accounts for the varying benefits of 
any such action under different hazard classes. Preparedness decisions are taken only 
once the hazard class is known, but the specific event realization is uncertain. Response 
actions are designed for specific disaster event scenarios and are determined once the 












Chapter 7: Conclusions and Extensions 
7.1. Conclusions 
 
This dissertation provided a general mathematical framework to protect transportation 
infrastructure systems in the presence of uncertain events with the potential to reduce 
system capacity/performance. The framework defined a number of disaster measures 
and clarified their boundaries and possible overlaps. These measures include, coping 
capacity, preparedness, robustness, flexibility, recovery capacity, and resilience. A 
single, general decision-support optimization model was formulated as a multi-stage 
stochastic program and captures the uncertain nature of disasters and their 
consequences. It seeks an optimal sequence of decisions over time based upon the 
realization of random events in each time stage. Exact (or approximate) solution 
methodologies based on concepts of decomposition, simulation, and cutting-edge 
linear approximation methods were presented for use in evaluating system performance 
in terms of these measures as well as optimally allocating the limited resources to 
mitigation, preparedness and response options.  
This dissertation addressed three problems to demonstrate the application of the 
IPP in different transportation environments with emphasis on resilience and 
robustness: Airport Resilience Problem (ARP), Building Evacuation Design Problem 
(BEDP), and Travel Time Resilience in Roadways (TTR). These problems aimed at 
identifying opportunities to support system performance measurement, operational 
decision-making, preparedness planning, and immediate post-disaster actions, given 





system operators were discussed in detail in Chapters 3 through 6, including, for 
example, the tool’s utility in suggesting equipment to have at the ready and identifying 
the critical system components for prioritizing future facility developments. 
The first problem, ARP, was formulated as a stochastic, integer program with 
recourse seeking to measure and optimize the resilience of airport runway and taxiway 
pavement networks under multiple potential damage-meteorological scenarios. The 
mathematical model and solution methodology were embedded within a decision 
support tool, along with a scenario generator for multiple hazard classes. The BEDP 
was formulated as a bilevel stochastic integer program with UE constraints for the 
robust design of shelters, fortified hallways and exits in buildings, and permited exact 
solution that minimizes the exposure of evacuees to risks under various hazard 
scenarios. Variants of the model involved both stochastic programming and robust 
optimization concepts under both user equilibrium and system optimal conditions, 
coupled with a multi-hazard approach to examine designs given various possible future 
emergency scenarios. Both the ARP and BEDP include binary first-stage and mixed 
integer second-stage variables, and the integer L-shaped decomposition was adapted to 
solve them. 
Finally, the TTRP was formulated as a bilevel three-stage stochastic program. 
The upper-level problem included a three-stage decision on pre-event mitigation and 
preparedness, and post-event response, based upon information that is revealed at each 
stage. A specialized user equilibrium, PUE, was presented in the lower level to capture 
users’ semi-adaptive behavior shortly after the event occurrence when short-term 





network damage and completion of repairs. An approximation approach was presented 
involving an efficient piecewise linearization technique to address PUE constraints, 
and an exact solution algorithm was proposed based on concepts of progressive 
hedging for solution of the sequence of decisions over the three stages. 
Numerical experiments were concluded on network representations of a United 
States rail-based intermodal container network, the LaGuardia Airport taxiway/runway 
pavement network, a single-story office building, and a small roadway network. The 
results illustrate the application of the proposed exact (approximate) solution 
techniques to solve small- and moderate-size problems to global optimality.  
7.2. Extensions 
A general mathematical framework along with three specialized problems, ARP, 
BEDP, and TTRP, have been addressed in this dissertation with emphasis on presenting 
exact solution techniques. These problems are all NP-hard. While potential application 
of these methods has been demonstrated, one might use the mechanism of the presented 
exact solution techniques to develop efficient heuristics for solving real-world size 
problems, particularly if decision makers need to make urgent decisions on post-
disaster contingency plans. This research can be extended in several directions. 
Directions for future research are discussed in following section.  
7.2.1. General IPP 
The proposed IPP formulation has as its objective the maximization of system 
performance given budget and recovery period limitations. Alternative formulations 





Likewise, the recovery period duration can be minimized under performance and 
budget limitations. While either budget or recovery period parameters would become 
decision variables, program properties of convexity, linearity and separability would 
be unchanged. Thus, applicability of discussed solution methodologies would persist.  
Additionally, for some applications, where a fixed number of actions or 
combinations of actions are to be considered, a discrete representation of the decision 
space might be required. In this case, formulation IPP would require integrality 
constraints and other adaptations. Appropriate solution methodologies would be 
needed. The conceptual framework, however, is developed in a general way and can 
be exploited regardless of the nature of action levels, whether discrete or continuous. 
For applications where the implementation time depends on the price one is 
willing to pay, budget-related equations will need to incorporate cost-related decision 
variables. Period performance measures may be useful in operational decision-making, 
where it is necessary to schedule response actions required to restore system 
performance and benefits can be derived from early improvements or outperforming 
level-of service constraints. Consider IPP-T in which maximum throughput is sought 
through a freight rail network. To encourage solutions that also seek universally 
maximum throughput levels (i.e. throughput levels that are maximal at each point in 
time), problem dynamics must be explicitly considered. This is the subject of future 
work. Finally, it should be noted that concepts given herein provide only one approach 
to thinking about resilience and other related measures in a consistent framework. Other 





divided into resistance, i.e. the ability to endure when confronted by a stressor, and 
excess, i.e. the ability to respond to and absorb disruption impacts within the IPF. 
7.2.2. ARP 
Several assumptions were made in creating the ARP and solution methodology. It was 
presumed that those resources procured in the preparedness stage will be available for 
recovery and, thus, these resources will not be affected by the damage event. 
Additionally, benefits derived from specific ordering of repair actions, and possible 
precedence requirements, were not accounted for in the model. Further assumptions 
related to homogeneity in runway and taxiway materials were made. When multiple 
locations require similar equipment to complete a repair task, that setup times at the 
additional sites may be significantly reduced is not addressed. Likewise, the cost and/or 
time associated with the reconfiguration of runway direction in response to damage 
events is not included. This work can be extended to address many of these limitations. 
To assess the impact on airport pavement network resilience of large infrastructure 
enhancement projects, the model can be run multiple times, each time using a network 
topology consistent with the capital investment strategy. Given customer demand 
forecasts, the return on investment can be analyzed by comparison of the results. On a 
final note, while the tool was designed for civilian applications, the model can also be 
applied for military use, where decisions related to RRR and MOS need systematic and 
methodical support.  
An alternative and more conservative modeling approach based on concepts of 
robust optimization might be considered. With such an approach, one would seek to 





would be maintained; however, in place of the maximum expected flow over all 
scenarios, the maximum total flow under the scenario leading to the worst performance 
would be sought. This results in a stochastic program with deterministic objective 
function that takes a max-min form. The advantage of such a methodology is that 
scenario occurrence probabilities need not be known. Such an approach was developed 
and applied to the case study. For all tested combinations of Tmax and budget, the 
resulting resilience level was zero, however. This will arise with such an approach 
when even only one extreme scenario exists in which no demand can be met through 
repair actions taken within given budget and time limitations. Thus, such a conservative 
approach is limited in its general utility. Its application further demonstrates that 
concentrating all internal and external resources on improving conditions for the worst-
case scenario may lead to insignificant improvements for the specific worst-case 
scenario and general performance. 
7.2.3. BEDP 
Though the presented BEDP is appropriate for supporting the design of buildings, an 
implementation of the UE approach for the actual management of evacuation events 
would require the development of a dynamic model in which link travel times are 
continuously reassessed, and of a sensor-based system that can capture in detail the 
movements of evacuees and provide in real-time information to each evacuee.  
An implementation of the program in a case study of a geographical evacuation 
problem is planned as well. The use of a program that minimizes the exposure of 
evacuees to risk, through an explicit consideration of the level of protection that 





previous geographical evacuation models that did not address such an objective. For 
example, in a flooding scenario, the risks of using different evacuation routes, 
depending on their location and elevation, can be considered when planning the 
location of emergency shelters. 
Additional extensions may be desirable. For example, shelter capacities may be 
uncertain due to their multi-purpose use. That is, a shelter may be used for a community 
activity and, thus, filled to capacity at the time it is needed. Heterogeneity in the 
evacuee population is ignored herein. However, some evacuees may move more 
quickly than others. Some evacuees may put more weight on risk exposure from 
traveling in the corridors versus waiting for help in a shelter than other evacuees. 
Moreover, risk perception may vary by evacuee and may be imperfect. Thus, 
alternative models for handling risk may be appropriate. Individualized risk functions 
may be warranted, and a stochastic UE may be beneficial. 
7.2.4. TTRP 
A A number of assumptions were made in development of the TTRP that can be 
addressed in the future extensions. First, the proposed stochastic problem addressed 
exogenous uncertainties, where disaster event scenarios are generated independent 
from the decision process. In this study, the mitigation actions, particularly network 
link retrofit actions, are assumed to only impact disaster consequences in terms of the 
level of damage to the link and not the disaster probability. As an extension, one might 
model endogenous uncertainties in which scenario probabilities are updated based on 
decisions made at each information state. Secondly, only network supply/capacity 





fixed and identical to the original pattern pre-event. Additionally, only travel time was 
considered in modeling user behavior. In reality, other factors, such as safety might 
also play a role in the route choice of the users, particularly under disaster events. It 
was assumed that all affected users are homogenous with respect to the evaluation 
function (a utility function) used in route selection in obtaining a PUE. Moreover, it 
was assumed that the users have perfect information on the damaged and repaired 
network links, and that they make decisions on their routes with the aim of selfishly 
minimizing their travel time. Alternative models may be of interest to capture 
uncertainty in user perception, heterogeneity in user route choice and other factors 
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